Event Notification Report for April 19, 2012
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/18/2012 - 04/19/2012
EVENT NUMBERS
478504785247853478544785547886
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47850
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRANDON SHULTZ
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BRANDON SHULTZ
HQ OPS Officer: KARL DIEDERICH
Notification Date: 04/19/2012
Notification Time: 11:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2012
Event Time: 07:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2012
Notification Time: 11:10 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2012
Event Time: 07:53 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/20/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING LOSS OF RECIRCULATION PUMPS
"Limerick Unit 1 was manually scrammed from 100% power at 0753 hours on 4/19/12 in accordance with plant procedure OT-112 'Recirculation Pump Trip' when both 1A and 1B Recirculation Pump Adjustable Speed Drives (ASDs) tripped due to an electrical fault affecting the 144D and 114A non-safety related 480V Load Centers. The shutdown was normal and the plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with normal pressure control via the Main Steam Bypass valves to the main condenser and normal level control using feedwater. The manual RPS actuation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2).
"The Technical Support Center (TSC) Normal Air conditioning systems shut down due to loss of power from the 144D Load Center. The loss of power also affects the flow indication for the Emergency Ventilation system. This is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability, and reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The Emergency TSC Ventilation system is available but flow cannot be verified. During a required activation the TSC, responders would report to the TSC. If conditions required use of the Emergency Ventilation system, the Station Emergency Director would assess habitability in accordance with Station procedures. TSC relocation of personnel would be directed as required until such time that the TSC ventilation system is returned to service"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1726 ON 4/20/2012 FROM BRANDON SHULTZ TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"The Technical Support Center (TSC) 144D load center has been re-energized, restoring the emergency ventilation flow indication and emergency assessment capability to its normal stand-by condition."
The switchgear was inspected for any potential grounds and then reenergized at approximately 0800 EDT on 4/20/2023.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Joustra).
"Limerick Unit 1 was manually scrammed from 100% power at 0753 hours on 4/19/12 in accordance with plant procedure OT-112 'Recirculation Pump Trip' when both 1A and 1B Recirculation Pump Adjustable Speed Drives (ASDs) tripped due to an electrical fault affecting the 144D and 114A non-safety related 480V Load Centers. The shutdown was normal and the plant is stable in Hot Shutdown with normal pressure control via the Main Steam Bypass valves to the main condenser and normal level control using feedwater. The manual RPS actuation is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2).
"The Technical Support Center (TSC) Normal Air conditioning systems shut down due to loss of power from the 144D Load Center. The loss of power also affects the flow indication for the Emergency Ventilation system. This is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability, and reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii). The Emergency TSC Ventilation system is available but flow cannot be verified. During a required activation the TSC, responders would report to the TSC. If conditions required use of the Emergency Ventilation system, the Station Emergency Director would assess habitability in accordance with Station procedures. TSC relocation of personnel would be directed as required until such time that the TSC ventilation system is returned to service"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1726 ON 4/20/2012 FROM BRANDON SHULTZ TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"The Technical Support Center (TSC) 144D load center has been re-energized, restoring the emergency ventilation flow indication and emergency assessment capability to its normal stand-by condition."
The switchgear was inspected for any potential grounds and then reenergized at approximately 0800 EDT on 4/20/2023.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Joustra).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47852
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN SCHWER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN SCHWER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 04/19/2012
Notification Time: 17:47 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2012
Event Time: 11:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2012
Notification Time: 17:47 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2012
Event Time: 11:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
Person (Organization):
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
JUDY JOUSTRA (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
OFFSITE TRANSPORT OF POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED INJURED WORKER
"At approximately 1156 EDT on 4/19/2012, a craft contractor worker was transported to an off-site medical facility due to a work-related injury. The injured individual was partially surveyed by a Health Physics technician in their anti-contamination clothing prior to leaving the site and no radioactive contamination was detected. The injured individual was then transported by ambulance accompanied by a Health Physics technician to the local hospital for medical treatment.
"At the hospital, the individual and applicable areas and equipment were surveyed by the Health Physics technician and no radioactive contamination was detected. The individual's anti-contamination clothing was returned to the site.
"This notification is being made under the 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) reporting requirements since a complete survey of the injured individual was unable to be made and he was considered to be potentially contaminated prior to being transported offsite.
"The site NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The worker was in containment on a polar crane platform when injured. He was subsequently released from the hospital and cleared to work.
"At approximately 1156 EDT on 4/19/2012, a craft contractor worker was transported to an off-site medical facility due to a work-related injury. The injured individual was partially surveyed by a Health Physics technician in their anti-contamination clothing prior to leaving the site and no radioactive contamination was detected. The injured individual was then transported by ambulance accompanied by a Health Physics technician to the local hospital for medical treatment.
