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Event Notification Report for July 27, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/26/2007 - 07/27/2007

** EVENT NUMBERS **


39014 43512 43513 43514 43524 43525 43526

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General Information or Other Event Number: 39014
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA INC.
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County:
License #: 12-8361
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GALLAGHAR
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 06/24/2002
Notification Time: 12:42 [ET]
Event Date: 06/24/2002
Event Time: 10:35 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
FRANT (NMSS)
DAVIDSON (IAT)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (IRO)

Event Text

AEA Technology QSA, Inc. (AEA) called to notify the State of the report to their office of the receipt of a package of very low activity Pu-242/Am-243 (12 Bq each) by Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory. AEA was notified by Knolls Atomic that the package, received by them on 12/6/01 or 12/7/01, was opened on or around 5/20/02, at which time the inner container appeared to have been opened, and all contents were absent.

The State Agency was informed by the licensee they received the shipment from England on 12/5/01, checked the outer cardboard container for damage, and resent the shipment to their customer, Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory in New York. The package was received 12/6/01 or 12/7/01. At Knolls, the radiation safety staff received the shipment and confirmed the outer package was undamaged and delivered it to the end user in the Chemistry Department. The user opened the package on or around 5/20/02. Knolls Atomic informed AEA they believe the seal on the inner plastic container was intact, but that the final container, a flame-sealed glass container, appeared to have been opened and the contents removed, in addition, AEA was informed that the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) was notified.

* * * UPDATE FROM GALLAGHAR TO KNOKE AT 0952 ON 07/26/07 * * *

The State provided the following information via email:

"The following information is provided to close NMED Item Number 020624:

"Material was shipped to the Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory (KAPL) and received there on or around 12/6 or 12/7/2001 and not opened until Mid-May of 2002. Investigation by AEA Technology QSA, Inc. (AEA) and KAPL revealed that the shipment arrived at the laboratory intact with no apparent damage; when later opened it appeared that the materials had been used.

"Based upon the condition of the shipping containers when they arrived at KAPL it appears likely that the vials were used at the customer location, apparently without their knowledge."

Notified R1DO (Finney) and NMSS (Flannery)

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43512
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: GREENHORN AND OMARA, INC
Region: 1
City: LAUREL State: MD
County:
License #: MD-33-047-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 07/23/2007
Notification Time: 10:58 [ET]
Event Date: 07/23/2007
Event Time: 07:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/23/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
PAT FINNEY (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
ILTAB (via email) ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

MARYLAND AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER

At 1000 EDT on 07/23/07, the licensee notified the State of Maryland of a Troxler moisture density gauge that was stolen from a trailer at a temporary job site located at 11540 Berry Road, Waldorf, MD. The gauge is a Model 3430, serial # 22355, with an 8 millicurie Cs-137 source and a 40 millicurie Am-241:Be source. While the gauge was in storage, the source rod was locked, the gauge case was locked, and the gauge was stored in a locked trailer on the temporary job site. The local police have been notified and are investigating. The State of Maryland will issue a press release on 07/24/07 if the gauge is not recovered.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43513
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: MCNDT LEASING INC
Region: 3
City: DARIEN State: IL
County:
License #: IL-01875-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 07/23/2007
Notification Time: 15:36 [ET]
Event Date: 07/20/2007
Event Time: 08:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/23/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE - STUCK RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE

"On the morning of July 20, [DELETED], RSO for McNDT, called. He was taking some radiographs while inside a water tower in Darien, IL and the magnetic cable stand used to hold the film cartridge fell over onto the cable and crushed the guide tube. He reported that he could not retract the source to the shielded position in the camera. The source is a 34 Ci Ir-192 source; the camera is a QSA 660B. The scene was secured and under constant oversight by the RSO. [DELETED] reported that there have been no overexposures or any injuries. [DELETED] estimated that some 6 inches of guide tube used to position the radiography source had been crushed/deformed by equipment that had been used to position the radiography source 8 feet high up against the wall of the tank. The guide tube was then stretched straight along the floor of the water tower which is approximately 50 feet in diameter. The damaged section of the tube was approximately 30 inches from the end of the 14 foot length of guide tube. A 'hot zone' barrier required by regulations was established around the water tower before the radiography job was begun. Dose rates around that zone were less than 60 milliR/hr. The water tower is near the intersection of Plainfield and Cass Avenues in Darien behind a retail shopping area. As the area is a construction area, there is fencing surrounding the work site so control of the scene has been relatively easy to maintain.

