Event Notification Report for October 05, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/04/2009 - 10/05/2009
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45414
Rep Org: MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: STORK TWIN CITY TESTING
Region: 3
City: ST PAUL State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SHERRIE FLAHERTY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Licensee: STORK TWIN CITY TESTING
Region: 3
City: ST PAUL State: MN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SHERRIE FLAHERTY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/06/2009
Notification Time: 11:11 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2009
Event Time: 10:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2009
Notification Time: 11:11 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2009
Event Time: 10:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/06/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
ANN MARIE STONE (R3DO)
GLENDA VILLAMAR (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - INDUSTRIAL RADIOGRAPHY SOURCE RETRACTION INCIDENT
The following event was received from the state via e-mail:
"On October 5, 2009 at approximately 1030, radiographers working for Stork Twin City Testing in a tunnel at a steam plant in St. Paul, Minnesota were unable to retract the 75 curie Iridium-192 source (serial number 56177B) of their AEA Model 660B exposure device (serial number 2657). The radiographers had the device placed on a ladder approximately six feet off the ground during this and two previous exposures. Following several attempts to retract the source the device fell from the ladder landing on the control cable. The Radiation Safety Officer was contacted at approximately 1045. The radiographers established boundaries of approximately 2 mR/h and maintained control over the area. The Radiation Safety Officer placed several layers of lead over the device and the cable to reduce the exposure levels, but he still considered the levels too high to safely work on releasing the source. Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) Radioactive Materials Unit was notified at approximately 1215. The University of Minnesota's Health Physics staff was contacted and offered to bring additional lead shielding to the area. MDH and University of Minnesota staff arrived at the location at approximately 1250. Following placing additional shielding around the device the Radiation Safety Officer made another attempt to release the source, but was unable to get the source back into the device. QSA Global was contacted for technical support at approximately 1430. At approximately 1530 the Radiation Safety Officer removed two pins from the back of the exposure device and was able to manually pull the cable and secure the source in the device. Following surveys of the device to determine the source was in the device, the control cable was examined. Damage to the cable at the point where the metal tip connects to the cable was discovered. The exposure device was transported back to Stork Twin City Testing and will be inspected and tested October 6, 2009. The Radiation Safety Officer will submit a complete report to MDH within 30 days. Personal dosimetry readings were 90 mR for the Radiation Safety Officer and approximately 80 and 30 mR for the radiographers."
The following event was received from the state via e-mail:
"On October 5, 2009 at approximately 1030, radiographers working for Stork Twin City Testing in a tunnel at a steam plant in St. Paul, Minnesota were unable to retract the 75 curie Iridium-192 source (serial number 56177B) of their AEA Model 660B exposure device (serial number 2657). The radiographers had the device placed on a ladder approximately six feet off the ground during this and two previous exposures. Following several attempts to retract the source the device fell from the ladder landing on the control cable. The Radiation Safety Officer was contacted at approximately 1045. The radiographers established boundaries of approximately 2 mR/h and maintained control over the area. The Radiation Safety Officer placed several layers of lead over the device and the cable to reduce the exposure levels, but he still considered the levels too high to safely work on releasing the source. Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) Radioactive Materials Unit was notified at approximately 1215. The University of Minnesota's Health Physics staff was contacted and offered to bring additional lead shielding to the area. MDH and University of Minnesota staff arrived at the location at approximately 1250. Following placing additional shielding around the device the Radiation Safety Officer made another attempt to release the source, but was unable to get the source back into the device. QSA Global was contacted for technical support at approximately 1430. At approximately 1530 the Radiation Safety Officer removed two pins from the back of the exposure device and was able to manually pull the cable and secure the source in the device. Following surveys of the device to determine the source was in the device, the control cable was examined. Damage to the cable at the point where the metal tip connects to the cable was discovered. The exposure device was transported back to Stork Twin City Testing and will be inspected and tested October 6, 2009. The Radiation Safety Officer will submit a complete report to MDH within 30 days. Personal dosimetry readings were 90 mR for the Radiation Safety Officer and approximately 80 and 30 mR for the radiographers."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45412
Facility: NINE MILE POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN DRISCOLL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-2,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: JOHN DRISCOLL
HQ OPS Officer: DONALD NORWOOD
Notification Date: 10/05/2009
Notification Time: 14:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2009
Event Time: 11:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2009
Notification Time: 14:41 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2009
Event Time: 11:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/05/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
SAM HANSELL (R1DO)
SAM HANSELL (R1DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL SCRAM AND HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION FOLLOWING A LOSS OF FEEDWATER LEVEL CONTROL
"At 1158 on Monday, October 5, 2009, Nine Mile Point Unit One was manually scrammed from approximately 100% rated power due to failure of the Feedwater Level Control System, in anticipation of a reactor scram. Following the manual scram insertion at 11:58, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated on low Reactor Vessel (RPV) level. At 11:59, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation setpoint, and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. At Nine Mile Point Unit One, a HPCI System actuation signal on low RPV level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink.
"Unit 1 has commenced cooldown, in preparation for the forced outage to commence repairs. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal operating band; reactor temperature is 450?F and reactor pressure is approximately 500 psig.
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) requires reporting within 4 hours when any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical.
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires reporting within 8 hours when a valid actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System occurs."
All control rods fully inserted. All systems functioned as required following the reactor scram. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. HPCI has been secured. Makeup water is being provided by the Reactor Feedwater System and decay heat removal is through the bypass valves to the condenser. There was no impact on Unit 2 and the plant is in a normal post-scram electrical lineup.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1158 on Monday, October 5, 2009, Nine Mile Point Unit One was manually scrammed from approximately 100% rated power due to failure of the Feedwater Level Control System, in anticipation of a reactor scram. Following the manual scram insertion at 11:58, High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System automatically initiated on low Reactor Vessel (RPV) level. At 11:59, RPV level was restored above the HPCI System low level actuation setpoint, and the HPCI System initiation signal was reset. At Nine Mile Point Unit One, a HPCI System actuation signal on low RPV level is normally received following a reactor scram, due to level shrink.
"Unit 1 has commenced cooldown, in preparation for the forced outage to commence repairs. Reactor water level is being controlled in the normal operating band; reactor temperature is 450?F and reactor pressure is approximately 500 psig.
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) requires reporting within 4 hours when any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical.
"10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) requires reporting within 8 hours when a valid actuation of the High Pressure Coolant Injection System occurs."
All control rods fully inserted. All systems functioned as required following the reactor scram. The reactor is currently stable in Mode 3. HPCI has been secured. Makeup water is being provided by the Reactor Feedwater System and decay heat removal is through the bypass valves to the condenser. There was no impact on Unit 2 and the plant is in a normal post-scram electrical lineup.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.