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Event Notification Report for October 4, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
10/03/2007 - 10/04/2007

** EVENT NUMBERS **


43563 43674 43680 43683 43684 43686 43687 43688 43689

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 43563
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RON FRY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/13/2007
Notification Time: 19:49 [ET]
Event Date: 08/13/2007
Event Time: 14:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
HAROLD GRAY (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

INOPERABLE RADIATION MONITORS DUE TO SETPOINT CALCULATION ERRORS

"On August 13, 2007 at 14:20 [EDT], the Susquehanna Control Room was notified that during review of calculations for the Secondary Containment Radiation Monitor Setpoints errors were identified in Tech Spec Allowable Values and TRM Trip Setpoints that rendered them non-conservative. The affected instruments are Refuel Floor Wall, Refuel Floor High, and Railroad Access radiation monitors. The condition affects both Susquehanna Units. The radiation monitors are required to be operable for conditions noted in footnotes (a), (b), and (c) in Tech Spec tables 3.3.6.2-1 and 3.3.7.1-1 (i.e. operations with a potential for draining the reactor vessel, during CORE ALTERATIONS and during movement of irradiated fuel assemblies in the secondary containment, and movement of irradiated fuel assemblies within or above the Railroad Access Shaft). The function of these instruments is to initiate systems that limit fission product release during and following certain postulated accidents and to minimize the consequences of radioactive material in the control room environment.

"The radiation monitoring instruments were declared inoperable. All movement of irradiate fuel assemblies was halted (dry fuel storage activities were in progress at the time of notification). Based on this action, these monitors are no longer within the specified Applicability, and are therefore not currently required to be operable. The event has been determined to be reportable within 8 hours under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D)."


The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE FROM G. ROBINSON TO J. KNOKE AT 1222 EDT ON 10/03/07 * * *

"On August 13, 2007 PPL Susquehanna reported that during a review of calculations for the Secondary Containment Radiation Monitor Setpoints, errors were identified in Tech Spec Allowable Values and TRM Trip Setpoints that rendered them non-conservative. The affected monitors were declared inoperable and the required LCO & TRO Actions entered.

A subsequent engineering review determined that the values used to establish the Tech Spec Allowable Values and TRM Trip Setpoints were based on a Realistic Source Term, not a Design Basis Source Term. These values were sufficiently conservative to compensate for the errors in the calculations and the dose release limits from a Design Basis Accident would not have been challenged. It was concluded that the existing Tech Spec values and setpoints remained valid and the monitors were operable in their original condition. Based on this conclusion Event Notification EN# 43563 is being retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO ( Powell) was notified.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43674
Rep Org: ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: APAC ARKANSAS INC
Region: 4
City: SPRINGDALE State: AR
County:
License #: ARK-0686-0312
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JARED THOMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 09/28/2007
Notification Time: 14:17 [ET]
Event Date: 09/27/2007
Event Time: 23:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/28/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
ROBERT PIERSON (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - TROXLER GAUGE DAMAGED IN HIGHWAY ACCIDENT

The State provided the following information via email:

"The Arkansas Department of Health received notification on September 27, 2007 at 11:00 p.m. a Troxler 4640B, Serial Number 1574 portable gauge was struck and damaged by a pick up truck. The gauge contains a 9 mCi, Cesium-137 source, Serial number 75-6810.

"The incident occurred on Highway 412 near Springdale, Arkansas. The gauge was being used during highway construction. The authorized user was struck and killed during this incident.

"The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) was contacted and arrived at approximately 12:00 a.m. to assess the scene. The source rod along with part of the shielding was separated from the main part of the gauge. A wipe test was taken and the field survey of the wipe indicated that the source had not been ruptured. The RSO partially shielded the source by returning it to the base plate and placed the source rod back with the gauge in the transport case. The gauge was then transported to the licensee's permanent storage area.

"Arkansas Department of Health personnel arrived at the licensee's facility at 9:00 a.m. on Friday, September 28, 2007. Department personnel gathered information about the incident and then conducted surveys of the gauge. It appears that the gauge shielding had been cracked and possibly compromised. The highest radiation reading was 35 mR/hour on contact of the left end side of the gauge.

