Event Notification Report for October 12, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/11/2012 - 10/12/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
4857048402484034840448741
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48570
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ANTHONY PETRELLI
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 12/07/2012
Notification Time: 14:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2012
Event Time: 10:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2012
Notification Time: 14:49 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2012
Event Time: 10:12 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 12/07/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
DON JACKSON (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TEMPERATURE SWITCH FAILURE CAUSES DIVISION I ISOLATION SIGNAL
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"On October 12, 2012, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) received a Division I primary containment isolation signal which resulted in the closure of Group 5, 6, and 10 primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) in the following systems:
"Group 5 PCIVs: Residual Heat Removal System (RHS); Shutdown Cooling (SDC);
"Group 6 PCIVs: Reactor Water Cleanup System (WCS) supply outside isolation valve; and
"Group 10 PCIVs: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System.
"All affected PCIVs responded as designed. The Division I isolation signal was generated due to the failure of a temperature switch unit. The Division I and II temperature switch units were both reading within limits when the Division I unit failed. Since the isolation signal was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation, the isolation signal was determined to be invalid.
"The event was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-2012-009380. There were no safety consequences and no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event."
The licensee notified the New York State Public Service Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made per the reporting requirements specified in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) to describe an invalid actuation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system.
"On October 12, 2012, Nine Mile Point Unit 2 (NMP2) received a Division I primary containment isolation signal which resulted in the closure of Group 5, 6, and 10 primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) in the following systems:
"Group 5 PCIVs: Residual Heat Removal System (RHS); Shutdown Cooling (SDC);
"Group 6 PCIVs: Reactor Water Cleanup System (WCS) supply outside isolation valve; and
"Group 10 PCIVs: Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) System.
"All affected PCIVs responded as designed. The Division I isolation signal was generated due to the failure of a temperature switch unit. The Division I and II temperature switch units were both reading within limits when the Division I unit failed. Since the isolation signal was not initiated in response to actual plant conditions or parameters satisfying the requirements for initiation, the isolation signal was determined to be invalid.
"The event was entered into the corrective action program as Condition Report CR-2012-009380. There were no safety consequences and no impact to the health and safety of the public as a result of this event."
The licensee notified the New York State Public Service Commission and the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48402
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSS PARKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSS PARKER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/12/2012
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2012
Event Time: 04:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2012
Notification Time: 11:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2012
Event Time: 04:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
REACTOR POWER EXCEEDED FSAR ANALYZED VALUE
"On 10/12/12 at 0420 CDT the Unit 2 Steam Generator B Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve (ADV) spuriously opened while in automatic control. This resulted in indicated reactor power exceeding the FSAR analyzed value of 1810.8 MWt. Prompt operator action was taken and reactor power was restored to within limits in approximately four minutes. The operators placed the Atmospheric Steam Dump Controller to manual and closed the ADV successfully. This event is being reported under the criteria in 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B).
"All other plant systems responded as expected."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM MARY SIPIORSKI TO VINCE KLCO ON 12/04/12 AT 1544 EST * * *
"This notification is being made to retract Event Notification EN #48402 which reported power exceeding the FSAR analyzed value of 1810.8 MWt due to a spurious opening of an Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve. While 1810.8 MWt is the normal PBNP [Point Beach Nuclear Plant] full power value without consideration to uncertainties, subsequent reviews show that the peak power level reached during the event was bounded by FSAR analyzed events. Additionally, the opening of the valve is an Anticipated Operational Occurrence, described and analyzed in the FSAR.
"The power excursion during the event was below excursions evaluated in the FSAR. The event was analyzed and plant safety was not significantly degraded. Therefore, the event does not meet the criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3) and NextEra Energy Point Beach retracts Event Notification EN #48402."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R3DO (Pelke).
"On 10/12/12 at 0420 CDT the Unit 2 Steam Generator B Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve (ADV) spuriously opened while in automatic control. This resulted in indicated reactor power exceeding the FSAR analyzed value of 1810.8 MWt. Prompt operator action was taken and reactor power was restored to within limits in approximately four minutes. The operators placed the Atmospheric Steam Dump Controller to manual and closed the ADV successfully. This event is being reported under the criteria in 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B).
"All other plant systems responded as expected."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM MARY SIPIORSKI TO VINCE KLCO ON 12/04/12 AT 1544 EST * * *
"This notification is being made to retract Event Notification EN #48402 which reported power exceeding the FSAR analyzed value of 1810.8 MWt due to a spurious opening of an Atmospheric Steam Dump Valve. While 1810.8 MWt is the normal PBNP [Point Beach Nuclear Plant] full power value without consideration to uncertainties, subsequent reviews show that the peak power level reached during the event was bounded by FSAR analyzed events. Additionally, the opening of the valve is an Anticipated Operational Occurrence, described and analyzed in the FSAR.
"The power excursion during the event was below excursions evaluated in the FSAR. The event was analyzed and plant safety was not significantly degraded. Therefore, the event does not meet the criteria of 10CFR50.72(b)(3) and NextEra Energy Point Beach retracts Event Notification EN #48402."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R3DO (Pelke).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48403
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BOB MURRELL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BOB MURRELL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/12/2012
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2012
Event Time: 15:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2012
Notification Time: 17:02 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2012
Event Time: 15:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO LEAK FROM CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK CONTAINMENT PIT SUMP
"On October 12, at 1535 CDT, Duane Arnold Energy Center made a voluntary report to the State of Iowa (Bureau of Radiological Health and Department of Natural Resources) and Linn County Public Health Department in accordance with the nuclear industry voluntary reporting criteria contained in NEI 07-07, 'Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative.' The subject of the report was a leak from the Condensate Storage Tanks' containment pit sump. The release occurred in an isolated area inside the plant property and has been terminated. Samples were taken and no regulatory limits were exceeded. During and following the leak, there was no impact to site worker or public health and safety.
