United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission - Protecting People and the Environment


ACCESSION #: 9808170270







RG and E



ROCHESTER GAS AND ELECTRIC CORPORATION o 89 EAST AVENUE,

ROCHESTER, N.Y. 14649-0001

AREA CODE 776-546-2700



ROBERT C.  MECREDY

Vice President

Nuclear Operation

                                                  August 12, 1998



U.S.  Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Operations Center

Facsimile Number 301-816-5151

Telephone Number 301-816-5100



Subject:  Initial Notification of 10 CFR Part 21 Defect

          R.E.  Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

          Docket No.  50-244



In accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Reporting of Defects and Noncompliance,

Section 21 (d) (3) (i), which requires "Initial notification by facsimile",

the enclosed initial notification is provided.  Written notification, in

accordance with 10 CFR Part 21, Section 21 (d) (3) (ii), will be provided

by September 11, 1998.



                                                        Very truly yours,



                                                       Robert C.  Mecredy

Enclosures

                                                          Terry A.  White

                                                      Manager, Operations



                                   Rochester Gas and Electric Corporation

                                        R.  E.  Ginna Nuclear Power Plant

                                                           1503 Lake Road

                                                      Ontario, N.Y. 14519



                                                    Phone: (716) 771-3667

                                                      Fax: (716) 771-3901



                                        email: Terry_White@dgmail.rge.com



                                                                   Page 1

10CFR21 INITIAL FACSIMILE NOTIFICATION



I.        NAME AND ADDRESS OF THE INDIVIDUAL INFORMING THE COMMISSION:



     NAME:     Robert C.  Mecredy

               Vice President Nuclear Operations Group

     ADDRESS:  Rochester Gas & Electric Corporation

               89 East Avenue

               Rochester, New York 14649



II.       IDENTIFICATION OF THE FACILITY, THE ACTIVITY, OR THE BASIC

          COMPONENT SUPPLIED FOR SUCH FACILITY WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR

          CONTAINS A DEFECT:



     The facility is the R.E. Ginna Nuclear Power Plant.  The basic

     component is a Westinghouse DB-75 circuit breaker.  This component was

     installed in a Class 1E Safety Related Bus.  The breaker is the 'B'

     Diesel Generator Supply breaker to Bus 16 (Safety Related Bus).



III.      IDENTIFICATION OF THE FIRM CONSTRUCTING THE FACILITY OR SUPPLYING

          THE BASIC COMPONENT WHICH FAILS TO COMPLY OR CONTAINS A DEFECT:



     The breaker is manufactured by:

          Westinghouse Electric Corporation

          Nuclear Services Integrated Division

          Box 78

          Pittsburgh, PA 15230-0078



IV.       NATURE OF THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY AND THE SAFETY HAZARD

          WHICH IS CREATED OR COULD BE CREATED BY SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE TO

          COMPLY:



     The DB-75 breaker was retrofitted with an AMPTECTOR solid state trip

     unit per Westinghouse instruction I.B. 33-850-6 that instructed the

     technician to remove all tripper bar tabs from the tripper bar.

     Subsequently the instruction bulletin was revised to specifically

     leave the center tripper bar tab installed.  There were no

     notifications to the plant to reinstall the center tripper bar tabs on

     previously modified breakers.  The absence of the center tripper bar

     tab allowed two tripper bar bushings to fall from their housing and is

     believed to, over time, bend the tripper bar so that it would not

     fully reset.  The failure of the tripper bar to fully reset caused

     intermittent failure to close on the DB-75 'B' Diesel generator supply

     breaker to Safety Related Bus 16.  With the identified deficiency in

     the 'B' Diesel Generator supply breaker it is possible that a single

     failure could render both safety trains incapable of performing their

     safety functions (buses 14 and 16).  This deficiency constitutes a

     substantial safety hazard.



V.        THE DATE ON WHICH THE INFORMATION OF SUCH DEFECT OR FAILURE TO

          COMPLY WAS OBTAINED:



     The information was obtained on July 27, 1998 after discussions with

     Westinghouse representatives.  The missing tripper bar tabs were

     discovered March 25, 1998 during troubleshooting of the latest

     failure.  The method of notification by the vendor was not determined

     until July 27, 1998.



VI.       IN THE CASE OF A BASIC COMPONENT WHICH CONTAINS A DEFECT OR FAILS

          TO COMPLY, THE NUMBER AND LOCATION OF ALL SUCH COMPONENTS IN USE

          AT, SUPPLIED FOR, OR BEING SUPPLIED FOR GINNA STATION:



     There are six Westinghouse DB-75 breakers installed at Ginna in

     safeguards busses 14 and 16.  There is also one Safety Related spare

     breaker.  The Bus 14 and 16 Safety Related bus feeds and the two (2)

     bus tie breakers between Buses 14 and 16 were correctly modified per

     the revised instructions.  The original Spare DB-75 breaker was also

     correctly modified prior to being installed into the 'A' Diesel

     Generator supply breaker position.