"Upon arrival at the scene, the investigators added bags of lead shot to the area where the source was determined to be. The drive cables and crank were then physically secured with the camera and a strong force was applied to the cranking mechanism. This resulted in the successful return of the cable with the Ir-192 source back into the radiography camera. Afterwards, the guide tube was surveyed and found to be free of contamination. The camera ports were likewise monitored with negative removable contamination present. The device (AEA QSA, Inc. model 660B w/ S/N B2020) has been secured and tagged as out of service until it can be returned to the manufacturer for source exchange and recertification. Surface dose rates on the radiography camera were at the expected 5 to 10 milliR/hr. Total exposures to personnel as measured by pocket dosimeters were very low (70 milliR to the RSO, 60 milliR to [DELETED] and 55 milliR to [DELETED]). [DELETED] was advised of our expectations for return of the potentially damaged source cable and the need to send in his own dosimetry in for immediate analysis to confirm the measured exposure prior to our staffs' arrival."

Illinois Item Number: IL070040

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43514
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: FRED WEBER, INC.
Region: 3
City: EAST ST. LOUIS State: IL
County:
License #: IL-02260-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/24/2007
Notification Time: 09:57 [ET]
Event Date: 07/21/2007
Event Time: 05:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/24/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)
SCOTT MOORE (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING EQUIPMENT DAMAGE DUE TO A VEHICLE ACCIDENT

The following information was provided via email:

"At approximately 5:00 AM on Saturday morning the Division's Radiological Duty Officer (RDO) was notified by the Illinois Emergency Management Agency Communications Center that a nuclear gauge was involved in a vehicular accident at the 3rd Street on-ramp at I-70 (E) in East St. Louis, Illinois. The RDO then contacted the responsible licensee, Fred Weber, Inc., and talked to [DELETED], the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer, who was at the scene.

"The RSO reported that the portable gauge had been struck at high speed by a car which had crossed into the marked and barricaded construction zone on the entrance ramp to the interstate. As a result the gauge had been destroyed into many parts. One of those parts, the source rod containing Cs-137 in a special form capsule had become separated from the gauge and its shielded housing. Using a hand held Geiger counter, [the RSO] performed wipe tests on the gauge base containing the Am-241 source and the Cs-137 source rod and found no removable gross contamination. [The RSO] had also contacted the manufacturer, Troxler for assistance and instruction in resolving the scene.

"After discussion with the Agency's RDO, [the RSO] was able to place the source rod in its original shielding and secure the rod into the shielding with tape. He then placed the base of the gauge and the source rod, with the shielding, in its Type 'A' transport case and filled any voids with sand to provide additional shielding and stabilization. Radiation readings taken by [the RSO] from the side of the case exhibited normal levels.

"The RDO then contacted the St. Clair County Emergency Services [DELETED]. [DELETED] of the Hazardous Materials unit were enroute to the scene at the time of that call. When they arrived, they performed confirmatory radiation surveys with their radiation instrumentation and noted no contamination on the roadway. Radiation levels of the transport case were also determined to be at normal levels. Surveys of [the RSO] noted no contamination. [The RSO] transported the gauge back to their storage site in Maryland Heights, MO. Arrangements were made for [the RSO] to contact the gauge manufacturer for further instructions with regards to returning the device for repair/disposal.

"[The RSO] confirmed he would send the required written report as well as notify the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission as the firm is also an NRC licensee. Pending receipt of that report and successful disposition of the damaged gauge, this item remains open. This event was reported to the U.S. NRC Operations Center on July 24 and assigned event number 43514.

"Corrective Actions:

Action Number: 1
Corrective Action: EQUIPMENT RETURNED TO MANUFACTURER FOR REPAIR OR DISPOSAL

"Keywords: DEVICE INVOLVED IN ACCIDENT

"Source of Radiation:

Source Number: 1
Form of Radioactive - SEALED SOURCE
Source Use: PORTABLE GAUGE
Manufacturer: AMERSHAM
Model Number:
Serial Number:77-5535
Radionuclide or Voltage (kVp/MeV): CS-137
Activity: 0.008 Ci or 0.296 GBq
Problem with Source: NONE

Source Number: 2
Form of Radioactive SEALED SOURCE
Source Use: PORTABLE GAUGE
Manufacturer: AMERSHAM
Model Number:
Serial Number: 78-2987
Radionuclide or Voltage (kVp/MeV): AM-BE
Activity: 0.040 Ci or 1.48 GBq
Problem with Source: NONE

"Device/Associated Equipment:

Device Number: 1
Device Name: PORTABLE GAUGE
Manufacturer: TROXLER
Model Number: 3440
Serial Number: 38181
Problem with Equipment: SHIELDING COMPROMISED

"Reporting Requirements:

Reporting Requirement: 32 IAC 340.1220(c)(2) - The Licensee shall notify the Division within 24 hours in the event equipment is disabled or fails to function as designated.
Mode Reported: Telephone"

The licensee whose principal business location is in Maryland Heights, MO is also licensed and maintains storage locations in Illinois due to the volume of work performed in that state.

