Event Notification Report for May 03, 2012

PREPLANNED MAINTENANCE ON TSC VENTILATION SYSTEM

"At approximately 0830 EDT on 5/3/12, preplanned maintenance will be performed on the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system. This maintenance will be performed for TSC Fan OA-2 for a motor replacement. This maintenance is planned to be performed and completed within 8 hours. If an emergency condition should occur that would require evacuation of the TSC, the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) emergency plan has procedural guidance for use of an alternate location.

"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) as described in NUREG-1022, Rev. 2 since this work activity affects an emergency response facility for the duration of the maintenance."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE FROM TIM ENGLISH TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1713 EDT ON 5/3/2012 * * *

Maintenance work has been completed and the TSC is considered operable as of 1713 EDT.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Seymour).

SHIPPING CASKS TAKEN OUT OF SERVICE FOR ACCIDENT SCENARIO NOT PREVIOUSLY ANALYZED

"This serves as notification of a regulatory compliance issue with the 10-160B Type B Cask (Certificate of Compliance #9204) and the 8-120B Type B Cask (Certificate of Compliance #9168). This notification is being made in accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.21(d)(3)(i). These casks have been administratively placed out of service as Type B Packages until a complete determination can be made by Energy Solutions and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).

"As part of the relicensing of new 8-120B Casks, EnergySolutions identified a hypothetical accident scenario required by 10 CFR 71 which was not previously analyzed as part of the original or ongoing licensing activities. This analysis confirmed that the current cask design does not comply with the Type B package requirement for this specific accident scenario. The 10-160B has a similar design. As such, the casks have been placed out of service. EnergySolutions initiated Condition Report ENG-CR12-018 to track this issue.

"In accordance with 10 CFR Part 21.21(d)(4), EnergySolutions will provide written notification to the NRC within 30 days with additional information including corrective actions."

* * * UPDATE AT 1644 EDT ON 5/25/12 FROM SHRUM TO HUFFMAN * * *

The licensee provided a 30-day written follow-up report to the condition described above:

"Pursuant to the requirements of 10 CFR 21, EnergySolutions is providing this thirty day written report as required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii).

"On May 3, 2012, the Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs, of EnergySolutions provided written notification to the NRC Operations Center of a regulatory compliance issue with the 10-160B Type B Cask (Certificate of Compliance #9204) and the 8-120B Type B Cask (Certificate of Compliance #9168) as required by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(i).

"Information required to be reported by 10 CFR 21.21(d)(3)(ii) is provided as follows:

(4) The written report required by this paragraph shall include, but need not be limited to, the following information, to the extent known:

(i) Name and address of the individual or individuals informing the Commission.

"Dan Shrum, EnergySolutions Senior Vice President, Regulatory Affairs
423 West 300 South, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84103

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect.

"Model 8-120B Package, USA/9168B(U)
"Model 10-160B Package, USA/9204B(U)F-96

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect.

"The basic component is supplied by EnergySolutions

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such defect or failure to comply.

"A Hypothetical Accident Condition was identified that had not been previously analyzed. Evaluation of this accident scenario found that during the thermal test the package secondary lid seals might reach a temperature exceeding the temperature limit for the seal material. If the temperature exceeds the limit, the seals may fail. Failure of the seals could result in a release of radioactive material exceeding the limits of 10 CFR 71.51.

(v) The date on which the information of such defect or failure to comply was obtained.

"Confirmatory calculations of the engineering analysis issue were completed on May 26, 2012.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which contains a defect or fails to comply, the number and location of these components in use at, supplied for, being supplied for, or may be supplied for manufactured, or being manufactured for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part.

"The packages, as currently designed, meet the requirements of a Type A or IP-2 package and some are being used in that capacity. The package location listed below is as of 5/23/12.

MODEL NUMBER LOCATION(S)
8-120B 4 120B-1 Cooper Nuclear Station in Nebraska; 120B-2 in transit to Tennessee;
120B-1S in to transit to Tennessee; 120B-2S in transit to Tennessee

10-160B 6 160B-1 Bremerton, WA; 160B-2 Columbia, SC; 160B-3 Portsmouth, MA; 160B-4 Canada;
160B-5 Canada; 160B-6 Kittery, ME; 160B-7 Carlsbad, NM; 160B-8 Columbia, SC

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will he taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action,

"EnergySolutions issued a Condition Report, ENG-CR12-018, on 4/26/12 identifying the issue and beginning the internal investigation process to determine the cause of the defect and identify corrective action(s); this internal investigation is in progress. The packages were taken out of service as of 4/27/12. EnergySolutions has submitted a request for NRC approval to continue use of the packages for a limited time. EnergySolutions will submit a request to the NRC before the end of May 2012 for approval of a change to the package design supported by a revision to the SAR demonstrating compliance with the requirements of Part 71.

