Event Notification Report for May 05, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/04/2011 - 05/05/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
4682546822468234683647249
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46825
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREG MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GREG MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 05/06/2011
Notification Time: 10:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2011
Event Time: 15:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/06/2011
Notification Time: 10:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2011
Event Time: 15:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/06/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.719 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3DO)
MARK RING (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LICENSED OPERATOR TESTED POSITIVE DURING RANDOM FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST
A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for an illegal drug during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
A licensed operator had a confirmed positive for an illegal drug during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46822
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID RICHARDSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID RICHARDSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 05/05/2011
Notification Time: 02:06 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2011
Event Time: 04:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2011
Notification Time: 02:06 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2011
Event Time: 04:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
HAROLD GRAY (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT SYSTEM VENTILATION OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"A planned maintenance evolution at the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant will remove the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system from service. The TSC ventilation system will be rendered non-functional during the course of the work activity. The TSC ventilation is expected to be out of service for approximately 9 hours from 0400 to 1300 today.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the station Emergency Plant Manager will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures giving first consideration to the Control Room. TSC facility leads have been made aware of this contingency.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility (ERF). An update will be provided one the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE FROM JON DEFALCO TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1334 EDT ON 05/05/11 * * *
As of 1215 EDT on 05/05/11, the planned maintenance activity on the TSC ventilation system is complete. Post work testing is complete and the system has been restored to its fully functional state.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R1DO (Harold Gray)
"A planned maintenance evolution at the James A. FitzPatrick (JAF) Nuclear Power Plant will remove the Technical Support Center (TSC) ventilation system from service. The TSC ventilation system will be rendered non-functional during the course of the work activity. The TSC ventilation is expected to be out of service for approximately 9 hours from 0400 to 1300 today.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation during this period, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing emergency planning procedures unless the TSC becomes uninhabitable due to ambient temperature, radiological or other conditions. If relocation of the TSC becomes necessary, the station Emergency Plant Manager will relocate the TSC staff to an alternate location in accordance with applicable site procedures giving first consideration to the Control Room. TSC facility leads have been made aware of this contingency.
"This notification is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) due to the potential loss of an emergency response facility (ERF). An update will be provided one the TSC ventilation has been restored to normal operation."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
* * * UPDATE FROM JON DEFALCO TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1334 EDT ON 05/05/11 * * *
As of 1215 EDT on 05/05/11, the planned maintenance activity on the TSC ventilation system is complete. Post work testing is complete and the system has been restored to its fully functional state.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed. Notified R1DO (Harold Gray)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46823
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRIAN MAGNUSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRIAN MAGNUSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 05/05/2011
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2011
Event Time: 10:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2011
Notification Time: 16:50 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2011
Event Time: 10:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/05/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MARK RING (R3DO)
MARK RING (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SUPPORT CENTER (TSC) VENTILATION SYSTEM DEGRADED
"At 1035 hours CDT on May 5, 2011, the TSC ventilation was secured due to the performance degradation of the air handling unit's fan. The air handling unit is required to maintain a positive pressure in the TSC when the ventilation system is in the emergency mode. At this time, repair activities are being pursued for the fan.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing procedures. In the event TSC evacuation is warranted due to radiological conditions, key emergency response organization members would be relocated in accordance with existing procedures.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) given the impact on the emergency response facility.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
"At 1035 hours CDT on May 5, 2011, the TSC ventilation was secured due to the performance degradation of the air handling unit's fan. The air handling unit is required to maintain a positive pressure in the TSC when the ventilation system is in the emergency mode. At this time, repair activities are being pursued for the fan.
"If an emergency is declared requiring TSC activation, the TSC will be staffed and activated using existing procedures. In the event TSC evacuation is warranted due to radiological conditions, key emergency response organization members would be relocated in accordance with existing procedures.
"This event is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(xiii) given the impact on the emergency response facility.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."
Agreement State
Event Number: 46836
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: GEORGIA PACIFIC
Region: 3
City: GREEN BAY State: WI
County:
License #: 009-1106-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK PAULSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: GEORGIA PACIFIC
Region: 3
City: GREEN BAY State: WI
County:
License #: 009-1106-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK PAULSON
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 05/10/2011
Notification Time: 14:28 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2011
Notification Time: 14:28 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
DAVE PASSEHL (R3DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STUCK FIXED GAUGE SHUTTER MECHANISM
The following information was received via facsimile:
"On May 5, 2011, the Licensee's Radiation Safety Officer reported via phone message that the shutter mechanism on an installed fix gauge failed to close. The gauge is an Ohmart model SHRM-3 with a 500 mCi Cesium-137 source. This malfunction was discovered during routine maintenance testing. No persons were exposed to radiation as a result of the malfunction. The Licensee has restricted access to the area and has scheduled repairs to be done by the manufacturer. DHS plans to perform a follow up inspection within the next 6 months."
