| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
09/26/2012 - 09/27/2012 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 46965 | Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MOECK
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 06/16/2011
Notification Time: 14:46 [ET]
Event Date: 06/16/2011
Event Time: 12:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text ADDITIONAL PENETRATION IDENTIFIED FOR MITIGATION DURING WALKDOWN
"Operations identified a potential flooding issue in the Intake Structure 1007 ft. 6 in. level. The area of concern is a the hole in the floor at the 1007 ft. 6 in. level where the relief valve from FP-1A discharge pipe goes through the raw pump bay and discharges into the intake cell. There is one penetration of concern. Flooding through this penetration could have impacted the ability of the station's Raw Water (RW) pumps to perform their design accident mitigation functions.
"Efforts are in progress to seal the penetration.
"This eight-hour notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(v)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 9/26/12 AT 1949 EDT FROM ROBERT KROS TO DONG PARK * * *
"The penetration in question is not an external penetration and is not within the scope of the CLB [Current Licensing Basis] and therefore the condition is not reportable. The penetration is internal to the intake structure and does not affect internal flooding.
"The failure to retract this notification in a timely fashion was identified while reviewing flood related station notifications from 2011 and has been entered into the corrective action system."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Werner). |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 47848 | Facility: FORT CALHOUN
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: (1) CE
NRC Notified By: AMY BURKHART
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER | Notification Date: 04/18/2012
Notification Time: 18:53 [ET]
Event Date: 10/06/2011
Event Time: 13:44 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
NEIL OKEEFE (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text WASTE DISPOSAL SYSTEM CLASS ONE SEISMIC SUPPORT INOPERABLE
"The Waste Disposal System [WDS] Class 1 piping requires operable seismic supports downstream of the isolation valve class break. Currently, eight (8) INC [International Nuclear Safety, Corp.] snubbers have been degraded to [Non Nuclear System] NNS Class 4 ridged struts. The snubbers original design function was to allow thermal motion but restrain seismic motion.
"The snubbers have been identified as potential to create an unanalyzed condition that over stresses the safety class 1 drain pipe upstream of the isolation valve if the snubbers on the drain pipe downstream of the isolation valve were in a locked condition (acting as a strut). Per NRC bulletin 81-01, these snubbers are assumed to be frozen and do not allow movement of the pipe; thus, they have been degraded to rigid struts as they are not in the snubber program and are not tested. They still provide a seismic safety function for [class] II/I issues and act as a strut to provide horizontal restraint to the WDS piping.
"The snubbers were removed from the piping system and tested to determine their performance and if they would have moved to allow thermal growth. Six snubbers failed the test and were either in a locked condition or their movement was dimensionally small relative to the required movement. The [Reactor Coolant System] RCS is within acceptable stress values with the snubbers removed.
"The 8-hour regulatory reporting time has been exceeded."
An initial Reportability Evaluation was completed on March 26, 2012 and had determined the supports were operable. A second Reportability Evaluation later determined the supports have been inoperable since October 6, 2011. The WDS is used to drain the RCS.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION ON 9/26/12 AT 1949 EDT FROM ROBERT KROS TO DONG PARK * * *
"Additional review and testing demonstrated that [there was] no degradation of the RCS from thermal fatigue. The analysis demonstrates adequate past performance of the snubbers with regard to thermal fatigue. The impact of the snubber has been analyzed and determined to have not resulted in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety. Therefore, this event is being retracted. The failure to retract this notification in a timely fashion has been entered into the corrective action system."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Werner). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 48320 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: BAYER MATERIAL SCIENCE LLC
Region: 4
City: BAYTOWN State: TX
County:
License #: 01577
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN BLANCHARD
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 09/19/2012
Notification Time: 14:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/19/2012
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
FSME EVENTS RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FIXED GAUGE SHUTTERS STUCK OPEN
State of Texas provided the following information via email:
"On September 19, 2012, the licensee notified the Agency [Texas Department of Health] that during a routine inspection it had discovered that the shutters on two Berthold LB-300L gauges were stuck in the open position. Both gauges contained cobalt-60 sources: one source was 1.9 milliCuries and the other was 1.68 milliCuries. Since these gauges normally operate in the open position, there was no increased risk of exposure to any individual. The licensee is making arrangements for a licensed vendor representative to make repairs as soon as possible. Information will be provided in accordance with SA-300 as it is obtained.
"Source holder/source information: 1.9 mCi cobalt-60 source holder/source SN: 1412/1-7-98; 1.68 mCi cobalt-60 source holder/source SN: 1771/2-11-00."
Texas Incident #: I-8990 |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 48322 | Rep Org: UTAH DIVISION OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: ENERGY SOLUTIONS LLC
Region: 4
City: CLIVE State: UT
County:
License #: UT2300249
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GWYNN GALLOWAY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 09/19/2012
Notification Time: 17:34 [ET]
Event Date: 09/18/2012
Event Time: 14:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 09/19/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
GEOFFREY MILLER (R4DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SURFACE CONTAMINATION IDENTIFIED ON A SHIPMENT
The following information was received from the State of Utah via email:
"During the normal receipt process of a shipment #0870-09-0101 of LLRW [low level radioactive waste] on September 18, 2012, Energy Solutions personnel found one barrel in a shipment of five barrels that had removable beta contamination (tritium) which exceeded U.S. DOT limits. There was no visible damage to the barrel and no indication that the barrel had leaked during transport. Licensee personnel surveyed the other barrels in the shipment and the vehicle. No removable beta contamination was found and the vehicle was released on September 18, 2012.
"[Utah Division of Radiation Control] staff are investigating this incident."
