Event Notification Report for July 25, 2012

PRESS RELEASE DUE TO AN ELEVATED LEVEL OF TRITIUM DETECTED ON SITE

"TMI is issuing a press release and performing courtesy stakeholder communications as a result of an elevated level of tritium detected in one of 55 on-site ground water monitoring wells near the plant structure. The tritium concentration in the well is contained to the site and well [within] EPA drinking water standards. TMI is performing voluntary communications in accordance with NEI 07-07 Industry Ground Water Protection Initiative and contacting local and state stakeholders as a courtesy. As a result of the press release, a four-hour notification is being made per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(xi)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and local counties (Dauphin and York).

UNACCOUNTED FOR SOURCE RANGE MONITOR DETECTOR

"During annual physical inventory of Special Nuclear Material (SNM) conducted at Grand Gulf Nuclear Station (GGNS), a replacement Source Range Monitor (SRM) detector could not be accounted for. The SRM detector was being stored in the refuel floor storage locker after maintenance activities during RF18. This detector did not function and was removed prior to the start-up therefore, the SRM detector was not subjected to a critical reactor. Actions continue to locate the missing SRM detector. There is no evidence of sabotage or tampering associated with this activity."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

IDENTIFICATION OF A DEGRADED OR UNANALYZED CONDITION

"At 1602 [CDT], Engineering personnel notified the control room that during review of a pipe stress calculation it was identified that non-conservative or incorrect methodologies were used in the calculation. This calculation was for a modification to install four; 3 [inch] drain lines between the Essential Service Water (ESW) (safety) and the Service Water (SW) (non-safety) in 1991. A preliminary ME101 stress analysis performed, which corrects the above-identified discrepancies, indicates that the pipe stresses at the drain line weldolet connection exceed the ASME code of record allowable stresses by approximately 50%, when the revised Stress Intensification Factor (SIF) is applied. This modification affected both trains (A & B) ESW trains.

"The normal system alignment uses the SW water to supply the ESW, then during accident conditions the SW and ESW systems isolate from each other so that two redundant separate train isolation valves isolate the ESW system. These 3 [inch] drain lines are located in the section of piping that is isolated from the ESW and SW systems.

"At the time of notification 'A' ESW was isolated from SW and 'B' ESW was in normal system alignment. 'B' ESW was declared inoperable and action was taken to separate the SW and ESW and isolate the 3 [inch] drain valves. With this action complete the non-conforming components have been removed from service and OPERABILITY of the ESW has been restored.

"This condition is been reported per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * RETRACTION FROM MARCY BLOW TO DONG PARK ON 09/19/12 AT 1520 EDT * * *

"Further engineering evaluation determined that the four drain lines [3-inch] between the Essential Service Water (ESW) (safety) and the Service Water (SW) (non-safety) were found to be within the allowable limits for operability and are acceptable. As a result, the condition has been determined to not be reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R4DO (Miller).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK SHUTTER ON FIXED PROCESS GAUGE

Louisiana provided the following information via fax:

"Georgia-Pacific (GP), AI#2617, had a shutter that failed open on a Ronan Engineering, Model SA-1-F37, Cs-137 2 Ci. The fixed gauge was located at the GP Consumer Operations LLC's GP Port Hudson facility and reported as not functioning properly. The device is used in production to measure chip level within the Esco Digester. This production unit was currently down for annual maintenance. The handle turned but subsequent surveys could not verify that the shutter was completely closed. As a precaution, GP did not allow any personnel to work in the affected area. [A person] with BP Sales evaluated the device and cycled the shutter to an open position so that the receiver got a positive reading. Therefore, the gauge appears to be functioning properly so that the Esco Digester can restart. The fixed gauge passed previous shutter tests on October 2011 and April 2012. GP plans to replace the gauge within the next 90 days. The gauge is 500 feet above ground and no employees work daily around the gauge."

NMED Item Number: LA120002