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Event Notification Report for August 27, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
08/24/2007 - 08/27/2007

** EVENT NUMBERS **


43592 43593 43594 43595 43597

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43592
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: TERRY BACON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/24/2007
Notification Time: 13:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2007
Event Time: 11:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FIRE BARRIER SEPARATION CRITERIA NOT MET FOR AFWP ROOMS

"On August. 24, 2007, Prairie Island staff completed a past operability evaluation of a condition involving a missing fire barrier, such that the required degree of separation for redundant safe shutdown trains was lacking. The floor trench which transverses the auxiliary feedwater pump (AFWP) rooms has a 12 inch thick concrete barrier at the interface of Fire Areas 31 and 32 (Unit 1 and Unit 2 AFWP rooms). That barrier is required by NRC commitment to prevent the flow of flammable liquid (i.e., oil) and fire suppression water from transferring fire from one AFWP room to the other. That barrier contains penetrations which shall be controlled like any other fire barrier penetration.

"One of those penetrations is a 4 inch pipe sleeve. When stuffed with fire-retardant wool and capped with provided threaded caps, it is a qualified seal. However, for approximately ten years, the 4 inch sleeve has contained a 3 inch hose. During most of this 10 year period there were hourly fire watches in these two fire areas, which were an acceptable compensatory measure. However; for a period between Sept. 19, 2005 and April 9, 2006 there were no hourly fire watches in place. Prairie Island staff concluded the required degree of separation was lacking with no compensatory measures, thus the as-found condition is reportable per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii) as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety."

This condition was discovered and corrected on 8/10/07.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43593
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: SCOTT SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 08/24/2007
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2007
Event Time: 09:47 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/24/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
OTHER UNSPEC REQMNT
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

REACTOR TRIP BREAKER UNDERVOLTAGE TRIP FAILURE DURING SURVEILLANCE TESTING

"During routine surveillance testing on Unit 1 'B' Train Solid State Protection System, per FNP-1-STP-33.2B, the 'B' Train Rx Trip Breaker Failed to trip when a trip signal was sent from one of the manual function test push buttons. Indicated voltage did go to zero, but the Reactor Trip Breaker did not open. Per the testing sequence, the shunt trip for this breaker was being blocked at this time. A timeout was taken to determine the best course of action. Following discussions with Shift Manager, Duty manager, Emergency Director, and Electrical Maintenance supervision, it was decided to determine if the breaker would trip via the shunt trip mechanism. The surveillance testing was continued, and the 'B' Reactor Trip Breaker opened when the test signal was again inserted with the shunt trip unblocked. The 'B' Reactor Trip Breaker was replaced with a new breaker, and was subsequently tested sat per applicable sections of the surveillance test procedure.

"***This event did not result an any offsite radiation release, and did not pose a threat to the general public.***"

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43594
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: MIKE MLYNAREK
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 08/25/2007
Notification Time: 01:27 [ET]
Event Date: 08/24/2007
Event Time: 19:57 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/26/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JULIO LARA (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

PARTIAL LOSS OF PROCESS COMPUTER PARAMETERS TO ERDS

"A portion of the Palisades Plant Process Computer (PPC) including a significant number or Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) trended input became inoperable due to a host computer failure. The cause of the host computer failure is unknown.

"Necessary redundant control room parameters exist and are functioning. Palisades is currently in no associated Technical Specification LCOs.

"Repair of the host computer will be prudently pursued. NRC notification of repair completion will occur."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 2005 ON 8/26/07 FROM MULFORD TO SNYDER * * *

The licensee restored the host computer at 1757 on 8/26/07 so it is now providing accurate data.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lara).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43595
Facility: SOUTH TEXAS
Region: 4 State: TX
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROGER SHALLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 08/25/2007
Notification Time: 07:41 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/2007
Event Time: 07:30 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JEFFREY CLARK (R4)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

ERDS SYSTEM AND PORTIONS OF PLANT COMPUTER OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE OUTAGE

The licensee will perform a planned power outage on Unit 1 which will take the ERDS system, 25% of the control room annunciators, and portions of the plant computer out of service. Some points on the plant computer will not be able to be monitored during the outage. However, the licensee has compensatory measures in place to monitor those parameters on the control boards. The outage is scheduled from 0730 CDT until 1800 CDT.

The licensee will enter Technical Specification LCO 3.1.3.1 and 3.1.3.2.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1905 EDT ON 8/25/07 FROM ROGER SHALLEY TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee restored ERDS to service at 1805 CDT on 8/25/07 and will inform the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R4DO (Jeff Clark).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43597
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN GATES
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 08/25/2007
Notification Time: 15:14 [ET]
Event Date: 08/25/2007
Event Time: 10:58 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/25/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

AUTOSTART OF ALL EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS DUE TO A GRID DISTURBANCE

"A switchyard grid disturbance caused undervoltage relays to start both unit's Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs). 1A, 1B, 2A, and 2B [EDGs] started which met ESF actuation [conditions]. The [EDGs] did not supply the emergency [buses] due to voltage returning to normal immediately. The grid fault was isolated and the [EDGs] were secured."

The EDGs are now available to respond if needed.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

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