Event Notification Report for September 18, 2007

SHIELD BUILDING VENTILATION SYSTEM INOPERABLE

"At 1200 a condition associated with the Shield Building Ventilation Train A damper controller was identified that rendered the system inoperable. This condition was identified while Shield Building Ventilation Train B was inoperable for routine maintenance. Consequently, both trains of Shield Building Ventilation were simultaneously inoperable. Technical Specification TS 3.6.c requires a reactor shutdown within 12 hours of this condition. The routine maintenance on Shield Building Ventilation Train B was completed and retest performed at 1331. Shield Building Ventilation Train B was returned to operable and Technical Specification requirements to shutdown were exited. The plant remains in a 7 day Action Statement per TS 3.6.c with Shield Building Ventilation Train A inoperable .

"This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(C), 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to control the release of radioactive material.'"

I&C technician was walking down a different job in the area and noticed a light illuminated on the A control board which should not have been illuminated. Additional investigation revealed an electrical condition would have prevented the modulation of the dampers thereby rendering the A train system inoperable.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE

A technician was working at a jobsite on 9/15/07, and when he completed his work about 1800, he drove to the company office in Southfield, MI. He left the Troxler gauge double locked in the back of the company pickup truck. When he reported to work on 09/18/07 at 0700 he noticed that the Troxler gauge was missing from the truck. He reported this to the RSO. The Troxler is a model 3440, s/n 36107, with Am-241/Be (40 mCi), s/n 78-998, and Cs-137 (8 mCi), s/n 77-3236. Licensee reported this to the Southfield police who issued report # 07-58570.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

REFUELING WATER STORAGE TANK TEMPERATURE ABOVE OPERATING LIMITS

"At 0043 on 9/18/07, during performance of Technical Specification (TS) Surveillance Requirement (SR) 3.5.4.1, the 2T-13 Refueling Water Storage Tank (RWST) was found to be at 105 degrees F. Limiting Condition for Operation (LCO) 3.5.4 A was therefore not met due to temperature being above the parametric value limit of 97 degrees F (100F technical specification value).

"The cause of the elevated temperatures of 2T-13 is currently under investigation. At 0843 an orderly shutdown of Unit 2 was commenced because of the continued elevated temperature of the Refueling Water Storage Tank. Troubleshooting to identify the cause of the problem and take remedial actions continues."

Unit 1 RWST temperature is 77 F. Licensee is taking action to lower Unit 2 RWST temperature.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY RICK ROBBINS TO JASON KOZAL ON 9/18/07 AT 1901 * * *

"Unit 2 RWST temperature was verified at 97 degrees F at 1421 CDT. The 2T-13 RWST is operable and LCO 3.5.4.is now met. The Unit 2 power reduction was terminated at 20% reactor power. Current plans are to continue to cool down the RWST using station procedures that place the RWST on recirculation through the residual heat removal (RHR) heat exchanger with component cooling water (CCW) to cool the heat exchanger. Plans are in progress to return Unit 2 to full power on 09/18/07.

"A root cause evaluation is in progress to determine the specific cause of the event; however, preliminary investigations have determined that the heaters were on with an improper setpoint. The power supply to the heaters have been turned off and temperatures are being monitored on an hourly basis while the RWST is on recirculation."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (Peterson)

LOST STATIC ELIMINATOR

The licensee reported they lost a static eliminator manufactured by NRD, Model #P202108181 with 2 milliCuries of Polonium 210. The device was last seen in June 2007 and was used to remove plastic particles from manufactured plastic parts. The licensee believes that the device became dislodged in the manufacturing plant, fell onto the shop floor, and was swept up with debris. The licensee was collecting and accounting for the devices in September 2007 when they noticed it was missing. As a result of this event, the licensee has since incorporated training into the workforce so that the employees can identify and account for the devices.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.