"At the hospital, the individual and applicable areas and equipment were surveyed by the Health Physics technician and no radioactive contamination was detected. The individual's anti-contamination clothing was returned to the site.
"This notification is being made under the 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xii) reporting requirements since a complete survey of the injured individual was unable to be made and he was considered to be potentially contaminated prior to being transported offsite.
"The site NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
The worker was in containment on a polar crane platform when injured. He was subsequently released from the hospital and cleared to work.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47853
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RODNEY NACOSTE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RODNEY NACOSTE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/19/2012
Notification Time: 20:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2012
Event Time: 14:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2012
Notification Time: 20:58 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2012
Event Time: 14:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI FAILED TRIP TESTING SURVEILLANCE
"On 04/19/12 at 1430 while performing 1-SR-3.5.1.7, HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] Main & Booster Pump Set developed head & flow rate at rated reactor pressure. The HPCI turbine failed to trip using the manual trip pushbutton. This manual trip pushbutton should have caused the 1-FCV-73-18, HPCI TURBINE STOP VALVE, to go closed. HPCI was secured by taking the 1-FCV-73-16, HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE, to close. The 1-FCV-73-18, HPCI TURBINE STOP VALVE, also failed to go closed locally using the 1-XCV-73-18, HPCI TURBINE MECHANICAL TRIP, nor did it go closed when the auxiliary oil pump was secured.
"With the 1-FCV-73-18, HPCI TURBINE STOP VALVE, open, the HPCI ramp generator is no longer in the circuit therefore, should an initiation occur and cause the 1-FCV-73-16, HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE, to open there is the potential for the HPCI turbine to over speed. Therefore, HPCI was isolated using 1-FCV-73-3, HPCI STEAM LINE OUTBD ISOL VALVE. This incident is reportable as an 8-hour ENS notification under 10CFR 50,72 (b)(3)(v) as 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"It also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"On 04/19/12 at 1430 while performing 1-SR-3.5.1.7, HPCI [High Pressure Coolant Injection] Main & Booster Pump Set developed head & flow rate at rated reactor pressure. The HPCI turbine failed to trip using the manual trip pushbutton. This manual trip pushbutton should have caused the 1-FCV-73-18, HPCI TURBINE STOP VALVE, to go closed. HPCI was secured by taking the 1-FCV-73-16, HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE, to close. The 1-FCV-73-18, HPCI TURBINE STOP VALVE, also failed to go closed locally using the 1-XCV-73-18, HPCI TURBINE MECHANICAL TRIP, nor did it go closed when the auxiliary oil pump was secured.
"With the 1-FCV-73-18, HPCI TURBINE STOP VALVE, open, the HPCI ramp generator is no longer in the circuit therefore, should an initiation occur and cause the 1-FCV-73-16, HPCI TURBINE STEAM SUPPLY VALVE, to open there is the potential for the HPCI turbine to over speed. Therefore, HPCI was isolated using 1-FCV-73-3, HPCI STEAM LINE OUTBD ISOL VALVE. This incident is reportable as an 8-hour ENS notification under 10CFR 50,72 (b)(3)(v) as 'any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.'
"It also requires a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR 50.73(a)(2)(vii).
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47854
Facility: MCGUIRE
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK JACKSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: RICK JACKSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/19/2012
Notification Time: 22:07 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2012
Event Time: 17:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2012
Notification Time: 22:07 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2012
Event Time: 17:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL FIRE INDUCED SPURIOUS OPERATION OF STEAM GENERATOR PORV BLOCK VALVES
"On March 22, 2012, McGuire Nuclear Station notified the NRC of a condition which could result in fire induced spurious operation of the block valves for the Unit 2 Steam Generator (SG) Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs). This potential condition could adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown of Unit 2. This represented a condition reportable as per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Reference Event #47764 [for Unit-2].
"In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(c)(2)(i), McGuire is reporting results of ensuing cause and extent of condition evaluation of Event #47764, which has identified a similar condition on McGuire Unit 1. This condition could result in a fire induced spurious operation of the block valves for the Unit 1 SG PORVs. This spurious operation could potentially damage these valves and render them inoperable. Since these valves are unisolable, they could not be repaired to allow the Unit 1 SGs to be used for Unit cool down if needed. This potential condition could adversely affect the ability of the plant to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown of Unit 1. This represents a condition reportable as per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This potential condition is mitigated by existing compensatory measures (i.e. fire watches) which have been in place as part of McGuire's transition to NFPA 805."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On March 22, 2012, McGuire Nuclear Station notified the NRC of a condition which could result in fire induced spurious operation of the block valves for the Unit 2 Steam Generator (SG) Power Operated Relief Valves (PORVs). This potential condition could adversely affect the ability to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown of Unit 2. This represented a condition reportable as per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). Reference Event #47764 [for Unit-2].
