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Event Notification Report for December 5, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
12/04/2007 - 12/05/2007

** EVENT NUMBERS **


43692 43779 43812 43816 43824

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43692
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BOB MURRELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/05/2007
Notification Time: 11:30 [ET]
Event Date: 10/05/2007
Event Time: 04:08 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 96 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF BOTH EMERGENCY SERVICE WATER PUMPS

"On October 5, 2007, at approximately 0408, while attempting to open 480 VAC breaker 1B4234A/B for preplanned maintenance, a loss of bus 1B42 occurred. The preliminary cause of the bus trip was arcing of the bucket stabs/bus bars when opening the door to breaker 1B4234A/B. The arcing was a result of the breaker bucket inadvertently pulling away from the bus. At the time of this event, the 'A' Emergency Service Water (ESW) pump was out of service for preplanned maintenance. The loss of 1B42 resulted in a loss of the 'B' ESW pump. The 'A' ESW pump was subsequently returned to service at 0458 on October 5, 2007. Note that power was conservatively lowered approximately 4% at 0512. At the time of this power reduction, the plant was not in a Technical Specification that would require a plant shutdown.

"In addition to the loss of the 'B' ESW pump, the loss of 1B42 resulted in invalid Group 1-5 isolations on the 'B' side of PCIS (not including Main Steam Line Isolation Valves).

"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Any event or condition that alone at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector."

The licensee has not yet determined if this is a mechanical failure of the breaker or a human error. However, they are looking at OE associated with this issue.

* * * UPDATE AT 1324 EDT ON 10/26/07 FROM BOB MURRELL TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee provided the following information as an update:

"In addition to the ESW loss of safety function that occurred, it has been determined that from 0408 till approximately 0715 on 10/05/07, a loss of both onsite emergency AC power sources occurred. Specifically, at the time of the event, the 'A' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was out of service for preplanned maintenance. When bus 1B42 was lost, this resulted in a loss of 'B' ESW. The loss of 'B' ESW resulted in the 'B' EDG being incapable of performing its safety function. Therefore, this is another example of an event or condition that could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Hills).

* * * UPDATE AT 1619 ON 12/4/2007 FROM BOB MURRELL TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"On 10/05/07, this event was reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v), Any event or condition that alone at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident due to the loss of both ESW pumps. Further reviews have determined that the 'A' ESW pump was available at the time of the event and therefore, this event is not reportable for a loss of the ESW safety function. This event is still reportable for a loss of the on-site emergency AC power safety function."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R3DO (Lara).

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 43779
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BERNARD LITKETT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 11/11/2007
Notification Time: 20:06 [ET]
Event Date: 11/11/2007
Event Time: 16:39 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 8 Startup 8 Startup

Event Text

HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO VALVE FAILURE DURING QUARTERLY SURVEILLANCE

"On 11/11/07 at 1639, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable. The quarterly HPCI System Valve In-Service Surveillance was in progress. During the performance of the surveillance, the Suppression Chamber supply check valve was unable to be cycled open in accordance with the surveillance procedure.

"Loss of the HPCI system is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. The plant is stable in Operational Condition 2, no other Emergency Core Cooling or Safety Related systems are inoperable and plant start-up activities are in progress."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.

* * * RETRACTION AT 1532 ON 12/4/2007 FROM MICHAEL REED TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *

"Further investigation revealed that the existing steps of the controlling surveillance procedure did not consistently equalize pressure across the HPCI suction check valve and therefore did not establish adequate test conditions. The surveillance procedure was revised to ensure adequate test conditions were established and the valve was successfully stroked. Evaluation of the initial assessment of operability determined that the suction check valve was not inoperable. Therefore the HPCI system was also not inoperable as initially declared and continued to be able to perform its safety function.

"Based on this additional information, the associated non-emergency 8-hour notification made on November 11, 2007, is retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the Lower Alloways Creek Township.

Notified the R1DO (Barkley).

