Event Notification Report for September 06, 2016
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/05/2016 - 09/06/2016
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52223
Facility: PILGRIM
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ROBERT O'NEILL
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Region: 1 State: MA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ROBERT O'NEILL
HQ OPS Officer: BETHANY CECERE
Notification Date: 09/06/2016
Notification Time: 11:24 [ET]
Event Date: 09/06/2016
Event Time: 08:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2016
Notification Time: 11:24 [ET]
Event Date: 09/06/2016
Event Time: 08:27 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/06/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 91 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO HIGH REACTOR WATER LEVEL
"On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 0827 [EDT], with the reactor at 91% core thermal power (CTP), Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) operators initiated a manual reactor scram due to high reactor water level resulting from feedwater level control oscillation. Other than the feedwater level control oscillations, all other plant systems responded as designed. Plant cooldown is in progress using the High Pressure Coolant Injection System in the pressure control mode.
"The plant is in hot shutdown. The cause of the feed water level control oscillations is under investigation. This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public.
"Subsequent to the manual reactor scram the plant experienced the following isolation signals:
Group 1 Isolation: Main Steam Isolation Valves
Group 2 Isolation: Miscellaneous containment isolation valves
Group 6 Isolation: Reactor Water Clean-up
Reactor Building [Ventilation] Isolation Actuation
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical...'. This notification is also being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section...' (B)(2) 'General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).'"
All rods were inserted. The plant is stable with normal off-site power line-up.
The licensee will notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
"On Tuesday, September 6, 2016 at 0827 [EDT], with the reactor at 91% core thermal power (CTP), Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) operators initiated a manual reactor scram due to high reactor water level resulting from feedwater level control oscillation. Other than the feedwater level control oscillations, all other plant systems responded as designed. Plant cooldown is in progress using the High Pressure Coolant Injection System in the pressure control mode.
"The plant is in hot shutdown. The cause of the feed water level control oscillations is under investigation. This event has no impact on the health and safety of the public.
"Subsequent to the manual reactor scram the plant experienced the following isolation signals:
Group 1 Isolation: Main Steam Isolation Valves
Group 2 Isolation: Miscellaneous containment isolation valves
Group 6 Isolation: Reactor Water Clean-up
Reactor Building [Ventilation] Isolation Actuation
"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 'any event that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical...'. This notification is also being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A), 'Any event or condition that results in valid actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (b)(3)(iv)(B) of this section...' (B)(2) 'General containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves (MSIVs).'"
All rods were inserted. The plant is stable with normal off-site power line-up.
The licensee will notify the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 52224
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIK SILKO
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ERIK SILKO
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 09/07/2016
Notification Time: 16:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/06/2016
Event Time: 13:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2016
Notification Time: 16:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/06/2016
Event Time: 13:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/23/2016
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
MEL GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
NON-ESSENTIAL SERVICE WATER HEADER DECLARED INOPERABLE
"At 1347 EDT on September 6, 2016, the non-essential service water header was declared inoperable due to what appeared to be a leak on a filet weld on a slip-on flange upstream of the 23 service water pump discharge valve SWN-2-2. [Operators] entered LCO 3.0.3 based on Engineering input with no code case to support an immediate determination of operability. The 23 service water pump was secured and the discharge valve SWN-2-2 was closed isolating the leak and restoring the non-essential SW header to operable status. With the discharge valve closed, LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 1417 EDT on September 6, 2016. The declaration of the inoperability of the non-essential service water header is considered a loss of safety function for purposes of reporting under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Further investigation of the leak revealed [that the leak had occurred at] a pipe flaw rather than at the weld location. An operability evaluation is ongoing. There was no reduction in power while in LCO 3.0.3 and no other issues arose."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM CHARLES ROKES TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 0839 EDT ON 9/23/16 * * *
"Indian Point Unit 2 is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on September 7, 2016, at 1647 hours EDT (EN #52224). The notification on September 7, 2016, reported a safety system functional failure (SSFF) as a result of declaring the non-essential service water (SW) header inoperable due to discovery of a through wall leak on the discharge line from the 23 SW Pump. The leak appeared to be on the downstream fillet weld on the north side of the pipe spool piece. At the time the exact location of the leak could not be established due to the geometry of the area and its carbon fiber coating. Because there is no qualified NDE inspection technique for fillet welds and the analytical methods provided in ASME code Case N-513-3 are not applicable to fillet welds, operability of the effected section of the SW System could not be demonstrated and the SW piping was conservatively considered inoperable.
