Event Notification Report for October 09, 2007

ELEVATED ONSITE TRITIUM LEVELS

"Thirty new ground water monitoring wells were recently installed at Catawba Nuclear Station in support of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) ground water initiative. The initial sampling of one of these wells displayed a level of tritium that triggered the communication protocol of the NEI initiative on ground water protection. The tritium concentration for this well was 42,335 picocuries per liter (pCi/l). The threshold for initiating the communication protocol is 20,000 pCi/l. This well is inside the owner controlled area. Adjacent wells surrounding this well do not have similar tritium levels. The station is continuing to investigate the source of tritium identified in this well. Samples from the remaining wells are far below the communication protocol threshold. There is no public risk associated with this well sample. There is no indication that tritium has migrated off the Catawba site in the ground water at the communication threshold. Also this well is not a drinking water source and therefore, there is no potential dose to plant workers or the public."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

POSSIBLE LEAK AT PENN STATE RESEARCH REACTOR

Pennsylvania State University Operations personnel noticed increased makeup at the Breazeale (Triga) reactor, an open pool reactor. At 1600, the leak rate was measured at approximately ten gallons per hour. The Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Health was notified of the probable leak to the environment (possibly to the ground around the containment pool). The licensee has not reached any required reporting criteria.

Water activity:
Gross Alpha: less than minimum detectable
Gross Beta: approx. 3.8 picoCuries/liter
Chromium Gamma: approx. 103 picoCuries/liter


* * * UPDATE FROM MARVIN MENDONCA VIA E-MAIL TO JOE O'HARA AT 0606 ON 10/10/07 * * *

Mark A. Trump, Associate Director of Operations, Breazeale Nuclear Reactor Radiation Science and Engineering Center Pennsylvania State University, University Park, PA 16801 provided the following information to Marvin Mendonca via e-mail at 0536 on 10/10/07.

"At approximately 1600 hrs on 10/9/07 review of water inventory data on the reactor pool indicates a probable leak of approximately 10 gallons per hour from the approximately 71,000 gallon pool. A walk down of reactor systems does not show any signs of leakage into any interfacing systems leading to a probable conclusion that the leak is through the concrete pool wall into the biological shielding (earthen wall). This leakage amount is well within normal makeup system capacity and is at the low threshold of our ability to determine the leakage due to variables such as evaporation rates.

"The reactor is in a safe condition, all reactor pool water chemistry is normal but notification is being done to the PA Department of Environmental Protection (as required).

"Notification of the NRC operational department is also being made concurrently. Notification number 43704."

Notified R1DO(Cook), NRR(Mendonca), NRR(Adams), FSME(Flanders), and NRR(Cunningham).

SAFETY SYSTEM VALVE DID NOT OPERATE AS EXPECTED

"At 1700 CDT, on 10-09-07 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that the C-333 Unit 4 Cell 3 freezer/sublimer computer indicated that the 'B' valve failed to unknown status. Investigation by an operator determined that the 'B' valve would not operate electrically and was in the open position. The freezer/sublimer automatically transitioned to the Hot Standby Mode (FS4) and the electrically failed 'B' valve was closed manually by an operator. The freezer/sublimer was being operated in mode FS1, the freeze mode, at the time of the failure. TSR 2.4.3.1 requires the high-high weight trip system and its associated 'B' valve to be operable in mode FS1. It was determined that the system would not have been able to perform its intended safety function with the 'B' valve disabled. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

"PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-07-2675; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2007-16"