"In accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(c)(2)(i), McGuire is reporting results of ensuing cause and extent of condition evaluation of Event #47764, which has identified a similar condition on McGuire Unit 1. This condition could result in a fire induced spurious operation of the block valves for the Unit 1 SG PORVs. This spurious operation could potentially damage these valves and render them inoperable. Since these valves are unisolable, they could not be repaired to allow the Unit 1 SGs to be used for Unit cool down if needed. This potential condition could adversely affect the ability of the plant to achieve and maintain a cold shutdown of Unit 1. This represents a condition reportable as per the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). This potential condition is mitigated by existing compensatory measures (i.e. fire watches) which have been in place as part of McGuire's transition to NFPA 805."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47855
Facility: HARRIS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM HELSEL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM HELSEL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/19/2012
Notification Time: 22:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2012
Event Time: 17:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2012
Notification Time: 22:32 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2012
Event Time: 17:24 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/19/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
REBECCA NEASE (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 90 | Power Operation | 90 | Power Operation |
TSC VENTILATION INOPERABLE
"At approximately 1724 EDT on April 19, 2012 with the Harris Nuclear Plant operating at 90% power in mode 1, Air Handler 17 was discovered not operating. Air Handler 17 provides ventilation supporting environmental habitability to the Technical Support Center (TSC) to keep ambient temperatures habitable for personnel and to ensure communications and assessment equipment remains functional. This degrades the heating and cooling capacity of the TSC by approximately one third. Due to the cool weather in the forecast, the remaining cooling systems will be operating more efficiently than they would in the hot summer months, which mitigates the impact of the degraded ventilation system. The system has been repaired as of 1950 EDT on April 19, 2012. The cause of the equipment failure was a broken belt and a condition report has been entered into the site's corrective action program. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii) as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility. The plant continues to operate at 90%. Other equipment functioned as expected. The on call Emergency Response Manager and Site Emergency Coordinator (TSC) have been notified and the alternate TSC is available."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At approximately 1724 EDT on April 19, 2012 with the Harris Nuclear Plant operating at 90% power in mode 1, Air Handler 17 was discovered not operating. Air Handler 17 provides ventilation supporting environmental habitability to the Technical Support Center (TSC) to keep ambient temperatures habitable for personnel and to ensure communications and assessment equipment remains functional. This degrades the heating and cooling capacity of the TSC by approximately one third. Due to the cool weather in the forecast, the remaining cooling systems will be operating more efficiently than they would in the hot summer months, which mitigates the impact of the degraded ventilation system. The system has been repaired as of 1950 EDT on April 19, 2012. The cause of the equipment failure was a broken belt and a condition report has been entered into the site's corrective action program. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72, criterion (b)(3)(xiii) as a condition that may impair the functionality of an Emergency Response Facility. The plant continues to operate at 90%. Other equipment functioned as expected. The on call Emergency Response Manager and Site Emergency Coordinator (TSC) have been notified and the alternate TSC is available."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Agreement State
Event Number: 47886
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: FORMOSA PLASTICS CORP
Region: 4
City: POINT COMFORT State: TX
County:
License #: 03893
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: FORMOSA PLASTICS CORP
Region: 4
City: POINT COMFORT State: TX
County:
License #: 03893
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/02/2012
Notification Time: 11:00 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2012
Notification Time: 11:00 [ET]
Event Date: 04/19/2012
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/02/2012
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
GREG WERNER (R4DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - PROCESS GAUGE SHUTTER STUCK IN OPEN POSITION
The following report was received from the State of Texas Department of Health Radiation Branch (via e-mail):
"On May 1, 2012, the Agency (Texas Radiation Branch) was notified by a licensee that the shutter on a Ronan SA-1 nuclear gauge containing 50 millicuries of cesium-137 was stuck in the open position. This is the normal position for the gauge shutter.
"The licensee contacted the gauge manufacture and the gauge shutter was repaired by the manufacturer on May 1, 2012. The shutter failure did not create an exposure risk to any individual. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA - 300."
Texas Report I-8950
The following report was received from the State of Texas Department of Health Radiation Branch (via e-mail):
"On May 1, 2012, the Agency (Texas Radiation Branch) was notified by a licensee that the shutter on a Ronan SA-1 nuclear gauge containing 50 millicuries of cesium-137 was stuck in the open position. This is the normal position for the gauge shutter.
"The licensee contacted the gauge manufacture and the gauge shutter was repaired by the manufacturer on May 1, 2012. The shutter failure did not create an exposure risk to any individual. Additional information will be provided as it is received in accordance with SA - 300."
Texas Report I-8950