"Further investigation of the leak determined the leak occurred mid-pipe 1/2 inch upstream from a slip-on flange socket weld and not on the weld itself. The weld location is ASME Section XI Class 3, nuclear safety-related, Seismic Class 1. An engineering evaluation was performed of the pipe defect and concluded the identified through-wall defect on the pipe spool piece did not result in any structural, flooding, spraying condition or SW system capacity issues which would adversely impact any normal or accident design functions of the SW system or any other nuclear safety-related equipment or component to perform their design safety functions from the time of the leak occurrence to the isolation of the pipe. The structural portion of the evaluation was performed using the ASME CC N-513-3 methodology but the code case was not invoked because the flaw was isolated and a code repair was made. The 23 SW Pump discharge line spool piece is a 14 inch NPS schedule STD cement-lined carbon steel pipe having a nominal wall thickness of 0.375 inches with slip-on flanges welded on both sides with fillet welds on the exterior. The function of this spool piece is to connect the 23 Zurn Strainer outlet to the isolation valve SWN-2-2. The degradation mechanism was likely due to corrosion of the carbon steel on the underside of the cement lining due to a lining defect."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Krohn).
"At 1347 EDT on September 6, 2016, the non-essential service water header was declared inoperable due to what appeared to be a leak on a filet weld on a slip-on flange upstream of the 23 service water pump discharge valve SWN-2-2. [Operators] entered LCO 3.0.3 based on Engineering input with no code case to support an immediate determination of operability. The 23 service water pump was secured and the discharge valve SWN-2-2 was closed isolating the leak and restoring the non-essential SW header to operable status. With the discharge valve closed, LCO 3.0.3 was exited at 1417 EDT on September 6, 2016. The declaration of the inoperability of the non-essential service water header is considered a loss of safety function for purposes of reporting under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v). Further investigation of the leak revealed [that the leak had occurred at] a pipe flaw rather than at the weld location. An operability evaluation is ongoing. There was no reduction in power while in LCO 3.0.3 and no other issues arose."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM CHARLES ROKES TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 0839 EDT ON 9/23/16 * * *
"Indian Point Unit 2 is retracting the 8-hour non-emergency notification made on September 7, 2016, at 1647 hours EDT (EN #52224). The notification on September 7, 2016, reported a safety system functional failure (SSFF) as a result of declaring the non-essential service water (SW) header inoperable due to discovery of a through wall leak on the discharge line from the 23 SW Pump. The leak appeared to be on the downstream fillet weld on the north side of the pipe spool piece. At the time the exact location of the leak could not be established due to the geometry of the area and its carbon fiber coating. Because there is no qualified NDE inspection technique for fillet welds and the analytical methods provided in ASME code Case N-513-3 are not applicable to fillet welds, operability of the effected section of the SW System could not be demonstrated and the SW piping was conservatively considered inoperable.
"Further investigation of the leak determined the leak occurred mid-pipe 1/2 inch upstream from a slip-on flange socket weld and not on the weld itself. The weld location is ASME Section XI Class 3, nuclear safety-related, Seismic Class 1. An engineering evaluation was performed of the pipe defect and concluded the identified through-wall defect on the pipe spool piece did not result in any structural, flooding, spraying condition or SW system capacity issues which would adversely impact any normal or accident design functions of the SW system or any other nuclear safety-related equipment or component to perform their design safety functions from the time of the leak occurrence to the isolation of the pipe. The structural portion of the evaluation was performed using the ASME CC N-513-3 methodology but the code case was not invoked because the flaw was isolated and a code repair was made. The 23 SW Pump discharge line spool piece is a 14 inch NPS schedule STD cement-lined carbon steel pipe having a nominal wall thickness of 0.375 inches with slip-on flanges welded on both sides with fillet welds on the exterior. The function of this spool piece is to connect the 23 Zurn Strainer outlet to the isolation valve SWN-2-2. The degradation mechanism was likely due to corrosion of the carbon steel on the underside of the cement lining due to a lining defect."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R2DO (Krohn).