Event Notification Report for March 29, 2011
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/28/2011 - 03/29/2011
EVENT NUMBERS
4671046708467064670746704
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 46710
Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
NRC Notified By: SCOTT MURRAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 03/30/2011
Notification Time: 09:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2011
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2011
Notification Time: 09:07 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2011
Event Time: 10:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(1) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
TIM MCCARTIN (NMSS)
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
TIM MCCARTIN (NMSS)
COMPLETION OF ISA ACTION PLAN CONVERSION MILESTONE
"In response to a Notice of Violation (NOV), Global Nuclear Fuels - America (GNFA) committed to perform a review of the existing Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). An ISA Action Plan and schedule for performing the ISA review was described in GNF-A's response to the NOV and the first milestone (conversion) was scheduled for completion by January 31, 2011. This milestone was subsequently extended by approximately 60 days.
"On 3/29/11, GNF-A completed the ISA review for the conversion area and has identified 87 existing safety controls that are now being designated as items relied on for safety (IROFS). Implementation of the revised safety basis, IROFS and application of management measures to the new IROFS will be completed within 90 days per the ISA Action Plan.
"Because the revised ISA has designated existing safety controls as additional IROFS, GNF-A is making a report of this completion pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours.
"Safety Significance of Events: There was no event or plant condition that resulted in a degraded safety condition.
"Safety Equipment Status: Existing conversion area safety controls have now been designated as IROFS per ISA Action Plan. Controls are available to perform their safety function.
"Status of Corrective Actions: Conversion Area milestone complete. ISA Action Plan continues."
The licensee intends to discuss this issue further with the State of North Carolina, New Hanover County, and the NRC Region 2 office.
"In response to a Notice of Violation (NOV), Global Nuclear Fuels - America (GNFA) committed to perform a review of the existing Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA). An ISA Action Plan and schedule for performing the ISA review was described in GNF-A's response to the NOV and the first milestone (conversion) was scheduled for completion by January 31, 2011. This milestone was subsequently extended by approximately 60 days.
"On 3/29/11, GNF-A completed the ISA review for the conversion area and has identified 87 existing safety controls that are now being designated as items relied on for safety (IROFS). Implementation of the revised safety basis, IROFS and application of management measures to the new IROFS will be completed within 90 days per the ISA Action Plan.
"Because the revised ISA has designated existing safety controls as additional IROFS, GNF-A is making a report of this completion pursuant to the reporting requirements of 10CFR70 Appendix A(b)(1) within 24 hours.
"Safety Significance of Events: There was no event or plant condition that resulted in a degraded safety condition.
"Safety Equipment Status: Existing conversion area safety controls have now been designated as IROFS per ISA Action Plan. Controls are available to perform their safety function.
"Status of Corrective Actions: Conversion Area milestone complete. ISA Action Plan continues."
The licensee intends to discuss this issue further with the State of North Carolina, New Hanover County, and the NRC Region 2 office.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46708
Facility: BYRON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ALAN GUSTAFSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ALAN GUSTAFSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 03/30/2011
Notification Time: 01:39 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2011
Event Time: 20:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2011
Notification Time: 01:39 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2011
Event Time: 20:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL VOIDING IN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ALTERNATE SUCTION LINE
"The design of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) system is for the AF pumps to normally take suction from the condensate storage tank. If the condensate storage tank is not available, the essential service water system provides the alternate supply. Due to the AF system suction piping and valve configuration, a voided section of pipe could exist in the portion that isolates the condensate storage tank supply from the essential service water supply. A preliminary vendor analysis has determined that the void fraction to reach the pump in a dynamic scenario exceeds the acceptance criteria for AF pump operability. Based on past operation in this configuration, the event is being reported as a unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (i.e., remove residual heat) under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). Further review of the void model and pump performance characteristics are planned.
"In 2011, prior to the completion of this analysis. The void was refilled and verified full for both trains at Byron U1 and U2."
Unit 1 is defueled. This condition affects both 'A' and 'B' trains of auxiliary feedwater for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
"The design of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) system is for the AF pumps to normally take suction from the condensate storage tank. If the condensate storage tank is not available, the essential service water system provides the alternate supply. Due to the AF system suction piping and valve configuration, a voided section of pipe could exist in the portion that isolates the condensate storage tank supply from the essential service water supply. A preliminary vendor analysis has determined that the void fraction to reach the pump in a dynamic scenario exceeds the acceptance criteria for AF pump operability. Based on past operation in this configuration, the event is being reported as a unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (i.e., remove residual heat) under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). Further review of the void model and pump performance characteristics are planned.
"In 2011, prior to the completion of this analysis. The void was refilled and verified full for both trains at Byron U1 and U2."
