Event Notification Report for November 29, 2012

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST X-RAY FLUORESCENCE ANALYZER

The following was submitted by the State of Texas via email:

"On November 19, 2012, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee that they could not locate a Thermo Niton model number XL-II x-ray fluorescence analyzer. The device contains a 10 millicurie cadmium - 109 source and a 20 millicurie iron - 59 source. The radiation safety officer thought the device had been shipped to the manufacturer, but after he was unable to find any shipping papers for the device, he determined the device was missing. The licensee does not believe the lost device poses an exposure hazard to members of the general public. The investigation into this event is on going. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA-300."

Texas Incident #: I - 9019

* * * UPDATE AT 1513 EST ON 12/4/12 FROM ART TUCKER TO S. SANDIN * * *

The following update was received from the State of Texas via email:

"The Agency [State of Texas] contacted the device manufacturer and was informed that the device requires a password to operate. The Agency [State of Texas] contacted the licensee who stated the password feature was active and that the password would not have been included in the container with the device.

"The device contains a 20 millicurie iron - 55 source and not a iron - 59 source as previously reported. The date of the event was November 29, 2012, not November 19, 2012 as stated in the Event Narrative."

Notified R4DO (Deese) and FSME Events Resource, ILTAB and MEXICO via email/fax.

* * * UPDATE FROM ART TUCKER TO CHARLES TEAL ON 12/11/12 AT 1607 EST * * *

"On December 11, 2012, the Agency [State of Texas] was notified by the licensee that the source had been located at the manufacturer facility. The manufacturer provided a letter to the licensee dated March 13, 2012, stating that they had removed the two sources from the device and placed them in storage until they could be disposed of."

Notified R4DO (Haire) and FSME Events Resource, ILTAB and MEXICO via email/fax.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION OF INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION

"This telephone notification is being made for an invalid actuation in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) following the reporting guidance of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) and is not considered a Licensee Event Report.

"With Unit 2 at Cold Shutdown (about 105?F and depressurized), an invalid actuation of the Main Feedwater (FW) isolation occurred at 2200 [EST] during removal of the 'A' Train Hi Consequence Limiting Safeguards (CLS) fuses. This action caused the 'A' train FW isolation relay to actuate and, as designed, tripped the operating 'B' Main Feed Pump (MFP) and the Main Turbine, which was latched for testing. The 'A' MFP was not in operation at the time of the event.

"This was a partial actuation of the SI system. SI signals were inhibited prior to removal of the Hi CLS fuses by the tagging of the lead connecting the Hi CLS relay to the SI master relay. Although FW isolation occurs with SI actuation, the relay associated with the FW isolation circuitry is separately actuated and had not been tagged out. When the Hi CLS fuses were removed, the FW isolation relay was energized.

"Plant systems and components responding to the signal started and functioned as designed with the exception of those inhibited by tag out. The affected components were restored to their pre-event configuration, The action to determine and initiate corrective actions is complete, and the necessary procedures are under revision."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER FAILURE

"On December 26, 2012 the licensee reported that the shutter of one of its fixed gauges could not be closed as designed. The gauge is a Metso Automation, Inc., Model BWM-T (Serial Number 21136049). The gauge contains 400 mCi of Kr-85. The gauge is mounted on a scanning platform that traverses a paper web and is used as a sensor. The problem was noted by the on-site technician of Hoosier Technical Services Company, service provider on November 29, 2012.

"Metso Automation, Inc. was contacted and the following actions were taken: The scanning platform containing the gauge was placed in the home position and removed from the process, power was removed from the equipment, and finally the old shutter mechanism was removed and replaced with a new part.

"A radiation survey was performed and found to be within design parameters and regulatory limits. The Virginia Radioactive Material Program is not performing a site visit or follow-up as the shutter was repaired, all radiation levels are normal, and there was no public health or environmental concerns."

Virginia Report: VA-13-001