Event Notification Report for July 26, 2007

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MALFUNCTION OF RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SAFETY EQUIPMENT

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

A licensee technician was performing an exposure with a INC Model IR-100 (Source: Ir-192 source strength: 41 Ci) on a test coupon in the company shooting room. When the technician attempted to retract the source the safety latch popped up to indicate that the source was in the shielded position. The technician approached the camera with a survey meter. The technician, thinking the source was retracted, turned the key to lock the camera. When the technician surveyed the front of the camera, the survey meter went off scale. The technician realized there was a malfunction exited the area and contacted the Assistant RSO (ARSO).

The ARSO and the technician determined that the source was still in front of the safety latch and not shielded. The licensee called the manufacturer for guidance. The licensee freed the source, and after several attempts was able to engage the safety latch and lock the source in the stowed position.

The camera has been taken out of service and is being shipped to the manufacturer for repair. Both the technician and the ARSO received between 2-3 mR during the event.

FIRE IN THE PELLETING AREA

"On 7/26/07, an attempt to extinguish a small grease fire with water was observed by a Westinghouse engineer. This is a violation of IROFS-PELFIRE-902 (also identified as IROFS-BWR-107), which restricts the use of water for fire suppression in pellet/rod areas. The fire observed was located beneath the Line 4 polypak lift. The fire was estimated to be approximately three feet by three feet in area and approximately 2 inches in height. Three polypaks with an unknown quantity of material were observed on the lift at the time the fire occurred.

"The fire was believed to have been started by weld sparks originating from overhead work being performed by construction workers. The water used to extinguish the fire was delivered to the fire in hardhats and welding masks that the construction personnel had at their immediate disposal from a nearby hand-wash basin. The total quantity of water involved was estimated to be a maximum of one gallon.

"Notification is being made based on the potential for 'Any natural phenomenon or other external event, including fires internal and external to the facility, that has affected or may have affected the intended safety function or availability or reliability of one or more items relied on for safety', reference Appendix A, Section (b)(4) to Part 70 of 10CFR70.

"Safety Basis: At no time was the integrity of nearby special nuclear material (SNM) containers challenged. No SNM was involved with the fire. None of the water involved in putting out the fire came into contact with SNM. Even if fissile material had been present during the fire, and that water had contacted and mixed with the fissile material, the quantity of water was limited to approximately one gallon. The minimum quantity of water necessary to challenge the normal case conditions involving homogenous SNM is 3.8 gallons. It should also be pointed out that the quantity of water was limited by the ability of the construction personnel to apply the water using their improvised method and further limited by the source of the water. (The intention of PELFIRE 902 is to prevent the large, uncontrolled addition of water as with firefighters wielding fire hoses attached to an effectively infinite source.)

"Summary of Activity: All construction work has been halted pending a stand-down meeting with personnel. The event was documented in the plant Corrective Action Process (CAPs #07-208-C007).

"Conclusions: Problem was self identified by Westinghouse Operations personnel. The fire was put out immediately and there was no challenge to the integrity of nearby special nuclear material containers. At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved. A causal analysis will be performed.

UNANALYZED CONDITION - FLOOD DOORS CLOSED CAUSING A POTENTIAL LOSS OF BOTH VITAL SWITCHGEAR

"At 09:02 on 07/28/07, an outplant operator identified that DOOR-18, which is a normally open fire door, had closed due to a failed fusible link. With this door closed, the pathway for a potential flood due to a high energy line break (HELB) is blocked therefore closing off a drain path for the water. This represented an unanalyzed condition where both divisions of essential switchgear could be impacted. As a result, both divisions of essential switchgear were declared inoperable and Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3 was entered. At 09:55 on 07/26/07, the closed fire door was restored to the open state. Both divisions of switchgear were declared Operable and LCO 3.0.3 was exited. No system actuations occurred as a part of this event."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

ACCIDENT MITIGATION REPORT - UNIT 2 HPCI ISOLATED DUE TO SMALL BORE STEAM LEAK

"At 1706 hours on 07/26/07, a through wall leak was identified on the U2 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) Inlet Drain Pot drain piping. This piping is ASME Code class 2 piping and as required by the Technical Requirements Manual the piping was isolated which resulted in isolation of the U2 HPCI System. U2 HPCI was declared inoperable. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Piping repair preparations are in progress."

During the performance of operator rounds, the licensee noticed a puddle of fluid on the deck and wet lagging overhead. Upon removal of the lagging, the licensee noticed a small steam leak in a 1" small bore line. The licensee is currently in a 14 day LCO under technical specification 3.5.1 F(1) and F(2). The licensee is currently developing a work package to repair or replace the line.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

PART 21 NOTIFICATION - FAILURE OF ENERSYS (EXIDE) BATTERY

In March 2005, battery cell internal resistance for an EDG battery bank revealed five cells with abnormal resistance. "There was one cell for which no reading could be obtained and was replaced immediately. A second cell had a reading that was nearly four times the average of the associated string and was subsequently replaced as a proactive measure during the EDG maintenance outage. Three (3) other cells were noted with higher than average readings that are not considered to be operability concerns. In total, five (5) cells out of a total of 240 were found with higher than expected internal resistance values."

The failed battery was destructively tested revealing significant corrosion within the battery. The unit-2 batteries have been replaced. The unit-1 batteries will be replaced in the fall 2007 outage.

Manufacturer: Enersys (Exide)
Model: 3CA-5
Serial Number: beginning with 05

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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UNANAYLZED CONDITION - UNFAVORABLE GEOMETRY CONTAINER

"On 7/26/07 at approximately 10:30 AM, an unusual condition occurred in the outside alley west of [DELETED]. During movement of a portable Raschig ring vessel from the Recovery [DELETED] to the Central Storage [DELETED], the vessel tipped over, spilling its contents. The vessel contained uranium-[DELETED] waste solution at less than [DELETED] gram U-235 per liter.

"In order to transfer the portable Raschig ring vessel outside of a radiologically controlled area, the vessel was covered by two 55-gallon plastic bags in order to contain contamination within the vessel as it was being transferred outside the radiologically controlled area. The vessel overturned creating an unfavorable geometry container via the outer 55 gallon plastic bag that collected solution from the spill separately from the Raschig rings.

"The solution from the portable Raschig ring vessel was sampled and found to have a concentration of [DELETED] grams U235 per liter. The solution that collected in the outer bag was held at a [DELETED] height approximately [DELETED]. The inner bag also contained some solution, but it also contained Raschig rings, and therefore was not of immediate concern. Although the configuration of the tipped over vessel created an unfavorable geometry, due to the low concentration of the solution and the [DELETED] height, there was little risk of a criticality accident. The vessel was outside the process area when it tipped over, so there was no opportunity that additional uranium-[DELETED] solution could have been collected in the bags or the vessel.

"Previous safety analyses considered the issue of whether a spilled vessel could preferentially separate high concentration solution from the Raschig rings in a Raschig Ring vessel, leaving solution in the vessel without the poisoning effect of the rings and concluded that event was not credible. In this event, however, the spilled solution was preferentially separated from the Raschig rings though the concentration remained low. Based on these facts, this condition that was not fully analyzed in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA).

"The immediate corrective action was to suspend operations associated with the vessel, isolate the spilled material, and clean up the spill. Corrective actions to prevent recurrence are being developed. Since this event was not fully analyzed in the ISA, transfer of bagged Raschig ring vessels containing uranium-[DELETED] solutions shall not occur until appropriate evaluations are performed.

"The operators involved in the event were Fitness For Duty tested. BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10 CFR 70.61, Appendix A, (b)(1).

"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified."

* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY H. Crouch * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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