Unit 1 is defueled. This condition affects both 'A' and 'B' trains of auxiliary feedwater for both Unit 1 and Unit 2.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
Agreement State
Event Number: 46706
Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL
Licensee: ASTEN JOHNSON
Region: 1
City: CHAPIN State: SC
County:
License #: SC-534
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK WINDHAM
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Licensee: ASTEN JOHNSON
Region: 1
City: CHAPIN State: SC
County:
License #: SC-534
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK WINDHAM
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 03/29/2011
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2011
Notification Time: 20:02 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2011
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)
LAURA PEARSON (ILTA)
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
PAUL MICHALAK (FSME)
LAURA PEARSON (ILTA)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN NDC DRAIN PROFILE GAUGE
An NDC Model 104-P drainage profile gauge, serial number 1282, was stolen from a licensee vehicle. The box containing the gauge was chained to the floor of the vehicle which was also locked. The gauge contains an 80 mCi Am-241 source. A report was filed with the Chapin, SC police department.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
An NDC Model 104-P drainage profile gauge, serial number 1282, was stolen from a licensee vehicle. The box containing the gauge was chained to the floor of the vehicle which was also locked. The gauge contains an 80 mCi Am-241 source. A report was filed with the Chapin, SC police department.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf
This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46707
Facility: BRAIDWOOD
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOE KLEVORN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOE KLEVORN
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 03/30/2011
Notification Time: 01:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2011
Event Time: 20:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2011
Notification Time: 01:34 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2011
Event Time: 20:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 03/30/2011
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
HIRONORI PETERSON (R3DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
POTENTIAL VOIDING IN AUXILIARY FEEDWATER ALTERNATE SUCTION LINE
"The design of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) system is for the AF pumps to normally take suction from the condensate storage tank. If the condensate storage tank is not available, the essential service water system provides the alternate supply. Due to the AF system suction piping and valve configuration, a voided section of pipe could exist in the portion that isolates the condensate storage tank supply from the essential service water supply. A preliminary vendor analysis has determined that the void fraction to reach the pump in a dynamic scenario exceeds the acceptance criteria for AF pump operability. Based on past operation in this configuration, the event is being reported as a unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (i.e., remove residual heat) under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). Further review of the void model and pump performance characteristics are planned.
"In 2011, prior to the completion of this analysis, the void was refilled and verified full for the 'B' trains at Braidwood U1 and U2. Filling the voided piping of both 'A' trains at Braidwood U1 and U2 is in progress. Once filled, the AF systems are operable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The design of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AF) system is for the AF pumps to normally take suction from the condensate storage tank. If the condensate storage tank is not available, the essential service water system provides the alternate supply. Due to the AF system suction piping and valve configuration, a voided section of pipe could exist in the portion that isolates the condensate storage tank supply from the essential service water supply. A preliminary vendor analysis has determined that the void fraction to reach the pump in a dynamic scenario exceeds the acceptance criteria for AF pump operability. Based on past operation in this configuration, the event is being reported as a unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and a condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function (i.e., remove residual heat) under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v). Further review of the void model and pump performance characteristics are planned.
"In 2011, prior to the completion of this analysis, the void was refilled and verified full for the 'B' trains at Braidwood U1 and U2. Filling the voided piping of both 'A' trains at Braidwood U1 and U2 is in progress. Once filled, the AF systems are operable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 46704
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BETHANY HINCKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: BETHANY HINCKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 03/29/2011
Notification Time: 02:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2011
Event Time: 01:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2011
Notification Time: 02:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/29/2011
Event Time: 01:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/29/2011
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
WILLIAM DEAN (RA)
JACK GROBE (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)
MIKE CHEOK (NRR)
RAY POWELL (R1DO)
WILLIAM DEAN (RA)
JACK GROBE (NRR)
SCOTT MORRIS (IRD)
MIKE CHEOK (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
ELECTRICAL FIRE IN THE DRYWELL ON A PIECE OF LIFTING EQUIPMENT
"At approximately 0145 EDT, the Unit 1 control room was notified of elevated carbon monoxide (CO) levels in the Unit 1 Drywell. The cause of the elevated CO was a small fire on a 'Lift-A-Loft'. The fire was immediately extinguished followed by an evacuation of all personnel from the Drywell.
"Follow up atmosphere samples indicated carbon monoxide levels above the OSHA Threshold of 50 PPM. Readings were as high as 79 PPM and have been slowly lowering since the initial response. These values are considered to affect the health of plant personnel or safe plant operation and an Unusual Event was declared at 0155 EDT.
"As of 0225 EDT, all values within the Unit 1 Drywell have been confirmed to be below the 50 PPM threshold.
"As of 0226 EDT, the Unusual Event has been terminated."
There were no injuries, no offsite assistance required, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector responded to the site.
The licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector, the State Emergency Communication Center, and the Oswego County Warning Point. No press release is planned.
"At approximately 0145 EDT, the Unit 1 control room was notified of elevated carbon monoxide (CO) levels in the Unit 1 Drywell. The cause of the elevated CO was a small fire on a 'Lift-A-Loft'. The fire was immediately extinguished followed by an evacuation of all personnel from the Drywell.
"Follow up atmosphere samples indicated carbon monoxide levels above the OSHA Threshold of 50 PPM. Readings were as high as 79 PPM and have been slowly lowering since the initial response. These values are considered to affect the health of plant personnel or safe plant operation and an Unusual Event was declared at 0155 EDT.
"As of 0225 EDT, all values within the Unit 1 Drywell have been confirmed to be below the 50 PPM threshold.
"As of 0226 EDT, the Unusual Event has been terminated."
There were no injuries, no offsite assistance required, and the NRC Senior Resident Inspector responded to the site.
The licensee notified the NRC Senior Resident Inspector, the State Emergency Communication Center, and the Oswego County Warning Point. No press release is planned.