| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/21/2011 - 12/22/2011 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 47509 | Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: ALAN MCLAUGHLIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 12/07/2011
Notification Time: 20:40 [ET]
Event Date: 12/07/2011
Event Time: 14:58 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/22/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text REACTOR BUILDING VENTILATION DIFFERENTIAL PRESSURE ABOVE TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and (D), event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function needed to control the release of radioactive material and mitigate the consequences of an accident. Following initial troubleshooting of the reactor building ventilation (VR) differential pressure (DP) control loop, the Unit 1 VR DP controller was left in manual per the troubleshooting steps. It was noted at 1458 CST, on 12/7/11, that building DP was above the TS SR 3.6.4.1.1 required value of -0.25" H20. This rendered the secondary containment inoperable. Reactor building DP was returned to within the TS requirements within 14 minutes, and following system walkdowns, secondary containment was declared operable at 1615 [CST, on] 12/7/11. Troubleshooting will continue with other excursions above -0.25" H2O possible until repairs are complete (anticipated being complete week of 12/12/11)."
This condition requires the licensee to comply with technical specifications values within 4 hours or be in Mode 3 within 12 hours.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM R. DRAPER TO P. SNYDER ON 12/22/11 AT 1440 EST * * *
"On December 7, 2011, following initial troubleshooting of the reactor building ventilation (VR) differential pressure (DP) control loop, the building DP was above the TS SR 3.6.4.1.1 value of -0.25 inch of vacuum water gauge. The secondary containment was declared inoperable and determined to be a loss of safety function. During the investigation it was determined that the event occurred due to a failure in the non-safety reactor building ventilation differential pressure control loop. The safety related function of the secondary containment and the non-safely reactor building ventilation differential pressure control loop are completely independent from one another. It is recognized that reactor building DP may exceed the TS SR [Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement] 3.6.4.1.1 value due to non-safety related component failures such as system fan trips, pressure controller malfunctions, rapid air temperature changes due to blast heater trips, or station heat recovery coil issues. A failure of a non-safety component does not result in a loss of safety function. The safely function of the secondary containment is maintained by adequate leak tightness and the operable ventilation equipment required to maintain the negative pressure requirements of TS SR 3.6.4.1.1. The safety related Stand-By Gas Treatment (SGT) ventilation system performs the negative pressure safety function. The secondary containment isolation safety function, isolation dampers and SGT systems remained operable throughout the event. Therefore this event did not constitute a loss of safety function of secondary containment and this event is not reportable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Pelke). |
| Agreement State | Event Number: 47528 | Rep Org: MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA
Region: 3
City: MINNEAPOLIS State: MN
County:
License #: 1049-206-27
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LYNN DUNBAR
HQ OPS Officer: CHARLES TEAL | Notification Date: 12/15/2011
Notification Time: 17:43 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2011
Event Time: 19:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
KEVIN O'SULLIVAN (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POSSIBLE MEDICAL EVENT
The following was received from the State of Minnesota via email:
"Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) was initially notified on December 14, 2011, by a representative from the University of Minnesota about a possible HDR [High Dose Rate] medical event. As of December 15, 2011 MDH was notified of the determination of a medical event that resulted in a 50% overexposure to an unintended area."
* * * UPDATE FROM BRANDON JURAN TO DONALD NORWOOD AT 1149 EST ON 12/23/2011 VIA E-MAIL * * *
"This notification is to provide follow-up information to the medical event initially reported on 12/15/2011 by Lynn Dunbar of the Minnesota Department of Health.
"The patient was being treated for uterine cancer using iridium 192 high dose-rate (HDR) brachytherapy. The written directive called for treating the target area to approximately 600 cGy per fraction for five fractions. Instrumentation consisted of four plastic Heyman capsules, a tandem, and a pair of ovoids. Of the seven pathway options, five were identified to be used in the treatment plan for delivering the dose, and catheters were inserted into these instruments.
