Event Notification Report for July 12, 2016

INVALID ACTUATION OF BOTH TRAINS ESSENTIAL SPRAY POND SYSTEM

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"This telephone notification is being made pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation of both trains of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station (PVNGS) Unit 2 essential spray pond (SP) system. The SP system serves as an emergency service water system that does not normally run and serves as an ultimate heat sink as described in 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(9).

"On July 12, 2016, at approximately 0550, Mountain Standard Time, Unit 2 experienced a manual actuation of both trains of the SP system. Approximately 20 minutes earlier, the failure of a +15VDC power supply on the containment purge isolation actuation signal (CPIAS) module resulted in a trip of the B train CPIAS and a momentary cross trip of the A train CPIAS, and both trains of the control room essential filtration actuation system (CREFAS). These brief actuation signals resulted in starting of some but not all essential equipment because the actuation signals cleared before most of the equipment received a start signal. Both trains of the SP system were started manually in accordance with the alarm response procedure. The A train CPIAS and both trains of CREFAS were reset. The B train CPIAS remained in a partially tripped state because of the failed power supply.

"The manual actuation of both A and B trains of the SP system was complete. Both trains of the SP system started and functioned successfully. The invalid actuation was the consequence of a failed +15VDC power supply on the B train CPIAS module which resulted in momentary trips of both trains of CPIAS and CREFAS. The containment building radiation monitors that actuate CPIAS exhibited normal radiation levels which would not have required CPIAS actuation. The event was entered into the PVNGS corrective action program. There was no adverse impact
to public health and safety nor to plant employees.

"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE FOUND AT METAL RECYCLING FACULTY

The following report was received from the Commonwealth of Virginia via facsimile:

"On July 12, 2016, Sims Metal Recycling, Richmond Virginia, reported to the Virginia Radioactive Material Program (VRMP) that a radioactive source had been found in a shipment of metal. They said the source was a gauge like the one found the previous day in their Petersburg Virginia Facility [see EN #52088]. Refer to VA-16-008. VRMP Radiation Safety Specialists performed an onsite review. Labels indicated that the source was a general license device from EG&G Berthold, model not identified, serial number 001095, with a 100 millicurie (September 1990) cesium-137 source, serial number 3023. Maximum radiation levels at contact at the mounting near the shutter were 2 mR/hr, at three feet, maximum levels were less than 0.1 mR/hr. The gauge was placed in a drum in a secured area. Dose estimates by VRMP health physicists indicated no individual was likely to have received more than 1 mrem whole body or 5 mrem extremity dose. On-site tests for leakage indicated no removable contamination. The recycling facility will contact a waste broker to arrange for disposal. The gauge owner was not identified from review of the VRMP general license database. Berthold Technologies USA is reviewing records to identify the owner of the gauge.

Virginia Event Report ID No: VA-16-009

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

A Troxler moisture density gauge was stolen overnight from a locked overpack in a truck. The gauge contained both Am-241 and Cs-137 sources. The licensee contacted local law enforcement. Gauge serial number: 34700

Florida Incident: FL16-079

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

ALERT DECLARED FOR A FIRE IN THE SERVICE WATER BUILDING

At approximately 2039 EDT, there was smoke in the Service Water Building with the trip of the 2C service water pump. In accordance with plant procedures, unit-2 was ramped down to 70 percent power and the "Alert" was declared. EAL (emergency action level) SA8.1 was entered for damage with degraded performance including visible damage to the service water pump. Service water pressure was eventually restored by running both the 2A and 2B service water pumps.

At 2118 EDT, the site exited the "Alert" because service water pressure had been restored.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified DHS SWO, FEMA Ops Center, USDA Ops Center, HHS Ops Center, DOE Ops Center, DHS NICC Watch Officer, EPA EOC, FEMA National Watch Center (email), FDA EOC (email), Nuclear SSA (email).

* * * UPDATE ON 7/14/16 AT 1456 EDT FROM LEE GRZECK TO DONG PARK * * *

The initial notification should read:

"At approximately 2035 EDT, there was smoke in the Service Water Building with the trip of the 2C conventional service water pump. In accordance with plant procedures, unit-2 was ramped down to 70 percent power and the 'Alert' was declared at 2039 EDT. EAL (emergency action level) SA8.1 was entered for fire/smoke damage with degraded performance including visible damage to the service water pump. Service water pressure was eventually restored and the plant was stabilized.

"At 2118 EDT, the site exited the 'Alert' when service water pressure had been restored, and the fire was confirmed out (i.e., no reflash within 30 minutes)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Rich).

DEGRADED FIRE BARRIER

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"During the performance of a fire seal and barrier surveillance test, a degraded fire seal barrier that provides 1 hour separation between two fire zones containing redundant safe shutdown trains was identified in the 100 foot elevation of the PVNGS Unit 1 Auxiliary Building.

"This condition is reportable in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as an unanalyzed condition.

"Fire protection detection and mitigation systems in both fire zones are operable and compensatory measures (fire watches) have been implemented for affected areas.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

The degraded fire barrier consists of two holes in the through wall fire barrier surrounding two two-inch conduits. The two holes are approximately one to one and a half inches across.

* * * RETRACTION FROM SEAN DORNSEIF TO HOWIE CROUCH AT 1356 EDT ON 8/18/16 * * *

"Subsequent Engineering evaluation concluded the degraded fire seal in PVNGS Unit 1 reported on July 12, 2016, did not place PVNGS in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. The degraded fire seal would have continued to provide the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains.

"The evaluation found a fire initiated in a fire zone on either side of the barrier would not propagate within one hour into the adjacent zone with redundant safe shutdown equipment. These conclusions were based on an existing fire analysis which was used to demonstrate that the required degree of separation between safe shutdown equipment remained intact.

"Based on the above information, PVNGS is retracting event notification report #52083, as the degraded fire seal did not place PVNGS Unit 1 an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety.

"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been informed."

Notified R4DO (Proulx).