     Between 3/85 and 2/88 the 'B' Diesel Generator supply breaker was

     installed with the incorrect modification.  In 2/88 the DB-75 breaker

     installed in the 'A' Diesel Generator supply breaker on Bus 14, was

     incorrectly modified in the same manner as the 'B' Diesel Generator

     supply breaker.  Between 2/88 and 5/96 both Diesel Generator output

     breakers to Bus 14 and 16 were installed with incorrect modifications.

     In 5/96 the spare DB-75 breaker, 96-04, was installed in the 'A'

     Diesel Generator supply breaker position.  Breaker 96-04 was modified

     correctly per the current revision of the installation instructions.

     Although the potential for failure.  existed, the breakers were tested

     with regular surveillance tests to prove operability and the failure

     mechanism is of the nature that degrades over time.  The missing

     tripper bar tab would not immediately fail the breaker upon removal.



VII.      THE CORRECTIVE ACTION WHICH HAS BEEN, IS BEING, OR WILL BE TAKEN;

          THE NAME OF THE INDIVIDUAL OR ORGANIZATION RESPONSIBLE FOR THE

          ACTION; AND THE LENGTH OF TIME THAT HAS BEEN OR WILL BE TAKEN TO

          COMPLETE THE ACTION:



     All DB-75 breakers were inspected at the point the missing @enter

     tripper bar tab was discovered.  Maintenance personnel installed

     center tripper bar tabs on the 'B' Diesel Generator supply breaker and

     Spare breaker, previously installed in the 'A' Diesel Generator supply

     breaker position.  Nuclear engineering is performing a vendor document

     review which is in its final stages.  The review will verify all

     breakers are properly configured per applicable vendor documentation.

     The results of the review is being incorporated into maintenance

     procedures.  All corrective actions are scheduled to be completed by

     December 31, 1998.



VIII.     ANY ADVICE RELATED TO THE DEFECT OR FAILURE TO COMPLY ABOUT THE

          FACILITY, ACTIVITY, OR BASIC COMPONENT THAT HAS BEEN, IS BEING,

          OR WILL BE GIVEN To PURCHASERS OR LICENSEES:



     The tripper bar tab installation is verified by visual inspection,

     possible with the breaker in service.  An industry notification was

     distributed at the time the tripper bar tab was discovered to be

     improperly modified.



POWER REACTOR                           EVENT NUMBER: 34632



FACILITY: GINNA          REGION: 1      NOTIFICATION DATE:  08/12/98

UNIT: [1] [ ] [ ]         STATE: NY     NOTIFICATION TIME:  14:10 [ET]

RX TYPE: [1] W-2-LP                     EVENT DATE:         07/27/98

                                        EVENT TIME:         12:00[EDT]

NRC NOTIFIED BY: BOB MECREDY            LAST UPDATE DATE:   08/12/98

HQ OPS OFFICER: DICK JOLLIFFE



                                                  NOTIFICATIONS

EMERGENCY CLASS: NOT APPLICABLE

10 CFR SECTION:                         DAVID SILK, R1           RDO

CDEG 21.21(c)(3)(i) DEFECTS/NONCOMPLIANCE

                                        EDWARD McALPINE, R2      RDO

                                        MARK RING, R3            RDO

                                        GARY SANBORN, R4         RDO

                                        VERN HODGE               NRR



UNIT SCRAM CODE RX CRIT INIT PWR INIT RX MODE     CURR PWR CURR RX MODE



1         N         Y    100    POWER OPERATION     100 POWER OPERATION



                               EVENT TEXT



10CFR21 - WESTINGHOUSE DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS WITH MISSING TRIPPER BAR TABS



THERE ARE SIX WESTINGHOUSE DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS INSTALLED AT GINNA IN

SAFEGUARDS BUSES #14 AND #16 AND ONE UNINSTALLED SAFETY RELATED SPARE.



ON 03/25/98, DURING TROUBLESHOOTING ACTIVITIES, THE LICENSEE DISCOVERED

THAT THE CENTER TRIPPER BAR TABS WERE MISSING FROM A WESTINGHOUSE DB-75

CIRCUIT BREAKER INSTALLED IN THE 'B' EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR (EDG)

SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER TO THE CLASS 1E SAFETY RELATED BUS #16 AT GINNA.



PRIOR TO 03/25/98, GINNA MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS HAD RETROFITTED THE 'B'

EDG DB-75 SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER WITH AN AMPTECTOR SOLID STATE TRIP UNIT

PER WESTINGHOUSE INSTRUCTION I.B.  33-850-6 THAT INSTRUCTED THE TECHNICIANS

TO REMOVE ALL TRIPPER BAR TABS FROM THE TRIPPER BAR.  SUBSEQUENTLY, THE

WESTINGHOUSE INSTRUCTION BULLETIN WAS REVISED TO SPECIFICALLY LEAVE THE

CENTER TRIPPER BAR TAB INSTALLED.  THERE WERE NO WESTINGHOUSE

NOTIFICATIONS

TO GINNA TO REINSTALL THE CENTER TRIPPER BAR TABS ON PREVIOUSLY MODIFIED

DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS.