"The first fraction of five was delivered with the tandem catheter not fully inserted into the tandem. The second of five fractions was delivered according to the original written directive. The 3rd, 4th, 5th fractions were modified to give the treatment volume the originally intended total dose. The dose to the rectum would have been 157.5 cGy if all five fractions were completed according to the original written directive. The dose to the rectum as treated was 256.2 cGy, about 63% more than intended."
The Event Date provided in the initial report was changed (from 12/15/2011 to 12/6/2011) and the number given as the 'MDH #' (MDH #: 1049-206-27) was re-assigned as the licensee's license number based on information provided in the update.
Notified R3DO (Pelke) and FSME EO (Einberg).
A Medical Event may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient. |
| Part 21 | Event Number: 47537 | Rep Org: USEC
Licensee: WESTERMAN COMPANIES
Region: 1
City: BETHESDA State: MD
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket: 70-7001
NRC Notified By: STEVEN PENROD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 12/20/2011
Notification Time: 14:22 [ET]
Event Date: 12/20/2011
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/20/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
| Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
LARRY CAMPBELL (NMSS)
PART 21 GRP by email ()
| Event Text PART 21 - UF6 ACCUMULATOR TANK HAD THROUGH WALL CRACKS THAT CAUSED LEAKAGE
The following information was received via facsimile:
"On October 26, 2011, the discovery of two (2) defects (cracks) was identified on the north head of the Building C-310A side accumulator vessel. The accumulator is a tank used to provide a storage volume for liquid Uranium Hexafluoride (UF6) during the product withdrawal process, and it can hold up to 20,000 pounds of UF6 liquid. The defects in the 48" UF6 side accumulator allowed a small release of material which produced a process gas leak detection alarm on October 21, 2011
"Investigation to determine the cause of the cracks has revealed that the base metal contained stress defects which allowed multiple cracks to form with some of the cracks penetrating through the outer wall causing the vessel to leak. These cracks were a result of fabrication deficiencies and not the use of the vessel. There are nine (9) similar basic components used in Buildings C-310 and C-315. However, the other nine (9) vessels were not manufactured by Westerman Companies, the firm which designed and fabricated the defective vessel.
"The C-310A side accumulator has been repaired by cutting out the area of the defect extending into the unaffected areas of the base metal in accordance with ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section VIII, Division 1. USEC held a meeting with a representative of Westerman Companies on November 22. 2011, to discuss the defect." |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 47540 | Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: LANDON BRITTAIN
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA | Notification Date: 12/21/2011
Notification Time: 06:14 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2011
Event Time: 00:46 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text BOTH UNIT TWO SECONDARY CONTAINMENT DOORS WERE INADVERTENTLY LEFT OPEN
"On 12/21/11 at 0046 Secondary Containment integrity was lost when both U2 Reactor Building interlock doors were open simultaneously. Interlock door electrical checks were in progress. TS LCORA 3.6.4.1.Condition A was entered. Reactor Building differential pressure remained within Tech Spec limits. The doors were both open for approximately 9 seconds.
"The cause of the event is being investigated."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. The State of Illinois Inspector will be notified.
* * * RETRACTION FROM KATHARINE NETEMEYER TO CHARLES TEAL ON 2/6/12 AT 1243 EST * * *
"On 12/21/2011, EN 47540 was made describing a condition where secondary containment was declared inoperable due to not meeting the surveillance requirement for having one access door closed. This was reported as a loss of safety function for the secondary containment. This condition occurred during a planned maintenance activity.
