Event Notification Report for October 27, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/26/2016 - 10/27/2016
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52321
Facility: WATERFORD
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: RYAN TREGRE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] CE
NRC Notified By: RYAN TREGRE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 10/27/2016
Notification Time: 08:26 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2016
Event Time: 00:21 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/23/2016
Notification Time: 08:26 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2016
Event Time: 00:21 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 11/23/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Hot Standby | 0 | Hot Standby |
LOSS OF CHARGING AND LETDOWN SYSTEMS FROM THE REACTOR COOLANT SYSTEM
"At 0021 [CDT] on 10/27/16, Waterford 3 (WF3) experienced a loss of the charging and letdown systems from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered due to the loss of all three charging pumps. Charging Pump AB was restored and aligned to replace Charging Pump A and WF3 exited TS 3.0.3 at 0055 on 10/27/16.
"The cause of the loss of charging pumps was due to Refueling Water Storage Pool to Charging Pumps Suction Isolation, CVC-507, not opening as expected following a loss of Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS) 014AB during electrical troubleshooting. The cause of CVC-507 not opening is being investigated. Power was restored to SUPS 014AB at 0022.
"WF3 is currently stable in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed by the Steam Bypass Control System. Pressurizer Level was maintained throughout the event. WF3 was previously shut down for reasons unrelated to this event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Valve CVC-183 closed when the power supply was lost. CVC-183 is the Volume Control Tank outlet isolation valve. Waterford 3 will remain in mode 3 until the issue has been corrected.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1005 EST ON 11/23/16 FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"This is a retraction of EN 52321 which was reported as an 8 hour Non-Emergency on October 27th at 0826 EST.
"At 0021 [EST] on 10/27/16, Waterford 3 (WF3) experienced a loss of the charging and letdown systems due to an electrical transient on a Static Uninterruptable Power Supply that was being worked under a maintenance work order. The cause of the loss of charging pumps was due to Refueling Water Storage Pool to Charging Pumps Suction Isolation, CVC-507, not opening as expected following a loss of Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS) 014AB. Both operating charging pumps automatically secured due to low suction pressure trips as designed.
"Post event investigation determined that a relay that had failed affected only the normal suction path isolation valves to the charging pumps and did not impact the safety related flow path that is required during a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS). Had an SIAS occurred during the period when no active suction path was aligned, the low pressure trip would have been blocked and the pumps selected to start on an SIAS would have auto started. The SIAS would have aligned the Boric Acid Make-up system for Emergency Boration. This would have resulted in the Charging Pumps being aligned to take suction from the Boric Acid Make-up pumps and/or Boric Acid Gravity Feed valves.
"A function of the charging systems is to inject concentrated boric acid into RCS upon an SIAS. As discussed in FSAR Section 6.3.3.3.1, the injection flow from the charging pumps is not credited in the small break LOCA analysis. Charging is however credited for natural circulation cooldown without letdown in order to meet the safe shutdown requirements of NRC Branch Technical Position (RSB) 5-4. This analysis assumes that the charging source is initially Boric Acid Makeup Tanks followed by Refueling Water Storage Pool. Both sources were available. The charging system was fully capable of performing its safety function following the relay failure. The charging pumps remained capable of starting on an SIAS and the flow path from the Boric Acid Management system remained operable. In addition the flow path from the RWSP was not affected since the outlet isolation valve could be manually opened.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R4DO (Taylor).
"At 0021 [CDT] on 10/27/16, Waterford 3 (WF3) experienced a loss of the charging and letdown systems from the Reactor Coolant System (RCS). Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 was entered due to the loss of all three charging pumps. Charging Pump AB was restored and aligned to replace Charging Pump A and WF3 exited TS 3.0.3 at 0055 on 10/27/16.
"The cause of the loss of charging pumps was due to Refueling Water Storage Pool to Charging Pumps Suction Isolation, CVC-507, not opening as expected following a loss of Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS) 014AB during electrical troubleshooting. The cause of CVC-507 not opening is being investigated. Power was restored to SUPS 014AB at 0022.
