Event Notification Report for May 12, 2009

EXTERNAL CONTAMINATION FOUND ON MODIFIED SEALED SOURCE

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:

"One of the research projects at NIST involves research and testing of different types of bomb detection instruments. One of the experiments required that the source be removed from one of the instruments. Prior to January 2008, Researcher 1 spoke to the RSO for Smiths Detection in Canada. They discussed the possibility of removing the 15 mCi Ni-63 source from their instrument, an lonScan 400b, sealed source device number ND-0163-D-1014-G. The Smiths RSO approved this and sent schematics to assist with the project. Researcher 1 then started planning the project with NIST Health Physics review. It was decided that Health Physics would monitor this project to confirm that there was no unanticipated exposure or contamination resulting from the operation. On January 31, 2008, Researcher 1 began the process for source removal. Work was performed in a hood, in a controlled laboratory space, with a health physicist monitoring the operation. The process of source removal was based on the manufacturer schematics. These schematics were general and not a specific instruction for source removal. No information was available at the time that clearly defined the source encapsulation barrier. After a ceramic cap was removed, the side of the source holder was wiped and contamination was detected. It is believed that the wipe may have touched some of the nickel foil. Upon observing the way the source was placed in the ceramic in addition to the contamination detected, it was decided that it was not possible to safely modify the device in the intended manner. The ceramic head was reattached and reinserted into the box. External swipes were verified to be clean. It was decided to leave the source this way while it was determined if there was anything more they could do to meet the intended research results. It is believed that the sealed source containment was breached in the experiment thereby negating the manufacturer's sealed source certificate. In doing this, it became an unsealed source. The reassembly restored containment. The device was placed into secured storage.

"On May 12, 2009 wipes were taken of the external portion of the ceramic head and confirmed contamination of 72 nCi. A wipe was taken at the manufacturers recommended typical sealed source leak check location and was clean. The source box was collected for disposal. The hood, all items in the hood, and the floor were checked for potential contamination. They were verified to be clean.

"It is unclear whether this constitutes a reportable sealed source leakage situation with respect to 10CFR31.5c, since this occurred during an intended and controlled effort to modify the source configuration. The levels of unsealed source activity are within the limits prescribed in our license, SNM-362."

INSTRUMENT VALVE MALFUNCTION POTENTIALLY AFFECTING THE ISOLATION CAPABILITY OF ONE OF THE MAIN STEAM LINES

"The equalizing valve for one of the four Main Steam Line (MSL) Flow - High differential pressure switches on the 'B' MSL was leaking through. The leak effectively reduced the differential pressure across all four MSL Flow - High valves on the 'B' MSL. This reduction in differential pressure thus potentially would not allow the switches to isolate the 'B' MSL at the required setpoint. This switch was for group 1 isolation. This loss of safety function was restored by isolating the faulty valve block for DPIS-2-117A. All other switches are now reading normally. The repairs for the faulty valve are in progress."

The licensee will notify NRC Resident Inspector, State, and local authorities.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - FOUR TROXLER GAUGES FOUND MISSING

The State of Florida provided the following via fax:

"[The licensee RSO] found 4 Troxler gauges missing from [a] storage facility [located in Winter Park, FL] on 12 May 2009. [The] gauge handles were locked, also a second lock to [the] structure and door was locked to storage room [when last checked by the licensee]. [The] owner is contacting local police department and will offer an award. [The Florida Bureau of Radiation Protection] Orlando Inspection Office will investigate."

The four Troxler gauges each contained 8 mCi Cs-137 and 40 mCi Am-241/Be sources. Three of the Troxler gauges were Model 3430 (S/N: 29922, 35106, and 35474), and the fourth Troxler gauge was a Model 3440 (S/N: 23037).

Florida Incident Number FL09-042.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO ELEVATED TRITIUM LEVELS IN GROUND WATER SAMPLE

"[The licensee was] notified by Southern Nuclear Company (SNC) Chemistry that, while performing [the procedure for monitoring] the tritium activity results for ground water sample well number T3, elevated tritium levels were detected.

"On May 5, 2009, [a] data report from Georgia Power Central (GPC) Lab containing tritium activity results for ground water sample well T3 was received and reviewed for input into [the] Chemistry database. [The] activity for well T3 was observed to be elevated (36,500 pCi/L). This concentration had increased from [the] last sample activity (5400 pCi/L) on March 16, 2009. Chemistry personnel were directed to resample for verification [of the elevated activity levels]. A sample was collected on May 6, 2009 and shipped to GPC Lab. Sample results for the verification sample were received May 11, 2009. These results were confirmed to be elevated (34,300 pCi/L) compared to previous levels. Chemistry Management has notified the resident NRC inspector as well as SNC environmental affairs. SNC Corporate is performing the necessary notifications to the Georgia State Environmental Protection Division (EPD)."

The licensee is developing a plan to ascertain the cause of this event.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

LOSS OF EMERGENCY ASSESSMENT CAPABILITY

"Communication problems between the plant process computer and radiation monitoring system occurred at 0244 CDT. The failure disabled 17% of the plant data information inputs to the NRC Emergency Response Data System (ERDS). ERDS was not restored within one hour, which necessitates this ENS notification per 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM SHANE HARVEY TO JOHN KNOKE AT 1605 ON 05/12/09 * * *

Licensee stated that ERDS has been restored and Emergency Assessment capability is fully operable.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3 (Michael Kunowski).