Utah Incident No.: UT120002 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48339 | Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GLENN GOELZER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 09/25/2012
Notification Time: 09:46 [ET]
Event Date: 09/25/2012
Event Time: 05:55 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/27/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER REMOVED FROM SERVICE FOR MAINTENANCE
"On September 25, 2012, power was removed from various Technical Support Center (TSC) systems to perform planned system preventative maintenance (PM) and corrective maintenance (CM) activities. During these maintenance activities, the normal TSC and Operational Support Center (OSC) are unavailable for use during an emergency. The Plant Data Network (PDN) will not be available to the TSC. This will render the Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS), Emergency Response Facility Display System (ERFDS), Emergency Assessment and Response System (EARS) and the Post LOCA Sampling System in the TSC unavailable. System alarms and data displays will still be available to the plant operators in the Control Room. The expected duration of the power outage is approximately 39 hours.
"As compensatory measures, the backup emergency response facilities will be manned during an emergency. This compensatory measure has been communicated to the emergency response organization. It is expected that appropriate assessment of plant conditions, notifications, and communications could still be made, if required, during the time that the normal TSC and OSC are unavailable. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii), which is any event that results in a major loss of emergency assessment capability, offsite response capability, or offsite communications capability. An update message will be provided when the emergency response facilities are restored."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM GOELZER TO KLCO ON 9/27/12 AT 0025 EDT * * *
"This is an update to EN #48339 report on September 25, 2012, where Pacific Gas & Electric company (PG&E) reported that a planned maintenance power outage caused the normal Technical Support Center (TSC) and Operational Support Center (OSC) to be unavailable for use during an emergency.
"PG&E has completed all preventative maintenance (PM) and corrective maintenance (CM) activities that required the power outage to the TSC and OSC and has completed the restoration of these emergency response facilities. Plant personnel have been notified that the normal emergency response facilities have been restored.
"PG&E personnel have informed the NRC Resident Inspector."
Notified the R4DO (Werner). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48345 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDY SAND
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 09/26/2012
Notification Time: 09:47 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2012
Event Time: 08:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) PLANNED MAINTENANCE ACTIVITY
"On 9/26/12, the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant's TSC power supply will be isolated to perform a planned maintenance activity. The maintenance activity requires implementation of compensatory measures to maintain TSC functions during the planned activity. Compensatory measures include having the Emergency Director report to Control Room and relocating the remaining TSC staff at the EOF should an event be declared requiring Emergency Response Organization (ERO) activation. Maintenance activity is scheduled to be complete with the TSC fully functional by end of dayshift on 9/26/12. Site ERO has been notified of maintenance activity and instructed on planned compensatory measures to be implemented during activity if required. This event is considered reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."
The licensee will notify the Minnesota State Duty Officer, and the Sherriff Departments for both Wright and Sherburne Counties.
* * * UPDATE ON 9/26/12 AT 1734 EDT FROM TOM PROELL TO DONG PARK * * *
"At approximately 1520 Central time, a disturbance occurred in the 12.5kV system during restoration activities for the TSC power supply. This would have caused a Major Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and thus is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The licensee is investigating the disturbance. The EOF and all other emergency assessment capabilities were verified functional. The licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector."
The disturbance to the 12.5kV system did not affect plant operations.
Notified R3DO (Lipa). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48347 | Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DELBERT ELKINTON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 09/26/2012
Notification Time: 19:49 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2012
Event Time: 13:36 [MST]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
DARYL JOHNSON (ILTA)
WILLIAM RULAND (NRR)
JANE MARSHALL (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text ATTEMPTED ENTRY ONTO THE SITE BY AN ILLEGAL ALIEN WITH FALSE IDENTIFICATION
"This event is being reported as a newsworthy concern to the public under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi). All times listed are approximate Mountain Standard Time.
"On September 26,2012, at 13:36 pm, Arizona Public Service (APS) was notified of the intention of Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) to issue a press release regarding an attempted entry to the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station's (PVNGS) Security Owner Controlled Area (SOCA) by an individual with suspicious identification earlier this morning.
"An individual employed with a construction project sub-contractor arrived at the SOCA checkpoint and presented suspicious identification to PVNGS security officers to gain access to the site. The individual was not admitted through the checkpoint into the SOCA. MCSO was notified and placed the individual into custody. MCSO determined the identification was false and the individual was an undocumented immigrant.
"The individual did not enter nor was he previously granted access to the site's Protected Areas surrounding the three units and Independent Spent Fuel Storage Installation. No evidence of malicious intent has been identified. MCSO is investigating the incident.
"The station notified NRC Resident Inspectors and Region IV staff of the condition.
"APS does not intend at this time to issue a press release, but is responding to media inquiries." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 48348 | Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN HAYNES
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK | Notification Date: 09/26/2012
Notification Time: 22:27 [ET]
Event Date: 09/26/2012
Event Time: 15:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/26/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION 3.0.3 ENTERED DUE TO SURVEILLANCE TESTING NOT BEING COMPLETED AS REQUIRED
"Pressurizer Pressure LO Instrument surveillance testing was discovered to not have been completed as required. Existence of an internal jumper on solid state protection system input to logic cards prevented complete circuit testing. Unit 1 and unit 2 entered Technical Specification [TS] 3.0.3 at 1515 hours."
Alternate method of surveillance testing on one of the trains was completed and TS 3.0.3 was exited on Unit 1 at 2203 EDT and Unit 2 at 2132 EDT. The licensee plans to complete surveillance testing on the second train before 1515 hours on 9/27/12. The licensee is currently in TS 3.3.2.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The states of North Carolina and South Carolina will be notified. Local county governments of York, Gaston, and Mecklenberg counties will also be notified. | |