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43812
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: RONAN, INC
Region: 1
City: MIAMI State: FL
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEVE FURNACE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 11/29/2007
Notification Time: 16:13 [ET]
Event Date: 11/29/2007
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/29/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
ILTAB (VIA EMAIL) ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

FLORIDA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RECOVERED SEALED SOURCES

"[CVG Inc. employee] states that a crate with radioactive symbology is in a warehouse [rented by his company]. [CVG Inc. employee] wants to dispose of it and has asked the state for assistance. He suspects the crate has been there since 1995. Miami inspection office will investigate. A Venezuela company (CVG Inc.) ordered the two sources from Ronan Inc. out of Florence, Ky in 1995. Ronan was contacted and will arrange pick up and return to Kentucky after satisfactory wipe tests and updating paper work. No further action will be taken on this incident."

Investigation determined that the crate contained two RONAN Inc. Cs-137 sources, 300 millicuries each, serial numbers 1535 GK and 1536 GK. The sources were scheduled to be shipped to Venezuela in 1995, but the Captain of the shipping vessel in 1995 refused to accept the radioactive material shipment.

FL Incident Number: FL07-184

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43816
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: AVILES ENGINEERING INC.
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L03016
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 12/01/2007
Notification Time: 12:43 [ET]
Event Date: 12/01/2007
Event Time: 08:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/01/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
DENNIS RATHBUN (FSME)
ILTAB (VIA EMAIL) ()
MEXICO (VIA FAX) ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"On Saturday, 12/01/07 at 10:45 a.m., the agency was contacted through the 24-hour emergency answering service by the licensee's RSO, reporting the theft of their Troxler, Model 3430 moisture/density (m/d) [gauge]. The RSO reported that the employee was enroute to a job site and stopped at a Valero gas station on Tidwell Road in Houston, TX at approximately 8:45 a.m. to get gas. The employee finished pumping the gas, returned the nozzle to its hook and walked to the back of the bed of his Silver Dodge F1500 pickup truck to check the bracing of the gauge, when he noticed that a vagrant from the bus stop jumped in the truck and began to drive off. The employee banged on the window of the driver side and was subsequently drug alongside the truck for a distance, while the perpetrator sped off, jumped a median and eventually escaped. The RSO reported that the gauge was in its transport case, triple locked, and securely braced in the bed of the truck, but the [keys for the gauge locks] were on the same ring as the truck keys.

"The Houston local law enforcement (LLE) were immediately notified and a police report was filed and assigned case # 175693707-U. [Incident Investigation Program (IIP)] instructed the RSO to submit a picture of the gauge to the LLE to assist them in locating the gauge. The RSO was also asked to consider placing an advertisement in the local newspaper offering a reward. IIP informed the RSO that TDSH would submit an email notification to Texas Association of Pawn Brokers (TAPS) with a description of the gauge to possibly assist in its location.

Gauge Information: Mfg: Troxler, Model #: 3430, Serial #: 026027
Source information: 1) Cesium-137; 8 milliCuries, Serial #: 75-9095 2) Am-241:Be 40 milliCuries, Serial#: 47-22446
Last Leak lest: Monitoring Services on 08/14/07

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43824
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DANIEL HAUTALA
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 12/04/2007
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 12/04/2007
Event Time: 07:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/04/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL HAY (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
3 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO POTENTIAL LOSS OF THREE SIRENS

"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.

"On December 04, 2007 at approximately 07:00 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Palo Verde Emergency Preparedness Department discovered sirens 17, 18 and 23 out of service. Siren #23 was restored to service at 09:34 and siren 18 was restored to service at 10:32. Siren 17 remains out of service and is estimated to impact approximately 206 members of population in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) within 5 miles. Palo Verde's reporting criterion is a loss of capability to inform greater than 5% of the population within 5 miles. This call is being placed due to the relatively large segment of the population affected [10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii)]. During an event, the Palo Verde Emergency Plan has a contingency for dispatching Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) vehicles with loud speakers to alert persons within the affected areas when sirens are inoperable. In order to activate this contingency, Maricopa County Department of Emergency Management was notified of the failed siren at 12:58 [10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi)].

"There are no events in progress that require siren operation.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the siren 17 being out of service and this ENS call."

The utility received a pulse check report at 0700 this morning which indicated that three sirens failed the initial pulse check. After the second pulse check, two of the three sirens responded correctly. However, the third siren (No. 17) remained OSS, and the licensee has dispatched a crew to repair it.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012