"During a maintenance activity both doors unexpectedly opened. As a part of the maintenance, the inner door was opened by maintenance personnel using the normal control pushbutton. Upon personnel observing the outer door opening, the inner door button was released and the functional door automatically closed. Although both doors were briefly open, the negative pressure required to ensure secondary containment integrity was maintained at all times. Based on the door immediately closing and negative pressure being maintained, this is not considered a loss of safety function. Therefore this EN is being retracted."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified. Notified R3DO (Giessner). |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47541 | Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DANNY WILLIAMSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 12/21/2011
Notification Time: 11:52 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2011
Event Time: 09:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 08/09/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
BOB HAGAR (R4DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION FOR DETECTABLE LEVELS OF TRITIUM IN GROUNDWATER WELL
"On Tuesday, December 20, 2011, technicians discovered detectable levels of tritium in an onsite groundwater well. The measured concentration of the isotope was approximately 48,000 picocuries per liter. This discovery was made during the conduct of the site's ongoing groundwater monitoring program.
"The tritium concentration in the well sample exceeds the EPA established threshold for drinking water of 20,000 picocuries per liter. However, no groundwater wells on the River Bend site are used for drinking water. There has been no tritium identified in any wells downstream of, or surrounding, the affected well.
"This test result does not indicate any threat to public health or safety, since the affected well is only used for groundwater monitoring, and not drinking water. Other onsite wells in the area were tested and will continue to be tested to ensure the tritium is not migrating offsite. The monitoring of the wells in the area immediately surrounding the affected well will be increased to a monthly frequency.
"Voluntary notification of this discovery has been made to local and state governmental agencies, with the initial notification being made at 0930 CST today. This event is being voluntarily reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) as a condition related to health and safety of the public and onsite personnel for which a news release is planned."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state and local agencies and will be releasing information to the media.
* * * UPDATE FROM DANNY WILLIAMSON TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1518 EDT ON 08/09/12 * * *
"On August 7, 2012, one of the six new groundwater monitoring wells installed near the monitoring well which yielded the positive results on December 20, 2011, produced a groundwater sample containing 432,733 picocuries per liter of tritium. The investigation of the groundwater tritium activity is still ongoing, and the installation of these wells is part of that effort to determine the source.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and officials with the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality will be briefed."
Notified R4DO (Michael Vasquez) |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47542 | Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDREW WISNIEWSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 12/21/2011
Notification Time: 15:38 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2011
Event Time: 15:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
| Person (Organization):
NEIL PERRY (R1DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO WATER SAMPLE TESTING POSITIVE FOR LOW LEVEL OF TRITIUM
"On December 20, 2011, Vermont Yankee (VY) was notified by its vendor laboratory that a water sample, taken from the Connecticut River on November 3, 2011, tested positive for a low level of tritium [1120 pCi/L]. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) since VY is notifying government agencies and issuing a press release. The VY Off-Site Dose Calculation Manual contains effluent dose calculations that account for groundwater releases of this type. There is no impact on public health and safety as a result of this event."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state of Vermont. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47543 | Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDY SAND
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 12/21/2011
Notification Time: 15:38 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2011
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text PLANT COMPUTER CALCULATION INCORRECT FOR BACK-UP METEOROLOGICAL DATA
"During specification review of the computer points for the Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant backup meteorological tower (MET), it was identified by the station that the computer program software for the backup MET had not calculated the correct 15 minute average wind direction in all instances, A review and analysis of the historical data revealed that there were times that this condition existed when the site's primary MET had been out-of-service for maintenance or equipment issues. During those times the backup MET was relied on for determination of wind direction. Analysis determined that during those times the potential existed to incorrectly report affected sectors for Protective Action Recommendations.
"Currently the station's primary MET has been verified to be in service and functioning properly.
"The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector." |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47544 | Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: DALE SHELTON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 12/21/2011
Notification Time: 19:56 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2011
Event Time: 17:57 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2011 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
C. PEDERSON (RA)
B. BOGER (ET)
W. GOTT (IRDM)
M. ARNOLD (DHS)
P. VITALE (FEMA)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 18 | Power Operation | 18 | Power Operation | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT - HYDROGEN LEAK IN TURBINE BUILDING
"At 1641 CST, during preparations to synchronize the generator, hydrogen pressure began to lower. Personnel were dispatched to identify the source of the leak. At 1752 CST reports from personnel in the turbine building identified high hydrogen levels and the turbine building was evacuated. An Unusual Event [HU7] was declared at 1757 CST and state notification was completed at 1809 CST. Turbine building roof vents were opened to ventilate the turbine building and all elevations were verified to be clear of hydrogen. Access to the turbine building was restored.
