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Event Notification Report for September 13, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
09/12/2007 - 09/13/2007

** EVENT NUMBERS **


43626 43628 43634 43635

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43626
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: QSA GLOBAL, INC
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County:
License #: 12-8361
Agreement: Y
Docket: 09-7304
NRC Notified By: MIKE WHALEN
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 09/10/2007
Notification Time: 12:46 [ET]
Event Date: 08/31/2007
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/10/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
ILTAB (email) ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - AM-241 SOURCES LOST DURING SHIPMENT

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"Licensee received routine shipment of Am-241 button sources from supplier in China - Shenzhen CIC in Shenzhen, China on August 15, 2007. Shipment was sent via China Air from China to New York, and then transported by air to Boston. In Boston, it is then trucked via Ground Control and arrived at the licensees facility in Burlington, MA. The licensee estimates the package was sent from China sometime after July 25, 2007.

"The excepted package (UN2911) was damaged when it arrived at the licensees' facility. At this time the licensee confirmed there was no contamination nor high radiation levels from the package. This package is normally not opened as it is forwarded to a customer for use in smoke detectors. On August 31, 2007, before forwarding the package, the licensee opened the package to verify its contents. The licensee discovered that 2 vials from the package were missing.

"Each plastic vial contains 500 Am-241 button sources, each 0.8 microCi nominal activity, for a total of 0.4 milliCi total in each vial.

"The licensee immediately notified their transport broker and their agent in China."

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43628
Rep Org: MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: AMERICAN ENGINEERING AND TESTING
Region: 3
City: DEXTER State: MN
County:
License #: MN07005
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GEORGE JOHNS
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 09/10/2007
Notification Time: 15:53 [ET]
Event Date: 09/10/2007
Event Time: 03:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/10/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
MICHELLE BURGESS (FSME)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The State provided the following information via email:

"On Monday, September 10, 2007, the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH) was notified by American Engineering and Testing that a fire had destroyed a Troxler Model 3430 moisture density gauge. The fire occurred at a private residence, which was a farm, and spread to a pick-up truck that was parked beside the garage to that residence. The fire melted the plastic components of the gauge but did not effect the Cesium-137 source in the source rod or the Americium-241:Beryllium source that was in the lead shielding. Members of the Fire Department who responded to the fire were instructed to maintain a safe distance from the truck to avoid minimize radiation exposures.

"MDH completed radiation and contamination surveys of both sources. No contamination was detected and the radiation levels were as would be expected with the shielding intact. The sources were placed in containers filled with sand to provide shielding and removed to a secure permanent storage location. The RSO and the Corporate RSO will complete leak tests and arrange for the appropriate containers for shipment to the manufacturer.

"The gauge was a Troxler Model 3430, Serial Number 23279, which contained approximately 9 millicuries of Cesium-137 (Serial Number 75-5294) and 44 millicuries of Americium-241:Be (Serial Number 47-19161)."

Minnesota Report number: MN07005

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43634
Facility: COOPER
Region: 4 State: NE
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVEN JOBE
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 09/11/2007
Notification Time: 22:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/11/2007
Event Time: 15:09 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION - BOTH EDG'S UNAVAILABLE

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of SSCs that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Diesel generator #2 (DG2) was inoperable and unavailable for planned maintenance. This was day 2 of a 7 day shutdown LCO. At 1449, Diesel Generator #1 (DG1) was declared inoperable and unavailable at 1509, due to malfunction of the day fuel oil day tank high level shutoff solenoid valve. With both DGs unavailable, the required safety function was not maintained. At time 1645, DG1 was restored to an available status by repairing the diesel fuel oil day lank high level shut off solenoid. At this time DG1 is able to perform the safety function. DG1 was declared operable at 2129."

While recovering the DG2 from planned maintenance, the operators were refilling the DG2 day tank and noticed the level increasing in the DG1 day tank. The operators determined that a mechanical failure of the float occurred in the DG1 solenoid valve. The valve should have remained shut to preclude overfilling the tank. The safety function of the valve occurs on a loss of power. On a loss of power, the solenoid valve fails open to allow the tank to be filled.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * UPDATE FROM E. McCUTCHEN TO J. KNOKE AT 1743 ON 09/12/07 * * *

"This update is being made to correct certain technical inaccuracies in the initial Event Notification [43634] and in the additional information reflected on the NRC website. The corrected initial Event Notification is as follows.

