Event Notification Report for August 14, 2009
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/13/2009 - 08/14/2009
EVENT NUMBERS
45263452644527145335
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45263
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee:
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT FREE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee:
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT FREE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/14/2009
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/14/2009
Notification Time: 16:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/14/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
ANDREW MAUER (FSME)
JIM WHITNEY (ILTA)
JACK WHITTEN (R4DO)
ANDREW MAUER (FSME)
JIM WHITNEY (ILTA)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SR-90 SOURCE FOUND IN MAIL
The following report was received via e-mail:
"Customs called to report a detection at the international post office at DFW [Dallas/Ft Worth] airport. The source was contained in a package with some other materials including a couple of electronic devices, a small plastic container about the size of a contact lens holder, some dice and other articles. The package was being mailed to a private citizen living in Ft. Worth, TX. Customs provided pictures of the package and contents. The radioactive material was identified as Sr-90. Inspector surveys measured 0.3 mrem closed window, 60 mrem open window."
The State of Texas notified EPA, FBI, and ICE.
Texas Report #I-8656
The following report was received via e-mail:
"Customs called to report a detection at the international post office at DFW [Dallas/Ft Worth] airport. The source was contained in a package with some other materials including a couple of electronic devices, a small plastic container about the size of a contact lens holder, some dice and other articles. The package was being mailed to a private citizen living in Ft. Worth, TX. Customs provided pictures of the package and contents. The radioactive material was identified as Sr-90. Inspector surveys measured 0.3 mrem closed window, 60 mrem open window."
The State of Texas notified EPA, FBI, and ICE.
Texas Report #I-8656
Power Reactor
Event Number: 45264
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE JESTER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVE JESTER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/15/2009
Notification Time: 00:51 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2009
Event Time: 19:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2009
Notification Time: 00:51 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2009
Event Time: 19:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/15/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
MARVIN SYKES (R2DO)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO AUTOMATIC CLOSURE OF INBOARD ISOLATION VALVE
"On 8/14/2009 at 19:58, the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System inboard isolation valves automatically isolated. Inboard isolation was caused by an inadvertent high ambient temperature signal from the HPCI steam leak detection module. Local temperatures were confirmed to be normal and no steam leak was identified. With the HPCI system steam supply isolated, the HPCI system is inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.1. HPCI is a single-train safety function system.
"The initial safety significance of this condition is considered to be minimal. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system, Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Pressure Emergency Core Cooling systems (ECCS) remain operable at this time. Actions have been taken to protect redundant safety systems. Unit 1 risk condition is currently yellow due to the concurrent inoperability of a single loop of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water for system maintenance.
"The HPCI system remains isolated and inoperable pending further troubleshooting of the inboard isolation.
"The NRC resident has been notified."
"On 8/14/2009 at 19:58, the Unit 1 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System inboard isolation valves automatically isolated. Inboard isolation was caused by an inadvertent high ambient temperature signal from the HPCI steam leak detection module. Local temperatures were confirmed to be normal and no steam leak was identified. With the HPCI system steam supply isolated, the HPCI system is inoperable in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.1. HPCI is a single-train safety function system.
"The initial safety significance of this condition is considered to be minimal. The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system, Automatic Depressurization System (ADS), and Low Pressure Emergency Core Cooling systems (ECCS) remain operable at this time. Actions have been taken to protect redundant safety systems. Unit 1 risk condition is currently yellow due to the concurrent inoperability of a single loop of Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Service Water for system maintenance.
"The HPCI system remains isolated and inoperable pending further troubleshooting of the inboard isolation.
"The NRC resident has been notified."
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45271
Rep Org: VIRGINIA RAD MATERIALS PROGRAM
Licensee: MACTEC ENGINEERING & CONSULTING, INC.
Region: 1
City: CHANTILLY State: VA
County:
License #: 107-133-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: MACTEC ENGINEERING & CONSULTING, INC.
