Event Notification Report for May 14, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/13/2012 - 05/14/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
47921479224792348092
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47921
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MOTLEY HEDGES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MOTLEY HEDGES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/14/2012
Notification Time: 11:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2012
Event Time: 03:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2012
Notification Time: 11:02 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2012
Event Time: 03:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
DALE POWERS (R4DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER OUT-OF-SERVICE DUE TO PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"At 0300 PDT on 5-14-2012, planned maintenance was started on the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC system. The scope of work is to replace the carbon tray gaskets and perform carbon filter testing. The duration of this scheduled maintenance is planned for 26 hours.
"This condition represents a major loss of emergency preparedness capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) in that the TSC habitability might not be sustainable during events due to the inability of the filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Station procedures provide instructions to relocate the TSC if monitoring during an emergency event indicates habitability cannot be maintained. Compensatory measures are in place to heighten awareness of responsible TSC staff following ERO activation to monitor TSC habitability in accordance with procedures and to consider TSC relocation as necessary as described in the station emergency plan."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0300 PDT on 5-14-2012, planned maintenance was started on the Technical Support Center (TSC) HVAC system. The scope of work is to replace the carbon tray gaskets and perform carbon filter testing. The duration of this scheduled maintenance is planned for 26 hours.
"This condition represents a major loss of emergency preparedness capability per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) in that the TSC habitability might not be sustainable during events due to the inability of the filtration system to maintain a habitable atmosphere. Station procedures provide instructions to relocate the TSC if monitoring during an emergency event indicates habitability cannot be maintained. Compensatory measures are in place to heighten awareness of responsible TSC staff following ERO activation to monitor TSC habitability in accordance with procedures and to consider TSC relocation as necessary as described in the station emergency plan."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47922
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSTY WHITEHEAD
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RUSTY WHITEHEAD
HQ OPS Officer: DONG HWA PARK
Notification Date: 05/14/2012
Notification Time: 13:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2012
Event Time: 10:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2012
Notification Time: 13:45 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2012
Event Time: 10:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
SCOTT FREEMAN (R2DO)
SCOTT FREEMAN (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO OIL SHEEN OBSERVED ON DIFFUSER POND
"On 05/14/2012 at 1024 EDT, a notification to the National Response Center was made as a result of an oil sheen on waters of the U.S. (Sequoyah's Diffuser pond). The discharge from an onsite pond was isolated stopping what appears to be the source of oil to the diffuser pond. The source of leakage is still under investigation.
"The following additional agencies have also been notified:
"EPA Region 4,
"Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC), and
"Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA).
"Oil is maintained onsite, [and] no oil has been discharged to the river. Cleanup is in progress.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DOE (Turner), EPA (Post), USDA (Beverly), HHS (Emerson), and FEMA (Casto).
"On 05/14/2012 at 1024 EDT, a notification to the National Response Center was made as a result of an oil sheen on waters of the U.S. (Sequoyah's Diffuser pond). The discharge from an onsite pond was isolated stopping what appears to be the source of oil to the diffuser pond. The source of leakage is still under investigation.
"The following additional agencies have also been notified:
"EPA Region 4,
"Tennessee Department of Environment and Conservation (TDEC), and
"Tennessee Emergency Management Agency (TEMA).
"Oil is maintained onsite, [and] no oil has been discharged to the river. Cleanup is in progress.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified DOE (Turner), EPA (Post), USDA (Beverly), HHS (Emerson), and FEMA (Casto).
Part 21
Event Number: 47923
Rep Org: SHAW GROUP INC.