"The Unusual Event was terminated at 1838 CST."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 47545 | Facility: PERRY
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: JAMES PRY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 12/21/2011
Notification Time: 21:37 [ET]
Event Date: 12/21/2011
Event Time: 13:59 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/15/2012 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text GROUNDWATER LEVEL MAY EXCEED DESIGN ASSUMPTIONS
"On December 21, 2011, at 1359 hours EST, it was determined that the test instruction for the weekly groundwater level readings contained non-conservative acceptance criteria. The test instruction acceptance criteria for groundwater level exceeds the initial assumptions used in the Updated Safety Analysis Report (USAR) Chapter 15 accident analysis for 'Postulated Radioactive Releases due to Liquid Containing Tank Failures.' The issue was identified during the conduct of a prompt functionality assessment evaluating the plant underdrain system performance and to ensure all USAR described functions were being met.
"The test instruction acceptance criteria is less than 575 feet. The calculation supporting the Chapter 15 accident analysis assumes an initial groundwater elevation of 568 feet in order to accumulate a sufficient volume of groundwater to dilute the tank inventory prior to exiting the underdrain system. The accumulation volume results in hold up time allowing for mixing and radioactive decay. With the degraded performance of the underdrain system pumps and high precipitation, the groundwater level had risen above 568 feet but was still less than 575 feet. A preliminary engineering evaluation has determined that significant margin exists in the calculation. A calculation revision is being pursued in parallel with this notification.
"Compensatory actions involving the repair of 1 permanent non-safety pump and installation of temporary pumps were previously initiated and the groundwater levels are decreasing. Restoration of the remaining permanent plant pumps continues.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
* * * RETRACTION ON 2/15/12 AT 1315 EST FROM LLOYD ZERR TO ERIC SIMPSON * * *
"The calculation supporting the USAR Chapter 15 accident analysis was reviewed and subsequently revised. The revised calculation verifies an initial groundwater elevation of 575 feet is consistent with the preliminary assessment that substantial margin existed in the calculation for the underdrain system. Because the condition reported in Event Number 47545 was not an event or condition that results in the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that degrades safety, the condition is not reportable, and this notification is retracted. The evaluation for this condition is documented in condition report 2011-07169."
The NRC Resident Inspector and R3DO (Passehl) were notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 47546 | Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: LOURDES PORRO
HQ OPS Officer: VINCE KLCO | Notification Date: 12/22/2011
Notification Time: 09:56 [ET]
Event Date: 12/22/2011
Event Time: 10:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2011 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
| Person (Organization):
GERALD MCCOY (R2DO)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER VENTILATION UNAVAILABLE DUE TO PREPLANNED MAINTENANCE
"On December 22, 2011, at 1000 EST, due to pre-planned refueling outage maintenance, the Control Room Emergency Ventilation system on St. Lucie Unit 1 is inoperable. The Unit 1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation system provides filtered air to the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system, therefore, the TSC ventilation system has been rendered unavailable during the course of the work activities. The Control Room Emergency Ventilation system is expected to be returned to service in 38 hours, and TSC filtered ventilation restored.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures. Should the TSC become uninhabitable, the TSC staff will relocate to an alternate TSC location in accordance with applicable site procedures.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility (ERF). An update will be provided once the Control Room Emergency Ventilation system has been restored to normal operation. The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Unit 1 is currently de-fueled.
* * * UPDATE FROM CHUCK MONTANA TO VINCE KLCO AT 0459 EST ON 12/23/2011* * *
"Update 12/23/2011, 0418 EST: The U1 Control Room Emergency Ventilation has been restored to operable [status] and the TSC filtered ventilation has been restored [to operable status]."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R2DO (McCoy). | |