Wisconsin Event Report # WI-110004.
The following information was received via facsimile:
"On May 5, 2011, the Licensee's Radiation Safety Officer reported via phone message that the shutter mechanism on an installed fix gauge failed to close. The gauge is an Ohmart model SHRM-3 with a 500 mCi Cesium-137 source. This malfunction was discovered during routine maintenance testing. No persons were exposed to radiation as a result of the malfunction. The Licensee has restricted access to the area and has scheduled repairs to be done by the manufacturer. DHS plans to perform a follow up inspection within the next 6 months."
Wisconsin Event Report # WI-110004.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 47249
Facility: SEQUOYAH
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATT LOVITT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MATT LOVITT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN SHOEMAKER
Notification Date: 09/08/2011
Notification Time: 10:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2011
Event Time: 15:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2011
Notification Time: 10:34 [ET]
Event Date: 05/05/2011
Event Time: 15:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/08/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
DANIEL RICH (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 85 | Power Operation |
INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION
"This report is a 60-day telephone notification in lieu of a written licensee event report being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1). The event was an invalid actuation of a Unit 2 Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI). At the time of the event Unit 1 was at 100% power and Unit 2 was at 85% power.
"At 1520 EDT on 5/5/2011, an 'A' train CVI signal was inadvertently initiated during a surveillance test for containment purge air exhaust radiation monitor 2-RM-90-130. The inadvertent CVI signal was initiated due to incorrect connection of test equipment. The signal caused the 'A' train containment upper and lower compartment radiation monitor isolation valves to close. Unit 2 entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3.1 Action 27 and LCO 3.4.6.1 Action b, due to the isolation of lower compartment radiation monitor 2-RM-90-106. The inadvertent CVI signal was also received by the containment vent system, but the containment vent system was not in service and no valves were actuated.
"The radiation monitoring (system 90) and the containment vent (system 30) systems received a complete 'A' train CVI signal. The 'A' train radiation monitoring isolation valves closed as designed. The containment vent system was not in service, and since the valves were already closed, no valves were actuated. Actual plant conditions did not exist that required a CVI signal. Therefore, this actuation was invalid.
"The delay in reporting this event was due to an initial interpretation that the event did not result in an actuation of the systems listed in paragraph 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B), because only one system was in service which was affected by the actuation. Subsequent discussions noted that while only one system was in service, both systems received the CVI signal. The event is reported as a 60-day telephone notification in lieu of a written licensee event report being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1)."
The date, when the final determination of the invalid system actuation was made, was not provided.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This report is a 60-day telephone notification in lieu of a written licensee event report being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1). The event was an invalid actuation of a Unit 2 Containment Ventilation Isolation (CVI). At the time of the event Unit 1 was at 100% power and Unit 2 was at 85% power.
"At 1520 EDT on 5/5/2011, an 'A' train CVI signal was inadvertently initiated during a surveillance test for containment purge air exhaust radiation monitor 2-RM-90-130. The inadvertent CVI signal was initiated due to incorrect connection of test equipment. The signal caused the 'A' train containment upper and lower compartment radiation monitor isolation valves to close. Unit 2 entered Technical Specification Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.3.3.1 Action 27 and LCO 3.4.6.1 Action b, due to the isolation of lower compartment radiation monitor 2-RM-90-106. The inadvertent CVI signal was also received by the containment vent system, but the containment vent system was not in service and no valves were actuated.
"The radiation monitoring (system 90) and the containment vent (system 30) systems received a complete 'A' train CVI signal. The 'A' train radiation monitoring isolation valves closed as designed. The containment vent system was not in service, and since the valves were already closed, no valves were actuated. Actual plant conditions did not exist that required a CVI signal. Therefore, this actuation was invalid.
"The delay in reporting this event was due to an initial interpretation that the event did not result in an actuation of the systems listed in paragraph 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B), because only one system was in service which was affected by the actuation. Subsequent discussions noted that while only one system was in service, both systems received the CVI signal. The event is reported as a 60-day telephone notification in lieu of a written licensee event report being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(1)."
The date, when the final determination of the invalid system actuation was made, was not provided.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.