Event Notification Report for July 12, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
07/11/2012 - 07/12/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
48101480964809748099
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48101
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BILL HART
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BILL HART
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 07/12/2012
Notification Time: 23:29 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2012
Event Time: 13:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2012
Notification Time: 23:29 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2012
Event Time: 13:15 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
MARK HAIRE (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POWER SUPPLY PROBLEMS TO VARIOUS AREA RAD MONITORS
"At 13:15 PDT on 7-12-2012, during the performance of an annual surveillance, power supply ARM-E/S-603A was discovered to have out of tolerance voltage readings. ARM-E/S-603A was declared non-functional. This resulted in a loss of the ability to monitor and quantify radiological conditions in multiple areas of the reactor building, due to the loss of ARM-RIS-1 thru 10 (area radiation monitor radiation indicating switches 1 thru 10).
"The loss of ability to monitor and quantify radiological conditions in multiple areas of the reactor building represents a major loss of emergency assessment capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). As directed by station procedures, compensatory measures have been enacted to have Health Physics personnel tour the affected areas once per shift to document and trend the radiological conditions. ARM-RIS-1 and 4 thru 10 are used for EAL determinations.
"Work to return the ARM-E/S-603A to service is underway and is a high priority."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 13:15 PDT on 7-12-2012, during the performance of an annual surveillance, power supply ARM-E/S-603A was discovered to have out of tolerance voltage readings. ARM-E/S-603A was declared non-functional. This resulted in a loss of the ability to monitor and quantify radiological conditions in multiple areas of the reactor building, due to the loss of ARM-RIS-1 thru 10 (area radiation monitor radiation indicating switches 1 thru 10).
"The loss of ability to monitor and quantify radiological conditions in multiple areas of the reactor building represents a major loss of emergency assessment capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). As directed by station procedures, compensatory measures have been enacted to have Health Physics personnel tour the affected areas once per shift to document and trend the radiological conditions. ARM-RIS-1 and 4 thru 10 are used for EAL determinations.
"Work to return the ARM-E/S-603A to service is underway and is a high priority."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48096
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEITH MAESTAS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEITH MAESTAS
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/12/2012
Notification Time: 02:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2012
Event Time: 05:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2012
Notification Time: 02:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2012
Event Time: 05:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
| 4 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNAVAILABILITY OF TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM DUE TO SCHEDULED MAINTENANCE
"The Turkey Point Nuclear Plant will be performing the semi-annual HVAC inspection of the TSC Building on 7/12/2012. The work is scheduled to start at 0500 EDT and complete at 1500 EDT. The projected non-functional time is 10 hours. The Emergency Response Organization duty team members will be informed to respond to alternate locations if activation is required during that period.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to loss of an emergency response facility."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL COEN TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1538 EDT ON 7/12/12 * * *
The maintenance on the TSC has been completed and the TSC was declared operable at 1535 EDT on 7/12/12.
Notified R2DO (Calle).
"The Turkey Point Nuclear Plant will be performing the semi-annual HVAC inspection of the TSC Building on 7/12/2012. The work is scheduled to start at 0500 EDT and complete at 1500 EDT. The projected non-functional time is 10 hours. The Emergency Response Organization duty team members will be informed to respond to alternate locations if activation is required during that period.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to loss of an emergency response facility."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM MICHAEL COEN TO CHARLES TEAL AT 1538 EDT ON 7/12/12 * * *
The maintenance on the TSC has been completed and the TSC was declared operable at 1535 EDT on 7/12/12.
Notified R2DO (Calle).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48097
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN APRIL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN APRIL
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 07/12/2012
Notification Time: 04:49 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2012
Event Time: 02:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2012
Notification Time: 04:49 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2012
Event Time: 02:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOWERING CONDENSER VACUUM
"On July 12, 2012, at 0200 EDT, clean steam reboiler 'B' failed, causing a loss of sealing steam. This resulted in degrading condenser vacuum and rising off gas system pressure. The main steam backup supply for sealing steam also failed, and condenser vacuum and off gas system pressure continued to degrade.
"In response to rising off gas system pressure and lowering condenser vacuum, reactor power was lowered to 85% in accordance with Special Operating Procedures. With off gas system pressure approaching the procedural limit and condenser vacuum degrading rapidly, a manual reactor scram was inserted at 0220 EDT.
"All control rods fully inserted and all systems functioned as expected on the scram.