Region: 1
City: CHANTILLY State: VA
County:
License #: 107-133-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL WELLING
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 08/18/2009
Notification Time: 10:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2009
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2009
Notification Time: 10:10 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2009
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/18/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
RICHARD CONTE (R1DO)
ANGELA MCINTOSH (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER GAUGE RUN OVER BY CONSTRUCTION EQUIPMENT
The following information was received from the State via facsimile:
"The Virginia Radioactive Materials Program received a telephone message on Monday, August 17, 2009 (message was left at 6:30 PM on Friday, August 14, 2009) concerning the licensee's Troxler gauge. The gauge had been run over by a roller while in operation. The Radioactive Materials Program returned the call to the licensee's RSO at 7:45 AM on Monday, August 17. The accident occurred at 8AM on Friday, August 14. The guide rod and source rod were broken off the gauge, but the instrument's case was otherwise intact. The operator of the gauge placed it into the shipping container, placed the shipping container in the locked box on the back of the pickup truck, and transported the gauge back to the shop. The licensee's RSO surveyed the gauge and took wipe samples. Two radiation safety specialists from the Radioactive Materials Program visited the licensee, arriving at 12:00 noon on Monday, August 17. The radiation safety specialists visually inspected the gauge, took survey measurements with a maximum level of 100 mR/hr at the surface and 4 mR/hr at one meter from the shipping container, and also took wipe samples. When the gauge was run over, it was operating in "backscatter" mode, so the Cs-137 source was within the case of the gauge. The accident did damage the shutter mechanism for the Cs-137 source so that it could not be closed. The gauge in its shipping container was placed in a locked storage cabinet in the shop pending disposal. The local Troxler vendor had been contacted by the licensee's RSO. The licensee was advised to give the vendor the current radiation survey of the package and to obtain the results of the wipe tests prior to allowing the vendor to transport the gauge. The radiation safety specialists also visited the site of the accident, where they surveyed the ground at the site of the accident, the roller that ran over the gauge, and the pickup truck that transported the gauge. All surveyed areas at the accident location were at background."
VA Event Report ID No.: VA-2009-03
The following information was received from the State via facsimile:
"The Virginia Radioactive Materials Program received a telephone message on Monday, August 17, 2009 (message was left at 6:30 PM on Friday, August 14, 2009) concerning the licensee's Troxler gauge. The gauge had been run over by a roller while in operation. The Radioactive Materials Program returned the call to the licensee's RSO at 7:45 AM on Monday, August 17. The accident occurred at 8AM on Friday, August 14. The guide rod and source rod were broken off the gauge, but the instrument's case was otherwise intact. The operator of the gauge placed it into the shipping container, placed the shipping container in the locked box on the back of the pickup truck, and transported the gauge back to the shop. The licensee's RSO surveyed the gauge and took wipe samples. Two radiation safety specialists from the Radioactive Materials Program visited the licensee, arriving at 12:00 noon on Monday, August 17. The radiation safety specialists visually inspected the gauge, took survey measurements with a maximum level of 100 mR/hr at the surface and 4 mR/hr at one meter from the shipping container, and also took wipe samples. When the gauge was run over, it was operating in "backscatter" mode, so the Cs-137 source was within the case of the gauge. The accident did damage the shutter mechanism for the Cs-137 source so that it could not be closed. The gauge in its shipping container was placed in a locked storage cabinet in the shop pending disposal. The local Troxler vendor had been contacted by the licensee's RSO. The licensee was advised to give the vendor the current radiation survey of the package and to obtain the results of the wipe tests prior to allowing the vendor to transport the gauge. The radiation safety specialists also visited the site of the accident, where they surveyed the ground at the site of the accident, the roller that ran over the gauge, and the pickup truck that transported the gauge. All surveyed areas at the accident location were at background."
VA Event Report ID No.: VA-2009-03
General Information or Other
Event Number: 45335
Rep Org: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL STEPANTSCHENKO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: ENGINE SYSTEMS, INC
Region: 1
City: ROCKY MOUNT State: NC
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL STEPANTSCHENKO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/09/2009
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2009
Notification Time: 14:50 [ET]
Event Date: 08/14/2009
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/09/2009
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
PART 21 COORDINATOR (NRR)
ALAN BLAMEY (R2DO)
DAVID PROULX (R4DO)
PART 21 COORDINATOR (NRR)
PART 21 INVOLVING WOODWARD GOVERNORS USING UNAPPROVED SUPPLIER INTEGRATED CIRCUITS
The following information was provided via fax:
"COMPONENT: Woodward 2301A and DRU with unapproved supplier IC P/N: 9903-303, 9903-337, 9903-444 & 9903-470
"DISCUSSION: Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 8/14/09 to evaluate the use of an integrated circuit (IC) used in some 2301A and DRU controls. The suspect IC was obtained by Woodward from an unapproved supplier. The evaluation was concluded on 09/08/09 and was determined to be a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR21.
"On 8/14/09, Woodward confirmed that they had shipped ESI a total of thirty-four (34) 2301A and DRU controls with nuclear part numbers that contained an IC (Woodward P/N 1688-767) from a suspect lot. The lot was dated 12/12/08 and was received by Woodward from an unapproved supplier. Eight (8) of the 34 controls were subsequently shipped by ESI to nuclear customers (2 domestic plants and 3 foreign plants) before the issue was identified. To date, no operability issues have been reported or observed with 2301A and DRU controls containing the suspect IC.
"In the DRU, the IC is used in the raise-lower circuit and in the ramp time circuit (the ramp time circuit controls the ramp rate of the DRU). The DRU is primarily used as the speed reference input signal to the 2301A and provides remote speed adjustment for the 2301A (similar to the function of a motor operated potentiometer - MOP). In some applications, the DRU has also been used as a replacement for the voltage regulator MOP; in this case, the DRU provides the voltage adjustment signal to the voltage regulator. Failure of this IC could impact speed (frequency) control (and in some cases voltage control) of the EDG.
