Event Notification Report for September 21, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/20/2012 - 09/21/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
48332483334833448335
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48332
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ANDREW MITCHELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ANDREW MITCHELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/21/2012
Notification Time: 18:48 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2012
Event Time: 14:49 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2012
Notification Time: 18:48 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2012
Event Time: 14:49 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3DO)
MARK RING (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
DRYWELL RADIATION MONITOR INOPERABLE
"At 1449 CDT on September 21, 2012, the 2B Drywell Radiation Monitor was found downscale during control room panel monitoring. This monitor provides the input into one division of the primary containment isolation logic for a Group II isolation. As a result, the channel was placed in a tripped condition at 1515 hours in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, Condition B.
"Initial troubleshooting indicates that one of the two divisions of the isolation logic was inoperable. Given both divisions are required to complete the Group II isolation logic, this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"The station is currently taking action to restore the 2B Drywell Radiation Monitor to an operable condition.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
"At 1449 CDT on September 21, 2012, the 2B Drywell Radiation Monitor was found downscale during control room panel monitoring. This monitor provides the input into one division of the primary containment isolation logic for a Group II isolation. As a result, the channel was placed in a tripped condition at 1515 hours in accordance with Technical Specification 3.3.6.1, Condition B.
"Initial troubleshooting indicates that one of the two divisions of the isolation logic was inoperable. Given both divisions are required to complete the Group II isolation logic, this condition is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) as an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function.
"The station is currently taking action to restore the 2B Drywell Radiation Monitor to an operable condition.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48333
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: REX REISSNER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: REX REISSNER
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 09/21/2012
Notification Time: 20:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2012
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2012
Notification Time: 20:28 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2012
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION IDENTIFIED IN APPENDIX R FIRE SCENARIO
"On September 21, 2012, a condition was identified where hydrogen may become entrained in the charging pump suction after the credited pump is restarted as part of the alternate shutdown procedure for the Auxiliary Building basement and mezzanine levels.
"An air operated valve separates the Volume Control Tank (VCT) from the charging pump suction and this valve fails open on loss of air or power caused by the postulated fire. The alternate flow path from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) fails closed on a loss of air or power. A manual valve is provided to bypass this closed valve. However, due to hydrogen pressure in the VCT and the potential for significant pressure losses in the piping from the RWST to the charging pump suction, insufficient elevation head exists in the RWST to ensure that hydrogen will not become entrained. If this condition is left unmitigated, the credited charging pump is assumed to fail.
"Due to the location of the postulated fire and its impact on equipment and cables, no other inventory makeup sources are credited.
"Compensatory Measures have been implemented as follows:
1. All fire detection and suppression systems in the Appendix R fire zones have been verified functional.
2. All Hot Work in the area has been suspended.
3. Continuous Fire Watch has been posted in the Appendix R fire zone.
4. Combustion engine powered vehicles are restricted from entering the Auxiliary Building.
5. Within 24 hours remove all non-attended transient combustible materials from Appendix R fire zones.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION FROM REISNER TO SNYDER ON 9/28/12 AT 1415 EDT * * *
"This is a retraction of ENS report 48333 that was submitted at 2028 EDT on Friday, September 21 , 2012.
"A 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) ENS notification was made due to a condition that was identified where hydrogen may become entrained in the charging pump suction after the credited pump is restarted as part of the alternate shutdown procedure in the event of a fire in the Auxiliary Building basement and mezzanine levels.
"A subsequent engineering evaluation calculated the amount of gas that will be entrained into the charging pump suction flow and the duration of the entrainment. This evaluation demonstrates that for the most limiting Appendix R scenario that the charging pump will entrain a minimal amount of gas for a short duration, and is unaffected by this condition. Inventory control for the reactor coolant system is maintained throughout the scenario.
"Based on the above information the 'Unanalyzed Condition' ENS notification made on September 21, 2012 is being retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Bellamy).
"On September 21, 2012, a condition was identified where hydrogen may become entrained in the charging pump suction after the credited pump is restarted as part of the alternate shutdown procedure for the Auxiliary Building basement and mezzanine levels.
"An air operated valve separates the Volume Control Tank (VCT) from the charging pump suction and this valve fails open on loss of air or power caused by the postulated fire. The alternate flow path from the Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) fails closed on a loss of air or power. A manual valve is provided to bypass this closed valve. However, due to hydrogen pressure in the VCT and the potential for significant pressure losses in the piping from the RWST to the charging pump suction, insufficient elevation head exists in the RWST to ensure that hydrogen will not become entrained. If this condition is left unmitigated, the credited charging pump is assumed to fail.
"Due to the location of the postulated fire and its impact on equipment and cables, no other inventory makeup sources are credited.
