Event Notification Report for September 17, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/16/2007 - 09/17/2007
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43645
Facility: LIMERICK
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NED DENNIN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NED DENNIN
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 09/17/2007
Notification Time: 03:16 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2007
Event Time: 01:49 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/06/2007
Notification Time: 03:16 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2007
Event Time: 01:49 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/06/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI UNABLE TO PERFORM IT'S SAFETY RELATED FUNCTION
"During performance of the quarterly HPCI valve stroke test the HV-055-2F093, HPCI Vacuum Breaker Outboard PCIV, failed to close. The PCIV was declared inoperable. The valve was subsequently closed and de-energized to meet Technical Specification requirements. The valve did close from the handswitch on the subsequent attempt, investigation into the cause is in progress. The closure of this valve at 0149 on 9/17/07 prevents Unit 2 HPCI from performing it's safety related function. Unit 2 RCIC and all other Unit 2 ECCS systems remain operable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 12:34 ON 11/6/2007 FROM MARK ARNOSKY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"This is a retraction of the event notification made on 9/17/07 at 03:16 EDT hours. This event (43645) was initially reported as a safety system functional failure under the requirement of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable for a planned evolution to conduct stroke time surveillance testing on the HPCl exhaust vacuum breaker primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) and other valves. At 00:23 hours the outboard vacuum breaker PClV failed to close from the main control room hand switch. The PClV was declared inoperable and closed as required to support subsequent troubleshooting and to meet the Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves action statement. TS 3.6.3 Action 'a' requires the inoperable PClV to be closed within 4 hours. This action was completed at 01:50 hours.
"In addition, the HPCl system was declared inoperable following the remote manual closure of the inoperable PClV from the main control room hand switch since this made the HPCl exhaust line vacuum breaker function inoperable. The feed switch for the HPCl steam admission motor-operated-valve (MOV) was opened to prevent turbine start without exhaust line vacuum relief capability.
"Troubleshooting determined that the most likely cause of the PClV failure to close was an intermittent high resistance condition on the PClV hand switch contact. The PClV failed to close on the first demand but was successfully closed on the second and third demands. The PClV hand switch contacts were cleaned and successfully tested. Unit 2 HPCl was restored to operable status at 20:25 hours.
"The HPCl exhaust vacuum breaker PClVs are normally open. The automatic closure capability of though PClV was not adversely affected by the degraded hand switch contact.
"The HPCl system was declared inoperable as part of a planned evolution to conduct PClV surveillance testing in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's Technical Specifications. The HPCl system was later made unavailable for the purpose of conducting maintenance on the inoperable PCIV and completing the TS action. The failed PClV hand switch did not adversely affect the HPCl system's capability of performing its safety function. HPCl remained capable of automatic initiation until the exhaust vacuum breaker PClV and HPCl steam admission valves were closed under administrative control to support maintenance and completion of the TS action.
"A condition did not exist at the time of discovery that could have prevented the fulfillment of the HPCl safety function."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Miller).
"During performance of the quarterly HPCI valve stroke test the HV-055-2F093, HPCI Vacuum Breaker Outboard PCIV, failed to close. The PCIV was declared inoperable. The valve was subsequently closed and de-energized to meet Technical Specification requirements. The valve did close from the handswitch on the subsequent attempt, investigation into the cause is in progress. The closure of this valve at 0149 on 9/17/07 prevents Unit 2 HPCI from performing it's safety related function. Unit 2 RCIC and all other Unit 2 ECCS systems remain operable."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION AT 12:34 ON 11/6/2007 FROM MARK ARNOSKY TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"This is a retraction of the event notification made on 9/17/07 at 03:16 EDT hours. This event (43645) was initially reported as a safety system functional failure under the requirement of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system was declared inoperable for a planned evolution to conduct stroke time surveillance testing on the HPCl exhaust vacuum breaker primary containment isolation valves (PCIVs) and other valves. At 00:23 hours the outboard vacuum breaker PClV failed to close from the main control room hand switch. The PClV was declared inoperable and closed as required to support subsequent troubleshooting and to meet the Technical Specification (TS) 3.6.3 Primary Containment Isolation Valves action statement. TS 3.6.3 Action 'a' requires the inoperable PClV to be closed within 4 hours. This action was completed at 01:50 hours.
"In addition, the HPCl system was declared inoperable following the remote manual closure of the inoperable PClV from the main control room hand switch since this made the HPCl exhaust line vacuum breaker function inoperable. The feed switch for the HPCl steam admission motor-operated-valve (MOV) was opened to prevent turbine start without exhaust line vacuum relief capability.
"Troubleshooting determined that the most likely cause of the PClV failure to close was an intermittent high resistance condition on the PClV hand switch contact. The PClV failed to close on the first demand but was successfully closed on the second and third demands. The PClV hand switch contacts were cleaned and successfully tested. Unit 2 HPCl was restored to operable status at 20:25 hours.
"The HPCl exhaust vacuum breaker PClVs are normally open. The automatic closure capability of though PClV was not adversely affected by the degraded hand switch contact.
"The HPCl system was declared inoperable as part of a planned evolution to conduct PClV surveillance testing in accordance with an approved procedure and the plant's Technical Specifications. The HPCl system was later made unavailable for the purpose of conducting maintenance on the inoperable PCIV and completing the TS action. The failed PClV hand switch did not adversely affect the HPCl system's capability of performing its safety function. HPCl remained capable of automatic initiation until the exhaust vacuum breaker PClV and HPCl steam admission valves were closed under administrative control to support maintenance and completion of the TS action.
"A condition did not exist at the time of discovery that could have prevented the fulfillment of the HPCl safety function."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified the R1DO (Miller).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43646
Facility: SEABROOK
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 1 State: NH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE TAYLOR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 09/17/2007
Notification Time: 07:36 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2007
Event Time: 05:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2007
Notification Time: 07:36 [ET]
Event Date: 09/17/2007
Event Time: 05:59 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/17/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION TO LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT
"On 9/17/07 at 0559, an accidental discharge of a security officer's firearm occurred while conducting shift turnover and arming functions in the Station's security guard house. The officer was injured in the right leg below the knee and at this time, the injury is believed to be non-life threatening. The officer has been transported to a local hospital for treatment. No plant systems have been affected. The local NRC resident has been informed of the event. Local law enforcement [Seabrook Police and New Hampshire State Police] has also been notified and is onsite providing investigative assistance."
"On 9/17/07 at 0559, an accidental discharge of a security officer's firearm occurred while conducting shift turnover and arming functions in the Station's security guard house. The officer was injured in the right leg below the knee and at this time, the injury is believed to be non-life threatening. The officer has been transported to a local hospital for treatment. No plant systems have been affected. The local NRC resident has been informed of the event. Local law enforcement [Seabrook Police and New Hampshire State Police] has also been notified and is onsite providing investigative assistance."