"This report in being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), as a result of notification to offsite agencies.
"The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Total amount leaked was estimated to be less than 100 gallons.
"On October 12, at 1535 CDT, Duane Arnold Energy Center made a voluntary report to the State of Iowa (Bureau of Radiological Health and Department of Natural Resources) and Linn County Public Health Department in accordance with the nuclear industry voluntary reporting criteria contained in NEI 07-07, 'Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative.' The subject of the report was a leak from the Condensate Storage Tanks' containment pit sump. The release occurred in an isolated area inside the plant property and has been terminated. Samples were taken and no regulatory limits were exceeded. During and following the leak, there was no impact to site worker or public health and safety.
"This report in being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), as a result of notification to offsite agencies.
"The Licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
Total amount leaked was estimated to be less than 100 gallons.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48404
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JAMES PRIEST
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JAMES PRIEST
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/12/2012
Notification Time: 21:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2012
Event Time: 21:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2012
Notification Time: 21:04 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2012
Event Time: 21:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/12/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
JAMES TRAPP (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"On October 12, 2012, at 2100 EDT, the Hope Creek Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service to perform planned preventive maintenance on the system. The maintenance consists of minor maintenance to clean the intake louvers that supply outside air to the emergency filter unit (00-VH313), the supply unit fan (00-VH314) and the remote shutdown panel (RSP) supply unit fan (00-VH316). The removal of the ventilation potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared radiological emergency requiring activation. Appropriate compensatory measures are in place while the ventilation is out of service. The Emergency Response Organization duty team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to activate the TSC in an alternate location. The ventilation system is scheduled to be out of service for approximately 25 hours and the TSC Ventilation will be returned to service at 2200 on October 13, 2012.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The local township will be notified."
"On October 12, 2012, at 2100 EDT, the Hope Creek Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system was removed from service to perform planned preventive maintenance on the system. The maintenance consists of minor maintenance to clean the intake louvers that supply outside air to the emergency filter unit (00-VH313), the supply unit fan (00-VH314) and the remote shutdown panel (RSP) supply unit fan (00-VH316). The removal of the ventilation potentially affects the TSC habitability during a declared radiological emergency requiring activation. Appropriate compensatory measures are in place while the ventilation is out of service. The Emergency Response Organization duty team has been notified of the maintenance and the possible need to activate the TSC in an alternate location. The ventilation system is scheduled to be out of service for approximately 25 hours and the TSC Ventilation will be returned to service at 2200 on October 13, 2012.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The local township will be notified."
Part 21
Event Number: 48741
Rep Org: TOPWORX
Licensee: TOPWORX
Region: 1
City: LOUISVILLE State: KY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN HAMPTON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: TOPWORX
Region: 1
City: LOUISVILLE State: KY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN HAMPTON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 02/11/2013
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/2013
Notification Time: 15:26 [ET]
Event Date: 10/12/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/11/2013
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
PART 21 RX GROUP (E-MA)
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1DO)
GEORGE HOPPER (R2DO)
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
PART 21 RX GROUP (E-MA)
PART 21 REPORT - SWITCHES BUILT WITH ADHESIVE BEYOND ITS EXPIRATION DATE
TopWorx discovered that switches were built and shipped using adhesive G909 that was beyond its manufacturer's recommended expiration date. Adhesion properties of the expired adhesive cannot be guaranteed against the deleterious effects of seismic events, thermal aging, and high dose radiation. The switches involved were TopWorx M8-24521-P4 shipped on 12 October 2012 and TopWorx M8-2352T-P4 shipped on 8 November 2012. Both shipments were sent to PGS Enrique Maria Hierro S.L. in Spain.
If the units mentioned above are found to be installed in an environment that may expose them to the conditions of seismic events, thermal aging, and/or high dose radiation, then the units should be replaced.
Per TopWorx, there were 13 switches shipped. All switches were shipped to Spain. No switches were shipped to US licensees.
Technical questions or concerns should be addressed to Alex Murphy, Manager, Quality, (502) 873-4602.
TopWorx discovered that switches were built and shipped using adhesive G909 that was beyond its manufacturer's recommended expiration date. Adhesion properties of the expired adhesive cannot be guaranteed against the deleterious effects of seismic events, thermal aging, and high dose radiation. The switches involved were TopWorx M8-24521-P4 shipped on 12 October 2012 and TopWorx M8-2352T-P4 shipped on 8 November 2012. Both shipments were sent to PGS Enrique Maria Hierro S.L. in Spain.
If the units mentioned above are found to be installed in an environment that may expose them to the conditions of seismic events, thermal aging, and/or high dose radiation, then the units should be replaced.
Per TopWorx, there were 13 switches shipped. All switches were shipped to Spain. No switches were shipped to US licensees.
Technical questions or concerns should be addressed to Alex Murphy, Manager, Quality, (502) 873-4602.