Alert

Due to a lapse in appropriations, the NRC has ceased normal operations. However, excepted and exempted activities necessary to maintain critical health and safety functions—as well as essential progress on designated critical activities, including those specified in Executive Order 14300—will continue, consistent with the OMB-Approved NRC Lapse Plan.

Event Notification Report for December 11, 2012

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/10/2012 - 12/11/2012

** EVENT NUMBERS **

Agreement State	Event Number: 48553
Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION Licensee: ATC ASSOCIATES Region: 3 City: CINCINNATI State: OH County: License #: 31210310000 Agreement: Y Docket: NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN	Notification Date: 12/03/2012 Notification Time: 14:57 [ET] Event Date: 11/05/2012 Event Time: [EST] Last Update Date: 12/03/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: AGREEMENT STATE	Person (Organization): PATTY PELKE (R3DO) FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI) ILTAB (EMAI)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN AND RECOVERED TROXLER GAUGE

The following information was received from the State of Ohio:

"[The Ohio] BRP [Bureau of Radiation Protection] received call at approx. 3:30 PM on 11/5/12, with follow-up e-mail, that a licensee's technician had his truck stolen from a job site earlier in the day. The truck had a locked Troxler Model 3411B gauge in its locked case in the truck bed. A report was filed with the Cincinnati Police. The gauge serial # is 14560. Gauge contains 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241 sources.

"At approximately 6:00 PM on 11/5/12 the licensee informed BRP that the Cincinnati Police had apprehended person driving the stolen truck. The locked nuclear density gauge was still in the vehicle and appeared undisturbed. The truck with the gauge will be stored overnight in the secure police impound lot and licensee would be able to obtain them the next morning.

"At approximately 10:20 AM on 11/6/12 the licensee reported to BRP they had recovered the truck and gauge from Cincinnati Police impound lot. Gauge case and device still locked and there was no damage evident. Leak test showed no contamination. No further action required."

Ohio Item Number: OH120007

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

Power Reactor	Event Number: 48573
Facility: HARRIS Region: 2 State: NC Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] W-3-LP NRC Notified By: RICHARD HONEYCUTT HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ	Notification Date: 12/10/2012 Notification Time: 07:17 [ET] Event Date: 12/10/2012 Event Time: 07:30 [EST] Last Update Date: 12/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	Person (Organization): ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY- RADIATION MONITORS INOPERABLE FOR PRE-PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"This is a non-emergency notification. At approximately 07:30 EST on December 10, 2012, radiation monitor RM-01TV-3536-1, Turbine Building Vent Stack Wide Range Gas Monitor (WRGM) will be declared inoperable for pre-planned corrective maintenance on the FT-01TV-3536-1, Turbine Bldg Vent Stack flow rate monitor. The corrective maintenance is expected to last approximately 5 to 6 hours.

"This radiation monitor is necessary for accident assessment and is credited for Emergency Action Level (EAL) classification in the Harris Nuclear Plant Emergency Plan. Inability to classify an EAL due to an out of service monitor is considered a loss of accident assessment capability and is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2. This condition does not affect the health or safety of the public or the operation of the facility.

"The NRC Resident Inspectors have been notified."

Power Reactor	Event Number: 48574
Facility: PILGRIM Region: 1 State: MA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-3 NRC Notified By: PAUL GALLANT HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL	Notification Date: 12/10/2012 Notification Time: 19:24 [ET] Event Date: 12/10/2012 Event Time: 14:14 [EST] Last Update Date: 12/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE	Person (Organization): DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF EMERGENCY RESPONSE CAPABILITY - TSC/OSC UNAVAILABLE

"Unavailability of TSC/OSC Ventilation System due to Ventilation Fan (FN-1) failure to start.

"On Monday, December 10, 2012, at 1414 hours with Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station (PNPS) at 100% core thermal power, the Technical Support Center (TSC)/Operations Support Center (OSC) emergency ventilation system was declared non-functional due to the failure of a fan (FN-1) to start during a scheduled surveillance (8.B.24). The balance of the TSC/OSC ventilation is not affected by this event and remain available.

"Under certain accident conditions the TSC/OSC may become unavailable due to inability of the filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Compensatory measures exist to relocate TSC/OSC personnel to the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) and the Control Room. In the event of a declared emergency, all OSC personnel will report to the Control Room Annex. TSC minimum staffing will report to the Control Room and all other TSC staff will report to the EOF.

"The troubleshooting is being worked as a high priority and is conservatively scheduled to be completed by 1900 hours on Wednesday, November 12, 2012. A follow-up to this notification will be made when the TSC/OSC is returned to functional status or if the maintenance effort is significantly extended.

"The licensee has notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector.

"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of an emergency response facility."

Power Reactor	Event Number: 48575
Facility: LIMERICK Region: 1 State: PA Unit: [1] [ ] [ ] RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4 NRC Notified By: JOHN HARKINS HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO	Notification Date: 12/10/2012 Notification Time: 21:40 [ET] Event Date: 10/13/2012 Event Time: 18:41 [EST] Last Update Date: 12/10/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY 10 CFR Section: 50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION	Person (Organization): DANIEL HOLODY (R1DO)

Unit	SCRAM Code	RX CRIT	Initial PWR	Initial RX Mode	Current PWR	Current RX Mode
1	N	Y	100	Power Operation	100	Power Operation

Event Text

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID MULTIPLE SYSTEM ACTUATIONS

"On Saturday, October 13, 2012, Unit 1 was operating at 100% power. At 1841 [EDT], the 1A RPS/UPS inverter tripped and the automatic transfer of the RPS and UPS 120 VAC distribution panel (1A-Y160) loads to the primary alternate AC power source was delayed. The delay in automatic load transfer caused the RPS series breakers to trip on undervoltage. The failure caused a loss of power to Division IA and IIA RPS relays and Division IA and IIA NS4 relays. This caused primary containment isolation valves (PClVs) to automatically close on more than one system. The IB and IIB channels were unaffected.

"The most probable cause for the delayed load transfer was a failed logic power supply with a momentary loss of synchronization. Troubleshooting continues [in order] to confirm the specific cause of the component failure. The distribution panel loads are currently supplied by an installed alternate AC power source.

"The portion of the primary containment isolation system that received an actuation signal functioned successfully. All of the affected open isolation valves automatically closed. The isolation was a partial actuation.

"This 60-day ENS report is being made per 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1) to report invalid automatic actuations of systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B). The listed system that actuated was general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. Primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) closed on drywell chilled water (DWCW), reactor enclosure cooling water (RECW), primary containment instrument gas (PCIG), Unit 1 containment leak detector, and Unit 2 containment leak detector."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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