Event Notification Report for August 05, 2014
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/04/2014 - 08/05/2014
EVENT NUMBERS
50343503445034550346
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50343
Facility: MILLSTONE
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MAZZONE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: CT
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] CE,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL MAZZONE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/05/2014
Notification Time: 13:47 [ET]
Event Date: 08/05/2014
Event Time: 07:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2014
Notification Time: 13:47 [ET]
Event Date: 08/05/2014
Event Time: 07:47 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
DAN SCHROEDER (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
REMOVAL OF STACK HIGH RADIATION MONITOR FOR MAINTENANCE
"Unit 2 high range stack radiation monitor, RM-8168, was removed from service for planned maintenance. This action is reportable as a loss of assessment capability per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). RM-8168 will be restored to operable status by 1800 EDT.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State of Connecticut, and local agencies.
"Unit 2 high range stack radiation monitor, RM-8168, was removed from service for planned maintenance. This action is reportable as a loss of assessment capability per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). RM-8168 will be restored to operable status by 1800 EDT.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, State of Connecticut, and local agencies.
Agreement State
Event Number: 50344
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: STRUCTURAL METALS, INC.
Region: 4
City: SEGUIN State: TX
County:
License #: 02188
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Licensee: STRUCTURAL METALS, INC.
Region: 4
City: SEGUIN State: TX
County:
License #: 02188
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 08/05/2014
Notification Time: 18:06 [ET]
Event Date: 08/05/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/06/2014
Notification Time: 18:06 [ET]
Event Date: 08/05/2014
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/06/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK OPEN SHUTTER ON FIXED GAUGE
The following report was provided from the State of Texas via Email:
"On August 5, 2014, the licensee notified the [Texas Department of State Health Services, Investigation Unit, Radiation Branch] Agency that it had discovered it was unable to close the shutter on a Berthold model LB300ML fixed nuclear gauge that contains a 2.5 milliCurie cobalt-60 source. The licensee stated it had experienced a loss of power on August 3, 2014, that resulted in the loss of control of the flow of molten steel. The licensee stated when it was able to get to the gauge on August 5th and discovered that some steel had spilled onto the top of the gauge's knobs and prevented shutter closure. The licensee stated that the source housing was not damaged and the source had not been compromised. The licensee also reported it has not yet been able to get to the shutter on a second gauge (same model and source) due to the steel spillage. It is anticipating the steel will be cleared within the next 1-2 days so it can make a determination on the status of the shutter on the second gauge. The gauges normally operate with the shutter in the open position. There have been no overexposures as a result of this event. Due to the location of the gauges/sources and the steel spillage, there is no risk of overexposure. The licensee stated it had already scheduled a routine service call for August 7th, for its gauges. The licensee will have the technician make needed repairs to the disabled gauge(s) while they are at the facility. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9218
* * * UPDATE FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO JEFF ROTTON VIA EMAIL AT 1247 EDT ON 8/6/2014 * * *
"On August 6, 2014, the licensee notified the Agency that it was finally able to access the second gauge, Berthold LB300ML containing 2.5 milliCurie cobalt-60 source, referred to in the initial report. The licensee reported that the shutter on this second gauge was binding (cause unknown at this time) and they were unable to close it. The gauge normally operates with the shutter in the open position. There have been no overexposures as a result of this event. Due to the location of the gauges/sources and the steel spillage, there is no risk of overexposure. The licensee will include this shutter for evaluation/repair when the service technician comes to its facility on 08/07/2014. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Notified R4DO (Werner) and FSME Events Resource via email.
The following report was provided from the State of Texas via Email:
"On August 5, 2014, the licensee notified the [Texas Department of State Health Services, Investigation Unit, Radiation Branch] Agency that it had discovered it was unable to close the shutter on a Berthold model LB300ML fixed nuclear gauge that contains a 2.5 milliCurie cobalt-60 source. The licensee stated it had experienced a loss of power on August 3, 2014, that resulted in the loss of control of the flow of molten steel. The licensee stated when it was able to get to the gauge on August 5th and discovered that some steel had spilled onto the top of the gauge's knobs and prevented shutter closure. The licensee stated that the source housing was not damaged and the source had not been compromised. The licensee also reported it has not yet been able to get to the shutter on a second gauge (same model and source) due to the steel spillage. It is anticipating the steel will be cleared within the next 1-2 days so it can make a determination on the status of the shutter on the second gauge. The gauges normally operate with the shutter in the open position. There have been no overexposures as a result of this event. Due to the location of the gauges/sources and the steel spillage, there is no risk of overexposure. The licensee stated it had already scheduled a routine service call for August 7th, for its gauges. The licensee will have the technician make needed repairs to the disabled gauge(s) while they are at the facility. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Texas Incident #: I-9218
* * * UPDATE FROM KAREN BLANCHARD TO JEFF ROTTON VIA EMAIL AT 1247 EDT ON 8/6/2014 * * *
"On August 6, 2014, the licensee notified the Agency that it was finally able to access the second gauge, Berthold LB300ML containing 2.5 milliCurie cobalt-60 source, referred to in the initial report. The licensee reported that the shutter on this second gauge was binding (cause unknown at this time) and they were unable to close it. The gauge normally operates with the shutter in the open position. There have been no overexposures as a result of this event. Due to the location of the gauges/sources and the steel spillage, there is no risk of overexposure. The licensee will include this shutter for evaluation/repair when the service technician comes to its facility on 08/07/2014. More information will be provided as it is obtained in accordance with SA-300."