THE ABSENCE OF THE CENTER TRIPPER BAR TAB ALLOWED TWO TRIPPER BAR

BUSHINGS

TO FALL FROM THEIR HOUSING AND IS BELIEVED TO, OVER TIME, BEND THE TRIPPER

BAR SO THAT IT WOULD NOT FULLY RESET.  THE FAILURE OF THE TRIPPER BAR TO

FULLY RESET CAUSED THE INTERMITTENT FAILURE TO CLOSE ON THE DB-75 'B' EDG

SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER TO BUS #16.



WITH THE IDENTIFIED DEFICIENCY IN THE 'B' EDG SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER, IT IS

POSSIBLE THAT A SINGLE FAILURE COULD RENDER BOTH SAFETY TRAINS INCAPABLE

OF

PERFORMING THEIR SAFETY FUNCTIONS (BUSES #14 AND #16).

                        (Continued on next page)



FACILITY: GINNA                           PAGE # 2 OF EVENT NUMBER: 34632



THIS DEFICIENCY CONSTITUTES A SUBSTANTIAL SAFETY HAZARD.



BETWEEN MAR 85 AND FEB 88, THE DB-75 'B' EDG SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER WAS

INSTALLED WITH THE INCORRECT MODIFICATION.  IN FEB 88, THE DB-75 CIRCUIT

BREAKER INSTALLED IN THE 'A' EDG SUPPLY BREAKER ON BUS #14 WAS INCORRECTLY

MODIFIED IN THE SAME MANNER AS THE 'B' EDG SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER.  BETWEEN

FEB 88 AND MAY 96, BOTH EDG OUTPUT CIRCUIT BREAKERS TO BUSES #14 AND #16

WERE INSTALLED WITH THE INCORRECT MODIFICATIONS.



IN MAY 96, THE ORIGINAL SPARE DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKER, #96-04, WAS INSTALLED

IN THE 'A' EDG SUPPLY BREAKER POSITION.  CIRCUIT BREAKER #96-04 HAD BEEN

MODIFIED CORRECTLY PER THE CURRENT REVISION OF THE WESTINGHOUSE

INSTALLATION INSTRUCTIONS PRIOR TO BEING INSTALLED INTO THE 'A' EDG SUPPLY

CIRCUIT BREAKER POSITION.



ON 03/25/98, THE LICENSEE INSPECTED ALL WESTINGHOUSE DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS

AT GINNA.  PLANT MAINTENANCE TECHNICIANS INSTALLED CENTER TRIPPER BAR TABS

ON THE 'B' EDG SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER AND THE SPARE CIRCUIT BREAKER,

PREVIOUSLY INSTALLED IN THE 'A' EDG SUPPLY CIRCUIT BREAKER POSITION.  THE

DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS ON BUSES #14 AND #16 AND THE TWO BUS TIE CIRCUIT

BREAKERS BETWEEN BUSES #14 AND #16 HAD BEEN CORRECTLY MODIFIED PER THE

REVISED WESTINGHOUSE INSTRUCTIONS.



ALTHOUGH THE POTENTIAL FOR FAILURE EXISTED AT GINNA, THE WESTINGHOUSE

DB-75

CIRCUIT BREAKERS WERE TESTED WITH REGULAR SURVEILLANCE TESTS TO PROVE

OPERABILITY AND THE FAILURE MECHANISM IS OF THE NATURE THAT DEGRADES

OVER

TIME.  THE MISSING TRIPPER BAR TAB WOULD NOT IMMEDIATELY FAIL THE CIRCUIT

BREAKER UPON REMOVAL.



LICENSEE NUCLEAR ENGINEERING PERSONNEL ARE PERFORMING A VENDOR

DOCUMENT

REVIEW TO VERIFY THAT ALL WESTINGHOUSE DB-75 CIRCUIT BREAKERS ARE

PROPERLY

CONFIGURED IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE VENDOR DOCUMENTATION.  ALL

LICENSEE CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE SCHEDULED TO BE COMPLETED BY 12/31/98.



ON 03/25/98, THE LICENSEE DISTRIBUTED A NOTIFICATION OF THIS CONDITION TO

INDUSTRY REPRESENTATIVES.  THE CENTER TRIPPER BAR TAB INSTALLATION CAN BE

VERIFIED BY VISUAL INSPECTION, POSSIBLY WHILE THE CIRCUIT BREAKER IS IN

SERVICE.



SPECIFIC INFORMATION FOR THIS REPORT WAS OBTAINED DURING DISCUSSIONS WITH

WESTINGHOUSE REPRESENTATIVES ON 07/27/98.



THE LICENSEE PLANS TO SUBMIT A WRITTEN 10CFR21 REPORT OF THIS CONDITION TO

THE NRC BY 09/11/98.



*** END OF DOCUMENT ***



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