Licensee: GERDAU LONG STEEL NORTH AMERICA
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EDWARD HUBNER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: GERDAU LONG STEEL NORTH AMERICA
Region: 1
City: CHARLOTTE State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: EDWARD HUBNER
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 05/14/2012
Notification Time: 14:46 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2012
Notification Time: 14:46 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/14/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
10 CFR Section:
21.21(d)(3)(i) - DEFECTS AND NONCOMPLIANCE
Person (Organization):
SCOTT FREEMAN (R2DO)
PART 21 REACTORS GRP (EMAI)
SCOTT FREEMAN (R2DO)
PART 21 REACTORS GRP (EMAI)
THREADING DEVIATIONS ON STEEL REINFORCING BAR SUPPLIED TO CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS
This report was supplied for informational purposes. The threaded ends of some of the reinforcing bar supplied to the V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 and the Vogtle Units 3 and 4 nuclear projects were found to have threads too long or too short, double threaded areas, voids in threads, or an incorrect thread profile.
"The results of evaluations of this condition as documented by Shaw Nuclear and conducted in accordance with the procedure for performing evaluations required by 10 CFR 21.21, have concluded that the deviations in the rebar would not create a substantial safety hazard, if they were to remain uncorrected. Therefore, it has been determined that these deviations are not reportable under the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21. This information is being provided for industry awareness of the occurrence of these types of deviations in reinforcing steel being provided as a basic component."
This report was supplied for informational purposes. The threaded ends of some of the reinforcing bar supplied to the V.C. Summer Units 2 and 3 and the Vogtle Units 3 and 4 nuclear projects were found to have threads too long or too short, double threaded areas, voids in threads, or an incorrect thread profile.
"The results of evaluations of this condition as documented by Shaw Nuclear and conducted in accordance with the procedure for performing evaluations required by 10 CFR 21.21, have concluded that the deviations in the rebar would not create a substantial safety hazard, if they were to remain uncorrected. Therefore, it has been determined that these deviations are not reportable under the requirements of 10 CFR Part 21. This information is being provided for industry awareness of the occurrence of these types of deviations in reinforcing steel being provided as a basic component."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 48092
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CREASY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TODD CREASY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 07/11/2012
Notification Time: 12:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2012
Event Time: 09:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2012
Notification Time: 12:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/14/2012
Event Time: 09:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/11/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
ART BURRITT (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
60-DAY OPTIONAL TELEPHONIC NOTIFICATION FOR AN INVALID EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER ACTUATION
"At 0928 EDT on May 14, 2012, the 'B' Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump started during testing from the Unit 1 remote shutdown panel (RSP). The likely cause of the start was either human error in performing continuity checks or inadvertent contact with the manual start circuit in the RSP. Based on the likely cause, this was an invalid actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).
"As indicated in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. This 60-day telephone notification is being made to meet the reporting requirements instead of submitting an LER since the actuation was invalid and was not an RPS actuation with the reactor critical.
"The following additional information is being provided as specified in NUREG-1022:
"The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated: The 'B' ESW pump inadvertently started during testing from the Unit 1 remote shutdown panel.
"Whether each train actuation was complete or partial: This was a partial actuation (one of four ESW pumps).
"Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully: The 'B' ESW pump started successfully, operated properly, and continued running until manually secured via normal controls."
At the time of the event, the licensee was performing a surveillance where control was shifted from the control room to the remote shutdown panel.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 0928 EDT on May 14, 2012, the 'B' Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump started during testing from the Unit 1 remote shutdown panel (RSP). The likely cause of the start was either human error in performing continuity checks or inadvertent contact with the manual start circuit in the RSP. Based on the likely cause, this was an invalid actuation of a system listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv).
"As indicated in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), in the case of an invalid actuation reported under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. This 60-day telephone notification is being made to meet the reporting requirements instead of submitting an LER since the actuation was invalid and was not an RPS actuation with the reactor critical.
"The following additional information is being provided as specified in NUREG-1022:
"The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated: The 'B' ESW pump inadvertently started during testing from the Unit 1 remote shutdown panel.
"Whether each train actuation was complete or partial: This was a partial actuation (one of four ESW pumps).
"Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully: The 'B' ESW pump started successfully, operated properly, and continued running until manually secured via normal controls."
At the time of the event, the licensee was performing a surveillance where control was shifted from the control room to the remote shutdown panel.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.