"The licensee has been in contact with the manufacturer for possible disposal options."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43680
Facility: GRAND GULF
Region: 4 State: MS
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: HARDY FARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 10/02/2007
Notification Time: 04:28 [ET]
Event Date: 10/01/2007
Event Time: 22:20 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF EXHAUST VENTILATION STACK FLOW AND ACCIDENT RADIATION MONITORS DUE TO PLANT DATA MULTIPLEXER FAILURE

"On 10/01/2007 the failure of a plant data multiplexer (MUX) resulted in the loss of Control Room indication of all plant building exhaust ventilation stack flows and accident radiation monitors. The stack flows and accident radiation monitors are normally accessed by the plants Emergency Response Organization offsite dose calculation application but cannot be accessed at this time. Alternate means of offsite dose projections are available. The duration of the plant data MUX outage is currently unknown. Follow-up notification will be made after restoration of the plant data MUX."

The cause of the failure is being investigated.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY HARDY FERRIS TO JASON KOZAL ON 10/03/07 AT 0214 EDT * * *

The licensee reports that the plant data multiplexer (MUX) has been returned to service. A faulty off-gas building channel (Offgas / Radwaste Building AXM/SPING/FMIS) was the cause of the MUX failure. The off-gas channel remains out of service.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R4DO (Nease) notified.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43683
Facility: BEAVER VALLEY
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: KEN TIEFENTHAL
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 10/03/2007
Notification Time: 10:42 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2007
Event Time: 19:08 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FITNESS FOR DUTY - NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR

A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive test for alcohol during a random fitness-for-duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been placed on administrative hold. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43684
Facility: COOK
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUG BOWMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/03/2007
Notification Time: 13:08 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2007
Event Time: 06:36 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling

Event Text

CONTAMINATED WORKER TRANSPORTED TO OFFSITE MEDICAL FACILITY

"At 0540 Eastern Daylight Time (EDT) the Unit 2 Control Room was notified of a personnel injury in the Unit 2 containment. Unit 2 is currently in a refueling outage and the individual was working in upper containment in support of the reactor vessel closure head replacement project. The individual injuries are apparently the result of being struck when a rigging clevis (not under load) dropped from an elevated position. Site emergency medical technicians responded to the scene and the individual was transported to a local medical facility [Lakeland Hospital, St. Joseph, MI] via ambulance at 0636 EDT. At the time of transport, the individual was considered to be potentially contaminated because complete surveys could not be performed while the individual was immobilized for transfer. Subsequently, after arrival at the hospital, radiation protection personnel verified the presence of low levels of contamination on outer contamination clothing and transport material. These materials are being returned to plant in accordance with DOT guidelines.

"This report is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b(3)(xii), 'Any event requiring the transport of a radioactively contaminated person to an offsite medical facility for treatment.'"

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

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Fuel Cycle Facility Event Number: 43686
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
                   6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
                   BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
Region: 2
City: PADUCAH State: KY
County: McCRACKEN
License #: GDP-1
Agreement: Y
Docket: 0707001
NRC Notified By: M.C. PITMAN
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/03/2007
Notification Time: 14:35 [ET]
Event Date: 10/02/2007
Event Time: 14:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
GREG MORELL (FSME)

Event Text

RELEASE DETECTION SYSTEM (PGLD) DECLARED INOPERABLE

"At 1406 CDST, on 10-02-07 the Plant Shift Superintendent (PSS) was notified that an alarm was received for the C-333, Unit 6, Cell 4, UF6 Release Detection (PGLD) System. Operators responded and found that the READY and MANUAL lights for this system were not illuminated. This PGLD System contains detectors that cover C-333, Unit 6, Cell 4, and Section 2 of the cell bypass piping. At the time of this alarm, some areas of Section 2 of the cell bypass were operating above atmospheric pressure. TSR 2.4.4.1 requires that at least the minimum number of detector heads in each defined section of the cell bypass are operable during steady state operations above atmospheric pressure. With the Unit 6, Cell 4, PGLD System inoperable, only 2 of the required 3 heads in Section 2 of the cell bypass were operable. This PGLD System was declared inoperable, TSR LCO 2.4.4.1 .C.1 was entered and a continuous smoke watch was put in place within one hour. An investigation is ongoing and at this point a wire was found that had failed with visible insulation damage. Engineering has determined that the system would not have been able to perform its intended safety function when this alarm came in. This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.1 20(c)(2)(i). This is an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a.) the equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b.) the equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should have operated on demand, and c.) no redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function."

This event is similar to EN#43670 on 09/27/07.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43687
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: DOUG HOBSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 10/03/2007
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2007
Event Time: 14:10 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby

Event Text

REACTOR TRIP ON LOSS OF FORCED FLOW TO RCS LOOP "A"

"An emergency has not been declared and there has not been a release of radioactivity to the environment.