Illinois Report ID: IL070041

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 43524
Rep Org: US ARMY
Licensee: US ARMY
Region: 3
City: WARREN State: MI
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN MCGUIRE
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 07/26/2007
Notification Time: 16:12 [ET]
Event Date: 07/24/2007
Event Time: [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)
DENNIS RATHBUN (FSME)

Event Text

FAILED SOURCE SHIELD LOCK ON MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

"The Tester, Density and Moisture (Soil and Asphalt) Nuclear Method Campbell Pacific Model MC-1 (CCE), NSN 6635-01-030-6896, Serial Number M17112090, is assigned to the 980th Angering Battalion at Austin, TX. The MC-1 Tester had on manufacture (in 1977) 10 mCi of Cesium 137 and 50 mCi of Americium 241/Be. The sources are solid, sealed, and double encapsulated. The MC-1 Tester is licensed through an Army NRC license 21-01222-05, issued to the US Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command (LCMC), located in Warren, MI.

"The tester was used in Iraq in 2005 and was shipped back to the unit location in Texas in 2006. It is unknown, if the tester had any mechanical difficulties in Iraq . The tester had received servicing through CPN International, Inc. on June 19, 2003. [Servicing included replacing] standard wear items such as gaskets and the handle. Also, the electronic assembly was bench tested with the two detectors, and the body of the tester is cleaned with the guidetube and rod assembly cleaned/lubed. The tester was also calibrated and leak tested

"The tester hasn't been used since its use in Iraq . The tester has been in storage with the only interaction being physical inventories, radiation surveys of the storage and leak tests of the radioactive sources.

"On 24 July 2007, the undersigned received an e-mail (after-hours) indicating that the referenced tester was inoperative with an inoperative handle lock, that wouldn't engage. The e-mail asking for disposition of the tester. Confirmation of the information was made with two Army personnel doing internal radiation audits of Army radiation programs, who were visiting the unit. The Army personnel were told on their visit, that there was some difficulty with the locking mechanism. They were told, that the tester was hard to unlock and that they (the unit) didn't lock the handle for this reason.

"The tester is inside its transport case, locked inside of a lead lined box, inside of a locked connex container, which is locked inside a gate at the unit location. The tester sources to include rod remain inside the tester housing and no other apparent tester deficiencies outside the lock mechanism has been observed. The shutter is in place and closed. The tester will not lock in the various positions (i.e. safe, 6 inch, 8 inch and 12 inch). When the lock button is pushed in, it springs out. The lock could not be locked with the key. There are no known personnel exposures. The tester sources were last leak tested on July 2, 2007, which showed no leakage.

"The only personnel having access to the keys and the tester is the Local RSO. This ensures that the tester is not used. The transport case containing the tester is also now locked.

"It is planned to transport the tester back to the manufacturer for disposition. The tester has been coded as H for unserviceable. Instructions were provided to the unit today to perform a wipe test of the shipping container, prepare the tester for shipment, and to ship it to the manufacturer.

"Also, a reminder e-mail was sent to the unit and to various Army Commands of the requirement to report tester safety defects immediately to TACOM LCMC Warren, MI. This e-mail was sent again today (July 27, 2007) as it was sent out on July 5, 2007."

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43525
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: RANDY SAND
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 07/26/2007
Notification Time: 16:32 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2007
Event Time: 09:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION - FLOOD DOORS CLOSED CAUSING A POTENTIAL LOSS OF BOTH VITAL SWITCHGEAR

"At 09:02 on 07/28/07, an outplant operator identified that DOOR-18, which is a normally open fire door, had closed due to a failed fusible link. With this door closed, the pathway for a potential flood due to a high energy line break (HELB) is blocked therefore closing off a drain path for the water. This represented an unanalyzed condition where both divisions of essential switchgear could be impacted. As a result, both divisions of essential switchgear were declared inoperable and Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3 was entered. At 09:55 on 07/26/07, the closed fire door was restored to the open state. Both divisions of switchgear were declared Operable and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. No system actuations occurred as a part of this event."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43526
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: JOHN FEIGL
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 07/26/2007
Notification Time: 21:11 [ET]
Event Date: 07/26/2007
Event Time: 17:06 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/26/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD SKOKOWSKI (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 98 Power Operation 98 Power Operation

Event Text

ACCIDENT MITIGATION REPORT - UNIT 2 HPCI ISOLATED DUE TO SMALL BORE STEAM LEAK

"At 1706 hours on 07/26/07, a through wall leak was identified on the U2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Inlet Drain Pot drain piping. This piping is ASME Code class 2 piping and as required by the Technical Requirements Manual the piping was isolated which resulted in isolation of the U2 HPCI System. U2 HPCI was declared inoperable. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Piping repair preparations are in progress."

During the performance of operator rounds, the licensee noticed a puddle of fluid on the deck and wet lagging overhead. Upon removal of the lagging, the licensee noticed a small steam leak in a 1" small bore line. The licensee is currently in a 14 day LCO under technical specification 3.5.1 F(1) and F(2). The licensee is currently developing a work package to repair or replace the line.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Thursday, March 29, 2012