"Compensatory Measures have been implemented as follows:
1. All fire detection and suppression systems in the Appendix R fire zones have been verified functional.
2. All Hot Work in the area has been suspended.
3. Continuous Fire Watch has been posted in the Appendix R fire zone.
4. Combustion engine powered vehicles are restricted from entering the Auxiliary Building.
5. Within 24 hours remove all non-attended transient combustible materials from Appendix R fire zones.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION FROM REISNER TO SNYDER ON 9/28/12 AT 1415 EDT * * *
"This is a retraction of ENS report 48333 that was submitted at 2028 EDT on Friday, September 21 , 2012.
"A 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) ENS notification was made due to a condition that was identified where hydrogen may become entrained in the charging pump suction after the credited pump is restarted as part of the alternate shutdown procedure in the event of a fire in the Auxiliary Building basement and mezzanine levels.
"A subsequent engineering evaluation calculated the amount of gas that will be entrained into the charging pump suction flow and the duration of the entrainment. This evaluation demonstrates that for the most limiting Appendix R scenario that the charging pump will entrain a minimal amount of gas for a short duration, and is unaffected by this condition. Inventory control for the reactor coolant system is maintained throughout the scenario.
"Based on the above information the 'Unanalyzed Condition' ENS notification made on September 21, 2012 is being retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Bellamy).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48334
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 09/21/2012
Notification Time: 21:29 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2012
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2012
Notification Time: 21:29 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2012
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
CHRISTOPHER CAHILL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ISOLATION VALVES COULD FAIL TO FULLY CLOSE
"A review of load sequencing during a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) with offsite power available has identified an issue with 24 motor operated valves (MOVs - 12 per unit). These valves all use limit switch 8 (LS-8) as an isolation permissive and may indicate closed if they are in a dead band zone when stroking closed from a containment isolation signal at the time of the load shed. The valves will then not resume movement to full isolation when power is restored potentially impacting containment leakage. This condition could occur during specific LOCA conditions, dependent on several variables.
"The systems affected by this issue are:
- RWCU
- DWCW
- PCIG
- CAC
- Suppression Pool Cleanup
"Actions are in progress to resolve the LS-8 issue with a modification to remove this vulnerability. Appropriate testing will be done to prove that all valves perform their required safety function after the modifications are complete for each valve.
"All affected valves are either closed and de-energized, or have been modified at this time."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"A review of load sequencing during a design basis loss of coolant accident (LOCA) with offsite power available has identified an issue with 24 motor operated valves (MOVs - 12 per unit). These valves all use limit switch 8 (LS-8) as an isolation permissive and may indicate closed if they are in a dead band zone when stroking closed from a containment isolation signal at the time of the load shed. The valves will then not resume movement to full isolation when power is restored potentially impacting containment leakage. This condition could occur during specific LOCA conditions, dependent on several variables.
"The systems affected by this issue are:
- RWCU
- DWCW
- PCIG
- CAC
- Suppression Pool Cleanup
"Actions are in progress to resolve the LS-8 issue with a modification to remove this vulnerability. Appropriate testing will be done to prove that all valves perform their required safety function after the modifications are complete for each valve.
"All affected valves are either closed and de-energized, or have been modified at this time."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Non-Agreement State
Event Number: 48335
Rep Org: DOW CORNING
Licensee: DOW CORNING, MIDLAND PLANT
Region: 3
City: MIDLAND State: MI
County:
License #: 21-08362-12
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID DILLON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: DOW CORNING, MIDLAND PLANT
Region: 3
City: MIDLAND State: MI
County:
License #: 21-08362-12
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID DILLON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/21/2012
Notification Time: 22:51 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2012
Event Time: 22:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2012
Notification Time: 22:51 [ET]
Event Date: 09/21/2012
Event Time: 22:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/21/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
MARK RING (R3DO)
FSME EVENT RESOURCE (EMAI)
DENSITY GAUGE SHUTTER FAILURE
A density gauge with a 4 milliCurie Cs-137 source was identified to have a stuck shutter. The gauge is an Ohmart Vega Model SHF1A-0, S/N 0964CO, and is permanently installed on a process line in an isolated tower area. This event did not result in exposure to any personnel. The licensee barricaded the area, which read less than 1mR/hr. The licensee plans on having the gauge repaired by the manufacturer.
A density gauge with a 4 milliCurie Cs-137 source was identified to have a stuck shutter. The gauge is an Ohmart Vega Model SHF1A-0, S/N 0964CO, and is permanently installed on a process line in an isolated tower area. This event did not result in exposure to any personnel. The licensee barricaded the area, which read less than 1mR/hr. The licensee plans on having the gauge repaired by the manufacturer.