"Plant is currently shutdown and parameters are stable.
"The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures and plant cooldown is in progress.
"The cause of the loss of both the primary and backup sources of sealing steam is under investigation."
The shutdown electrical lineup is normal and decay heat is being removed via steam bypass valves to the main condenser. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Public Service Commission.
"On July 12, 2012, at 0200 EDT, clean steam reboiler 'B' failed, causing a loss of sealing steam. This resulted in degrading condenser vacuum and rising off gas system pressure. The main steam backup supply for sealing steam also failed, and condenser vacuum and off gas system pressure continued to degrade.
"In response to rising off gas system pressure and lowering condenser vacuum, reactor power was lowered to 85% in accordance with Special Operating Procedures. With off gas system pressure approaching the procedural limit and condenser vacuum degrading rapidly, a manual reactor scram was inserted at 0220 EDT.
"All control rods fully inserted and all systems functioned as expected on the scram.
"Plant is currently shutdown and parameters are stable.
"The unit is currently implementing post scram recovery procedures and plant cooldown is in progress.
"The cause of the loss of both the primary and backup sources of sealing steam is under investigation."
The shutdown electrical lineup is normal and decay heat is being removed via steam bypass valves to the main condenser. The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Public Service Commission.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 48099
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE HEMATITE
Region: 3 State: MO
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: DENNIS RECHARDSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: MO
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: DENNIS RECHARDSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 07/12/2012
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2012
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2012
Notification Time: 15:07 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2012
Event Time: 12:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/16/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCUN (R3DO)
PATTI SILVA (NMSS)
ERIC DUNCUN (R3DO)
PATTI SILVA (NMSS)
24 HOUR REPORT RELATED TO CRITICALITY CONTROL BULLETIN 91-01
"Around noon on July 12, 2012, workers noticed that a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS)-controlled 5-gallon container, formally identified as a 'Field Container' being used as part of burial pit remediation at the Westinghouse Hematite Decommissioning Project, looked unusual. Field Containers are white standard-size 5-gallon buckets with a locking lid and are supposed to be unique to other containers being used at the facility. Upon investigation, it was determined that the container was actually a 6-1/2-gallon container - white with a locking lid, almost identical to a Field Container except for height. The container was in the midst of being used to consolidate exhumed radiologically elevated soil, formally identified as a Hot Spot. One shovel's worth of dirt had been transferred into the 6-1/2-gallon container when the condition was noticed. The workers called their supervisor upon discovery. The supervisor issued a verbal stop work order, and went to investigate the condition in the field. The use of a 6-1/2-gallon container is a violation of an NCS Control (specifically, Safety Feature 01 of NSA-TR-09-15, Rev. 3).
"NCS was called to assess the condition and direction was given to transfer the shovel's worth of soil from the 6-1/2-gallon container into an empty 5-gallon Field Container. The 6-1/2-gallon container, now empty, was destroyed. Other 6-1/2-gallon containers (the remaining 18 out of 20 containers that were identified as being purchased for different purposes) were removed and are under control pending their destruction. (It was confirmed that the one missing container of the purchase lot had been used for other non-NCS purposes.)
"The work crew on the other end of the burial pit remediation area was informed of the problem and cautioned to confirm the labeled volume capacity on the bottom of Field Containers to be used. The other areas where Field Containers are staged in the field and at the work site were inspected to confirm that no other 6-1/2-gallon containers were present. The consolidation points where these containers are staged when filled were also inspected to confirm that no 6-1/2-gallon containers were present.
"An investigation is under way to determine:
1) how the 6-1/2-gallon containers were inadvertently brought out to the burial pit,
2) how and why 6-1/2-gallon containers looking very similar to 5-gallon Field Containers were purchased and became available for misidentification as Field Containers, and
3) what actions need to be put in place to assure that future purchases of containers that may be mistaken for Field Containers do not occur."
Westinghouse Hematite is undergoing decommissioning. The location of this event was at the burial pit remediation area.
The licensee plans to also notify NRC Region 3 (Lafranzo) and NRC HQ (Hayes).
