Event Notification Report for October 31, 2022

CONCURRENT REPORT FOR SHIPMENT OF UNDECLARED HAZARDOUS WASTE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"Framatome is making a concurrent report [following a report made to the Department of Transportation] in concurrence with 10 CFR 70 Appendix A(c), Concurrent Reports for Offsite Notification or News Release.

"An undeclared hazardous material was discovered following a completed waste shipment. The undeclared material was 18.3 grams of U-238 (depleted uranium).

"A hazardous waste shipment left the Framatome site on August 5, 2022, for Clean Earth Specialty Waste Solutions in Tacoma Washington.

"On September 22, 2022 at about 1130 [PDT], a Framatome Waste Engineer informed Framatome EHS&L (Environmental Health Safety and Licensing) management that this shipment included waste that had not passed the free release criteria for radioactive waste.

"The shipment included seven containers that went to Clean Earth Specialty Waste Solutions in Tacoma, Washington on the August 5th, 2022 shipment. To date, five of the seven waste containers have been returned to Framatome and have been confirmed that no radioactive material was present. The first of the two remaining waste packages is listed in sections 14, 26 and 27 above. [14-Proper Shipping Name of Hazardous Material: UN3262 Waste Corrosive solid, basic, inorganic, not otherwise specified (n.o.s.), 8pgII; 26-Identification Markings: UN 1H2/X65/S/22/USA/M4990 1610 2.2mm; 27-Package Capacity:15 Gallons, Amount in Package: 21 pounds, Number in Shipment: 2, Number Failed: None]

"The second [not yet returned] package included material not regulated by Department of Transportation, (WA state dangerous waste only, Toxic). Both packages were of the same UN specification markings."


THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A 'Less than Cat 3' LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

SECONDARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE DURING SURVEILLANCE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:

"At 1228 CDT on October 27, 2022, Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS) was in Mode 1 at 88 percent power when a failure of a draw down surveillance resulted in the loss of secondary containment. During the performance of the surveillance GGNS was unable to maintain secondary containment pressure, as required by Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.6.4.1.4, greater than or equal to 0.266 inches of water vacuum for 1 hour at a flow rate of less than or equal to 4000 cfm.

"The test was secured. Secondary containment was declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.6.4.1 A.1 was entered at 1228 CDT. Secondary containment was restored to operable status at 1240 CDT by restoring the configuration to a previously known operable condition.

"This event is being reported as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified."

AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM INOPERABLE

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 2050 EDT [on October 27, 2022], with Unit 1 in Mode 3, it was discovered that all auxiliary feedwater pumps were simultaneously inoperable and the capability to supply the 'B' steam generator was not maintained; therefore, this condition is being reported as an eight-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The function of the auxiliary feedwater pumps to supply the 'A' steam generator and 'C' steam generator was maintained.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP AND AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM ACTUATION

The following information was provided by the licensee via email:
"At 0653 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), with Unit 1 in Mode 1, at 16 percent power, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to an under-voltage condition on the 'A' reactor coolant pump (RCP) and the 'C' RCP. Power was lost from the 'A' auxiliary bus while performing an operating procedure to transfer power from the 'A' start-up transformer to the 'A' unit auxiliary transformer.

"Operations responded and stabilized the plant. Decay heat is being removed by the main steam system to the atmosphere using the steam generator power-operated relief valves. Due to the reactor protection system actuation while critical, this event is being reported as a four-hour, non-emergency notification per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B). This event is also being reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) as an event that resulted in a valid actuation of the auxiliary feedwater system.

"There was no impact on the health and safety of the public or plant personnel. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."