Notified R4DO (Werner) and FSME Events Resource via email.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50345
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM STANG
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM STANG
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/05/2014
Notification Time: 20:53 [ET]
Event Date: 08/05/2014
Event Time: 14:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2014
Notification Time: 20:53 [ET]
Event Date: 08/05/2014
Event Time: 14:46 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/05/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 89 | Power Operation | 89 | Power Operation |
BOTH TRAINS OF CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY FILTRATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE
"The Division 1 Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREF) was inoperable for scheduled replacement of charcoal. During the scheduled maintenance, Division 2 CREF was placed into service. Approximately 5 minutes after startup (1446 CDT on 8/5/2014), the Division 2 CREF recirculation fan tripped off for unknown reasons. This rendered both trains of CREF inoperable. This required entry into Technical Specification TS 3.0.3.
"This is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"At 1707 CDT on 8/5/2014, the Division 1 CREF train maintenance was completed and the Division 1 CREF was declared operable. TS 3.0.3 was exited at this time.
"Investigation is in progress to determine the cause of the Division 2 CREF trip.
"The control room boundary was not challenged during this time period with any change in radiation levels as plant operation was unaffected. Thus, the health and safety of the public was not affected."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Minnesota Duty Officer.
"The Division 1 Control Room Emergency Filtration System (CREF) was inoperable for scheduled replacement of charcoal. During the scheduled maintenance, Division 2 CREF was placed into service. Approximately 5 minutes after startup (1446 CDT on 8/5/2014), the Division 2 CREF recirculation fan tripped off for unknown reasons. This rendered both trains of CREF inoperable. This required entry into Technical Specification TS 3.0.3.
"This is being reported pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.
"At 1707 CDT on 8/5/2014, the Division 1 CREF train maintenance was completed and the Division 1 CREF was declared operable. TS 3.0.3 was exited at this time.
"Investigation is in progress to determine the cause of the Division 2 CREF trip.
"The control room boundary was not challenged during this time period with any change in radiation levels as plant operation was unaffected. Thus, the health and safety of the public was not affected."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of Minnesota Duty Officer.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 50346
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JASON ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JASON ADAMS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/05/2014
Notification Time: 22:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/05/2014
Event Time: 17:34 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/06/2014
Notification Time: 22:20 [ET]
Event Date: 08/05/2014
Event Time: 17:34 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/06/2014
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM
"This notification is being provided pursuant with SAF 1.6 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and SAF 1.7 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"At 1734 CDT on August 5, 2014, LaSalle Unit 2 automatically scrammed due to an RPS actuation. The MSIVs isolated on a Group 1 signal, the cause is under investigation. The reactor water cleanup system isolated during the transient. The plant is stable with Reactor Pressure Control being maintained by the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System and SRVs and level being controlled by the Low Pressure Core Spray System. The plant is planned to remain in hot shutdown pending investigation of the trip."
The Unit 2 electric plant is in a normal shutdown lineup. All control rods inserted fully on the scram. Unit 1 was not affected by the Unit 2 transient.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY MICHAEL FITZPATRICK TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1650 EDT ON 8/6/2014 * * *
The initial notification to the NRC stated that the reactor water cleanup system had isolated during the transient. The actual status is being corrected to state that the reactor water cleanup pump tripped during the transient.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Stone).
"This notification is being provided pursuant with SAF 1.6 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and SAF 1.7 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A).
"At 1734 CDT on August 5, 2014, LaSalle Unit 2 automatically scrammed due to an RPS actuation. The MSIVs isolated on a Group 1 signal, the cause is under investigation. The reactor water cleanup system isolated during the transient. The plant is stable with Reactor Pressure Control being maintained by the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System and SRVs and level being controlled by the Low Pressure Core Spray System. The plant is planned to remain in hot shutdown pending investigation of the trip."
The Unit 2 electric plant is in a normal shutdown lineup. All control rods inserted fully on the scram. Unit 1 was not affected by the Unit 2 transient.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY MICHAEL FITZPATRICK TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1650 EDT ON 8/6/2014 * * *
The initial notification to the NRC stated that the reactor water cleanup system had isolated during the transient. The actual status is being corrected to state that the reactor water cleanup pump tripped during the transient.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Stone).