* * * UPDATE FROM DENNIS RICHARDSON TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1707 EDT ON 07/16/2012 * * *
"In the original report, Hematite stated that "the remaining 18 out of 20 (6-1/2-gallon) containers that were identified as being purchased...were removed and are under control..." (Parenthetical statement added for clarity.) During the destruction of the 6-1/2-gallon containers, it was noticed that 6 of the 18 quarantined containers were actually 5-gallon containers. A second search of all inventoried, staged, and used/in-process containers was conducted to find the missing six 6-1/2-gallon containers. None of the missing six 6-1/2-gallon containers were found. The complete facility was then searched in an effort to find the 6 missing 6-1/2-gallon containers; but, none were found. The identified 5-gallon containers, which were in the middle of a stack of 6-1/2-gallon containers, were taken directly from the original shipping pallet; and, as the 6 missing 6-1/2-gallon containers cannot be found, were, mostly likely, mistakenly shipped by the supplier as 6-1/2-gallon containers. At this point, all identified 6-1/2-gallon containers on site have been destroyed."
The licensee will notify the NRC Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Kozak) and NMSS (Silva).
"Around noon on July 12, 2012, workers noticed that a Nuclear Criticality Safety (NCS)-controlled 5-gallon container, formally identified as a 'Field Container' being used as part of burial pit remediation at the Westinghouse Hematite Decommissioning Project, looked unusual. Field Containers are white standard-size 5-gallon buckets with a locking lid and are supposed to be unique to other containers being used at the facility. Upon investigation, it was determined that the container was actually a 6-1/2-gallon container - white with a locking lid, almost identical to a Field Container except for height. The container was in the midst of being used to consolidate exhumed radiologically elevated soil, formally identified as a Hot Spot. One shovel's worth of dirt had been transferred into the 6-1/2-gallon container when the condition was noticed. The workers called their supervisor upon discovery. The supervisor issued a verbal stop work order, and went to investigate the condition in the field. The use of a 6-1/2-gallon container is a violation of an NCS Control (specifically, Safety Feature 01 of NSA-TR-09-15, Rev. 3).
"NCS was called to assess the condition and direction was given to transfer the shovel's worth of soil from the 6-1/2-gallon container into an empty 5-gallon Field Container. The 6-1/2-gallon container, now empty, was destroyed. Other 6-1/2-gallon containers (the remaining 18 out of 20 containers that were identified as being purchased for different purposes) were removed and are under control pending their destruction. (It was confirmed that the one missing container of the purchase lot had been used for other non-NCS purposes.)
"The work crew on the other end of the burial pit remediation area was informed of the problem and cautioned to confirm the labeled volume capacity on the bottom of Field Containers to be used. The other areas where Field Containers are staged in the field and at the work site were inspected to confirm that no other 6-1/2-gallon containers were present. The consolidation points where these containers are staged when filled were also inspected to confirm that no 6-1/2-gallon containers were present.
"An investigation is under way to determine:
1) how the 6-1/2-gallon containers were inadvertently brought out to the burial pit,
2) how and why 6-1/2-gallon containers looking very similar to 5-gallon Field Containers were purchased and became available for misidentification as Field Containers, and
3) what actions need to be put in place to assure that future purchases of containers that may be mistaken for Field Containers do not occur."
Westinghouse Hematite is undergoing decommissioning. The location of this event was at the burial pit remediation area.
The licensee plans to also notify NRC Region 3 (Lafranzo) and NRC HQ (Hayes).
* * * UPDATE FROM DENNIS RICHARDSON TO JOHN SHOEMAKER AT 1707 EDT ON 07/16/2012 * * *
"In the original report, Hematite stated that "the remaining 18 out of 20 (6-1/2-gallon) containers that were identified as being purchased...were removed and are under control..." (Parenthetical statement added for clarity.) During the destruction of the 6-1/2-gallon containers, it was noticed that 6 of the 18 quarantined containers were actually 5-gallon containers. A second search of all inventoried, staged, and used/in-process containers was conducted to find the missing six 6-1/2-gallon containers. None of the missing six 6-1/2-gallon containers were found. The complete facility was then searched in an effort to find the 6 missing 6-1/2-gallon containers; but, none were found. The identified 5-gallon containers, which were in the middle of a stack of 6-1/2-gallon containers, were taken directly from the original shipping pallet; and, as the 6 missing 6-1/2-gallon containers cannot be found, were, mostly likely, mistakenly shipped by the supplier as 6-1/2-gallon containers. At this point, all identified 6-1/2-gallon containers on site have been destroyed."
The licensee will notify the NRC Inspector.
Notified R3DO (Kozak) and NMSS (Silva).