"Farley Unit 2 tripped from 100% power due to a loss of forced flow in the 'A' Reactor Coolant System loop. The loss of flow resulted from de-energization of the 2A 4160V Reactor Coolant Pump Bus that provides power to the 2A Reactor Coolant Pump following the de-energization of the 2B Start Up Transformer. The loss of the 2B Start Up Transformer appears to have been the result of relay testing on Farley Unit 1. Farley Unit 1 is currently in Mode 6 for a refueling outage.

"The loss of the 2B Start Up Transformer also de-energized the 2G 4160V Engineered Safeguards Feature Bus. This bus has been re-energized from the 2B Emergency Diesel Generator.

"All rods fully inserted and all systems functioned as required following the trip. Decay heat removal is being provided by both Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps supplying flow to all three Steam Generators. Cause of event is under investigation."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43688
Facility: ROBINSON
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES BAUCOM
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/03/2007
Notification Time: 18:43 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2007
Event Time: 18:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
CATHERINE HANEY (NRR)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO SOUTH CAROLINA OSHA DUE TO NON-WORK RELATED FATALITY ONSITE

"On October 3, 2007, a non-work related fatality occurred at the H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant, Unit No. 2. Specifically, at 1502 hours EDT, first responders were dispatched for a Progress Energy employee who suffered a medical condition that required immediate attention. Medical assistance was provided on-site by H. B. Robinson Plant first responders, and the employee was subsequently transported by ambulance to a nearby medical facility. At 1540 hours EDT, site personnel were notified that attempts to revive the employee were not successful and the employee had died. The employee was working in a non-radiologically controlled area of the plant and no radioactive material or contamination was involved.

"Notification of other governmental agencies, specifically the South Carolina Occupational Safety and Health Administration (SCOSHA), was completed at 1830 hours EDT on October 3, 2007. This report is being made in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(xi), which states that a report shall be made as soon as practical and in all cases within four hours of any event or situation, related to the health and safety of the public or on-site personnel, or protection of the environment, for which a news release is planned or notification to other government agencies has been or will be made. Such an event may include an on-site fatality. The resident inspector has been notified."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43689
Facility: KEWAUNEE
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: ANDREW SMOLINSKI
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 10/03/2007
Notification Time: 23:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/03/2007
Event Time: 15:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/03/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD
Person (Organization):
LAURA KOZAK (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

POTENTIAL UNAVAILABILITY OF TWO WAY RADIO SYSTEM TO SUPPORT SAFE SHUTDOWN

"In response to Self-Assessment Report SA014668 and preparation for the 2008 Triennial Fire Protection Inspection, a Fire Protection Improvement Plan implementation is in progress. Preliminary analysis of the major equipment, power supplies and cables associated with the two-way radio communication system (DCR-3341) indicates the potential for the plant two-way radio system to be adversely impacted and potentially unavailable to support post-fire safe shutdown operator actions and/or fire brigade fire fighting activities for a fire location in:
- Fire Zone AX-35 (Control Room and AC Equipment Room)
- Fire Zone TU-22 (Turbine Room) at the mezzanine elevation just outside Battery Room 1B
- Fire Zone TU-98 (Battery Room 1B)

"This review has identified discrepancies regarding the credited means of communication required for use by Operators in response to an Appendix R fire. The safe shutdown procedures E-O-06 and E-O-07, and the Manual Action Feasibility Study (Fire Protection Engineering Evaluation FPEE-003) only credit the plant two-way radio system.

"However, upper tier program documents (e.g., Fire Protection Program Plan, Appendix R Design Description) do not consistently contain the same requirements. For example, the Fire Plan, Rev 7, Section 12.9 requires both the 5-channel Gai-Tronics system between key shutdown locations AND the multi-channel portable radio communications equipped with repeaters and provided for use by the plant fire brigade shall be operable at all times. The Appendix R Design Description. Rev. 5 is silent on safe shutdown communications.

"It is not clear at this time whether the 5-channel Gai-tronics should also be credited in the safe shutdown procedures. If so, then the cables supporting operation of the Gai-Tronics would need to be identified and located by fire zone to determine their availability in lieu of two-way radio communications for a fire in any of the three fire zones identified above.

"Until this is verified, the Appendix R timeline for achieving sate shutdown may not be able to be met. Therefore, this is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(V)(A), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to:
(A) shutdown the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition,
(B) remove residual heat,
(C) control the release of radioactive material, OR
(D) mitigate the consequences of an accident."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Page Last Reviewed/Updated Thursday, March 29, 2012
Thursday, March 29, 2012