"WF3 is currently stable in Mode 3 with decay heat being removed by the Steam Bypass Control System. Pressurizer Level was maintained throughout the event. WF3 was previously shut down for reasons unrelated to this event.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Valve CVC-183 closed when the power supply was lost. CVC-183 is the Volume Control Tank outlet isolation valve. Waterford 3 will remain in mode 3 until the issue has been corrected.
* * * RETRACTION AT 1005 EST ON 11/23/16 FROM SCOTT MEIKLEJOHN TO JEFF HERRERA * * *
"This is a retraction of EN 52321 which was reported as an 8 hour Non-Emergency on October 27th at 0826 EST.
"At 0021 [EST] on 10/27/16, Waterford 3 (WF3) experienced a loss of the charging and letdown systems due to an electrical transient on a Static Uninterruptable Power Supply that was being worked under a maintenance work order. The cause of the loss of charging pumps was due to Refueling Water Storage Pool to Charging Pumps Suction Isolation, CVC-507, not opening as expected following a loss of Static Uninterruptible Power Supply (SUPS) 014AB. Both operating charging pumps automatically secured due to low suction pressure trips as designed.
"Post event investigation determined that a relay that had failed affected only the normal suction path isolation valves to the charging pumps and did not impact the safety related flow path that is required during a Safety Injection Actuation Signal (SIAS). Had an SIAS occurred during the period when no active suction path was aligned, the low pressure trip would have been blocked and the pumps selected to start on an SIAS would have auto started. The SIAS would have aligned the Boric Acid Make-up system for Emergency Boration. This would have resulted in the Charging Pumps being aligned to take suction from the Boric Acid Make-up pumps and/or Boric Acid Gravity Feed valves.
"A function of the charging systems is to inject concentrated boric acid into RCS upon an SIAS. As discussed in FSAR Section 6.3.3.3.1, the injection flow from the charging pumps is not credited in the small break LOCA analysis. Charging is however credited for natural circulation cooldown without letdown in order to meet the safe shutdown requirements of NRC Branch Technical Position (RSB) 5-4. This analysis assumes that the charging source is initially Boric Acid Makeup Tanks followed by Refueling Water Storage Pool. Both sources were available. The charging system was fully capable of performing its safety function following the relay failure. The charging pumps remained capable of starting on an SIAS and the flow path from the Boric Acid Management system remained operable. In addition the flow path from the RWSP was not affected since the outlet isolation valve could be manually opened.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Notified the R4DO (Taylor).
Agreement State
Event Number: 52326
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPT OF STATE HEALTH SERVICES
Licensee: INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY
Region: 4
City: QUEEN CITY State: TX
County:
License #: 01686
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Licensee: INTERNATIONAL PAPER COMPANY
Region: 4
City: QUEEN CITY State: TX
County:
License #: 01686
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF HERRERA
Notification Date: 10/28/2016
Notification Time: 10:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2016
Notification Time: 10:55 [ET]
Event Date: 10/27/2016
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/28/2016
Emergency Class:
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4DO)
NMSS_EVENTS_NOTIFIC (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SHUTTER ON GAUGE WOULD NOT CLOSE
The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via email:
"On October 27, 2016, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that the shutter on a Berthold model LB7440-D-CR gauge containing a 10 millicurie (original activity) cesium - 137 source would not close. The RSO stated they verified the shutter not closing by performing dose rate surveys around the gauge as they can not see the shutter. The shutter is in the open position which is the normal operating position for the gauge. The RSO stated the gauge does not create an exposure risk to their employees or any member of the general public. The RSO stated a service provider has been contacted to repair the gauge. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I - 9435
The following report was received from the Texas Department of State Health Services via email:
"On October 27, 2016, the Agency [Texas Department of State Health Services] was notified by the licensee's radiation safety officer (RSO) that the shutter on a Berthold model LB7440-D-CR gauge containing a 10 millicurie (original activity) cesium - 137 source would not close. The RSO stated they verified the shutter not closing by performing dose rate surveys around the gauge as they can not see the shutter. The shutter is in the open position which is the normal operating position for the gauge. The RSO stated the gauge does not create an exposure risk to their employees or any member of the general public. The RSO stated a service provider has been contacted to repair the gauge. Additional information will be provided in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I - 9435