(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees.

"Owners and users of the packages have been informed of the defect and have concurred with EnergySolution's action to remove the packages from service. Any action by the NRC on continued use will be communicated to the package users and owners. Once NRC has approved the design change, users and owners will be notified and modifications to the packages will be made to conform with the approved design.

(ix) In the case of an early site permit, the entities to whom an early site permit was transferred.

"Not applicable"

The R1DO (Trapp), R2DO (Sykes), R3DO (Dailey); R4DO (Spitzburg) & NMSS EO (Smith) were notified. Copies of this report were sent to the Part 21 Reactors and Materials Group and FSME Event Resource via e-mail.

OPERATOR FAILS FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST

"A licensed operating supervisor tested positive in a for-cause test for alcohol. The operator was not on shift during the day of the test. The operator's access to the plant has been suspended. A review of the operators work is being performed."

The license has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

BOTH TRAINS OF THE CONTROLLED VENTILATION AREA SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"This is a non-emergency 8 hour notification being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) Prevented Safety Function. Both trains of the Controlled Ventilation Area System (CVAS) were considered inoperable from 1613 to 1641 CDT on 5/3/2012.

"Waterford 3 was performing planned maintenance on CVAS Train A with the train declared inoperable. Operations supervision was informed by maintenance personnel that an electrical conduit near the work area and not related to the work in progress had been found with a conduit connection unthreaded and separated. The contained wires could be seen and appeared intact. Investigation by engineering personnel determined that the conduit was associated with CVAS Train B. Operations declared CVAS Train B inoperable and entered Technical Specification (TS) 3.0.3 at 1613 hours.

"Operations personnel were already restoring CVAS Train A following completion of maintenance. After performing the planned retest, Operations declared CVAS Train A operable and exited TS 3.0.3 at 1641 hours. No actions were taken to commence a power reduction or reactor shutdown.

"The CVAS is required following a design basis accident to draw all exhaust air from the CVAS areas of the Reactor Auxiliary Building through HEPA and charcoal filters before discharge to the atmosphere. The CVAS areas contain equipment such as the shutdown cooling heat exchangers, safety injection pumps and other areas with containment penetrations. The CVAS is credited in accident analysis for limiting the radiological release under a Loss of Coolant Accident condition.

"Following repair of the conduit connection, Operations declared CVAS Train B operable at 1956 hours.

"Waterford 3 remained stable at 100% power during the condition. Both trains of offsite and onsite electrical sources, ECCS, and Containment Cooling safety systems remained operable during the condition."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM WILLIAM HARDIN TO VINCE KLCO ON 6/29/2012 AT 1515 EDT * * *

"This is a non-emergency notification from Waterford 3 retracting a previous notification.

"On 5/3/2012 at 2107 EDT, Waterford 3 communicated Notification Message EN 47897, pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(ii), Degraded or Unanalyzed Condition and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Prevented Safety Function, stating that both trains of the Controlled Ventilation Area System (CVAS) were considered inoperable from 1613 to 1641 CDT on 5/3/2012.

"Subsequent engineering evaluation has determined that the as-found condition would not cause the inoperability of CVAS Train B. With one train operable, the plant remained within analyzed conditions and capable of fulfilling safety functions. As such, no condition existed which required reporting.

"Based on this information, Waterford 3 is retracting notification message EN 47897."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R4DO (Clark).

UNPLANNED MEDICAL TREATMENT OF A CONTAMINATED INDIVIDUAL

"An employee complained of feeling dizzy. He was taken into the onsite medical dispensary for observation. The employee had been working at the Uranium Ore Concentrates Sampling area when he began to feel ill. There was approximately 18,000 dpm/100cm2 contamination on the bottom of the employee's plant issued shoes. After the employee recovered sufficiently, he was released [to] the care of his personal physician. The employee was free of contamination before being transported to the offsite medical facility."

The licensee notified the Region II Senior Fuel Facility Inspector.