"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of SSCs that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident.

"Diesel generator #2 (DG2) was inoperable and unavailable due to planned maintenance. This was day 2 of a 7 day shutdown LCO. While recovering DG2 from planned maintenance, operators were refilling the DG2 fuel oil (FO) day tank and noticed that level was also increasing in [Diesel generator #1] DG1 FO day tank. The operators determined that the DG1 day tank float valve and FO day tank high level shutoff solenoid valve were both shut as designed, but were leaking by. At 1449, Operators declared DG1 inoperable but available due to leak-by of the FO day tank high level shutoff solenoid valve. At 1509, DG1 was declared unavailable due to operators positioning its Maintenance Lock-Out (MLO) switch to OFF (lock out) for work on the valves. With both DGs unavailable, the required safety function was not maintained. CNS [Cooper Nuclear Station] replaced the FO day tank high level shut off solenoid valve and at 1645, restored DG1 to an available status by repositioning the MLO switch to ON. Subsequently the replacement shutoff solenoid valve was also found to leak by. CNS realigned DG FO transfer systems and declared DG1 operable at 2129."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (Shannon)

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43635
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: GENE DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 09/12/2007
Notification Time: 09:58 [ET]
Event Date: 09/12/2007
Event Time: 06:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/12/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 M/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

REACTOR SCRAM FOLLOWING INTAKE STRUCTURE TRAVELING SCREEN FOULING

"As a result of high winds and a severe storm front moving through the area a Nuclear Plant Operator (NPO) found the intake canal water murky, wind speed was noted to be 40 MPH. The Traveling Screens were placed in the continuous mode of operation and increased monitoring was put in effect. At 0520 the NPO noted that 'a lot of weeds and fish were coming in through the intake' and that a full trash basket had been changed out. At approximately 0630 the NPO reported that the traveling screens were not moving and intake level was lowering due to the influx of debris. The Shift Nuclear Operator (SNO) entered the appropriate Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP) for lowering intake level and commenced rapid power reduction. At 0635 with intake level at 240 feet the SNO inserted a manual scram and entered the appropriate AOP and Emergency Operating Procedure (EOP).

"Reactor Vessel level decreased to less than 177 inches above the top of active fuel resulting in a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 isolation signal. The PCIS Group 2 isolation resulted in a valid signal to close PCIS valves in the Drywell Floor Drain System, the Drywell Equipment Drain System, the Residual Heat Removal (RHR) System, the Traversing In-Core Probe (TIP) System, the Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD) System, and the Reactor Water Clean-Up (RWCU) System. However, as a result of the power reduction the operators were able to maintain reactor vessel level above the actuation setpoint for the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) System and the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) Systems and these systems were not required to operate.

"At 0640 the Scram was reset, at 0710 the Group 2 PCIS Isolation was verified, and at 0729 the Group 2 PCIS Isolation was reset.

"The cause of the traveling screens stopping has been determined to be due to shear pins on the traveling water screen shearing due to excessive debris loading.

"All equipment responded as expected during the downpower and subsequent manual Scram. All rods are in and the plant is stable in MODE 3, Hot Shutdown." Decay heat is being removed by dumping steam to the condenser via the turbine bypass valves. The safety buses are being powered by offsite power. The 'B' train Residual Heat Removal pump was out of service at the time of the event for planned maintenance.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM G. DORMAN TO J. KNOKE AT 1205 EDT ON 09/12/07 * * *

"At 1034 with the plant shutdown and a cooldown in progress reactor vessel (RV) level lowered to less than 177 inches above TAF [Top of Active Fuel]. This resulted in a valid Reactor Protection System (RPS) Scram signal and a PCIS Group 2 Isolation Signal. AP systems responded as expected. Reactor vessel level remained above the actuation setpoint for HPCI and RCIC and they were not required to operate. RV level was restored and the Scram was reset.

"At the time of the initial event and at this update the plant is in LCO action statement 3.5.1.A for the 'B' RHR Pump being out of service. The system is being restored at this time.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The licensee also notified the state and is providing a press release to the media. Notified R1DO (Trapp).

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