"In the 2301A, the IC is used in the start fuel limit circuit and in the speed signal input (magnetic pickup) circuit. The 2301A is the electronic governor used on many EDG's. It provides speed and/or load control of the diesel engine by communicating with the governor/actuator mounted on the diesel engine. Failure of this IC could impact speed (frequency) control of the EDG.
"AFFECTED USERS: Thirty-four (34) controls were shipped to ESI containing IC's from the suspect lot. Twenty-six (26) of the suspect controls were in ESI inventory and have been returned to Woodward to have the suspect IC replaced. ESI shipped eight (8) controls with suspect IC's to nuclear customers as safety related items as identified in the tables below.
"LISTING OF WOODWARD CONTROLS SHIPPED WITH SUSPECT IC's - (DOMESTIC PLANTS)
McGuire - P/N # 9903-337, Customer PO # 00114776
Palo Verde - P/N # 9903-470 and # 9903-444, Customer PO # 500529186
"LISTING OF WOODWARD CONTROLS SHIPPED WITH SUSPECT IC's - (FOREIGN PLANTS)
Korea-KHNP - P/N # 9903-470, Customer PO # K080553241
Almaraz - P/N # 9903-470 and # 9903-337, Customer PO # 2009/015 - ER09AT06805MA
KRSKO - P/N # 9903-303, Customer PO # NEK-10271/309
"CORRECTIVE ACTION: The controls listed in the tables above should be returned to Engine Systems Inc. to have the suspect IC replaced as soon as possible. Contact ESI's Customer Service department with the part number and serial number of the control to be returned.
The following information was provided via fax:
"COMPONENT: Woodward 2301A and DRU with unapproved supplier IC P/N: 9903-303, 9903-337, 9903-444 & 9903-470
"DISCUSSION: Engine Systems Inc. (ESI) began a 10CFR21 evaluation on 8/14/09 to evaluate the use of an integrated circuit (IC) used in some 2301A and DRU controls. The suspect IC was obtained by Woodward from an unapproved supplier. The evaluation was concluded on 09/08/09 and was determined to be a reportable defect as defined by 10CFR21.
"On 8/14/09, Woodward confirmed that they had shipped ESI a total of thirty-four (34) 2301A and DRU controls with nuclear part numbers that contained an IC (Woodward P/N 1688-767) from a suspect lot. The lot was dated 12/12/08 and was received by Woodward from an unapproved supplier. Eight (8) of the 34 controls were subsequently shipped by ESI to nuclear customers (2 domestic plants and 3 foreign plants) before the issue was identified. To date, no operability issues have been reported or observed with 2301A and DRU controls containing the suspect IC.
"In the DRU, the IC is used in the raise-lower circuit and in the ramp time circuit (the ramp time circuit controls the ramp rate of the DRU). The DRU is primarily used as the speed reference input signal to the 2301A and provides remote speed adjustment for the 2301A (similar to the function of a motor operated potentiometer - MOP). In some applications, the DRU has also been used as a replacement for the voltage regulator MOP; in this case, the DRU provides the voltage adjustment signal to the voltage regulator. Failure of this IC could impact speed (frequency) control (and in some cases voltage control) of the EDG.
"In the 2301A, the IC is used in the start fuel limit circuit and in the speed signal input (magnetic pickup) circuit. The 2301A is the electronic governor used on many EDG's. It provides speed and/or load control of the diesel engine by communicating with the governor/actuator mounted on the diesel engine. Failure of this IC could impact speed (frequency) control of the EDG.
"AFFECTED USERS: Thirty-four (34) controls were shipped to ESI containing IC's from the suspect lot. Twenty-six (26) of the suspect controls were in ESI inventory and have been returned to Woodward to have the suspect IC replaced. ESI shipped eight (8) controls with suspect IC's to nuclear customers as safety related items as identified in the tables below.
"LISTING OF WOODWARD CONTROLS SHIPPED WITH SUSPECT IC's - (DOMESTIC PLANTS)
McGuire - P/N # 9903-337, Customer PO # 00114776
Palo Verde - P/N # 9903-470 and # 9903-444, Customer PO # 500529186
"LISTING OF WOODWARD CONTROLS SHIPPED WITH SUSPECT IC's - (FOREIGN PLANTS)
Korea-KHNP - P/N # 9903-470, Customer PO # K080553241
Almaraz - P/N # 9903-470 and # 9903-337, Customer PO # 2009/015 - ER09AT06805MA
KRSKO - P/N # 9903-303, Customer PO # NEK-10271/309
"CORRECTIVE ACTION: The controls listed in the tables above should be returned to Engine Systems Inc. to have the suspect IC replaced as soon as possible. Contact ESI's Customer Service department with the part number and serial number of the control to be returned.