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Event Notification Report for July 18, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
07/17/2007 - 07/18/2007

** EVENT NUMBERS **


43481 43482 43485 43489 43495 43498 43499 43500

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43481
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: OCEANEERING INTERNATIONAL
Region: 4
City: HOUMA State: LA
County:
License #: LA-7396-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD PENROD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 07/12/2007
Notification Time: 07:12 [ET]
Event Date: 05/31/2007
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"Agreement State Agency: Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality

"Event Report ID No.: LA070019

"License No.: LA-7396-L01

"Licensee: Oceaneering International, Inc

"Event date and Time: May 2007

"Event Location: Houma, LA

"Event type: Overexposure

"Notifications: LA DEQ

"Event description: Oceaneering received a notification from Landauer that one of Oceaneering's employees was over exposed for the month of May 2007. The dose that was reported for this employee was 5467 mrem (deep), 5677 (eye), and 5892 (shallow). This incident will be investigated and DEQ will forward new information once it is received.

Transport vehicle description: N/A

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43482
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: OHMSTEDE
Region: 4
City: SULPHUR State: LA
County:
License #: LA-5694-L01A
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD PENROD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 07/12/2007
Notification Time: 07:53 [ET]
Event Date: 06/25/2007
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA

The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:

"Agreement State Agency: Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality

"Event Report ID No.: LA070020

License No.: LA-5694-L0IA

"Licensee: Ohmstede

"Event date and Time: June 25, 2007

"Event Location: Sulphur, LA

Event type: Equipment

Notifications: LA DEQ

"Event description: Ohmstede sent an Amersham 660B camera serial number B1072 to QSA Global for a source exchange. Before a new source was put into the camera, QSA Global discovered that the camera had a cracked S tube. The camera has been removed from operation and is in storage."

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43485
Rep Org: KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: FULLER, MOSSBARGER, SCOTT AND MAY ENGINEERS, INC.
Region: 1
City: LEXINGTON State: KY
County:
License #: 201-142-51
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BRIAN PARSLEY
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 07/12/2007
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 07/12/2007
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAYMOND LORSON (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
ILTAB (E-MAIL) ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

At 9am on 7/12/07 the licensee noticed that their Troxler, Model 3440, S/N 20970, moisture density gauge was stolen. The gauge had been secured in a truck with a lock and chain inside a locked case at 3pm on 7/11/07. The licensee noticed that the lock on the case had been cut and the gauge was gone.

The licensee reported the incident to the Lexington Police Department as case identification number 07131235.

The gauge has a 0.04 curie Americium-241 source and a 0.008 curie Cesium-137 source. The sources were last leak checked in April of 2007.

The state is following up on this issue.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43489
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH PHARMACY SERVICES
Region: 1
City: WOBURN State: MA
County:
License #: 41-0366
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KANATH TRAEGDE
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/13/2007
Notification Time: 13:59 [ET]
Event Date: 07/06/2007
Event Time: 04:10 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/13/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
RAYMOND LORSON (R1)
SANDRA WASTLER (FSME)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

VEHICLE ACCIDENT DURING TRANSPORT OF RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL SOURCES

"On Friday, July 6, 2007, at approximately 4:10 am, an accident involving a vehicle transporting radiopharmaceuticals occurred on Route 3 North near Exit 32 in Chelmsford, Massachusetts. The Radiation Control Program (RCP) was informed about the accident via the State Police at approximately 5:15 am. The first responder from the RCP arrived at the scene of the accident at about 6:15 am.

"A vehicle carrying patient radiopharmaceutical doses had rolled over on Route 3 North beyond Exit 32, emptying 18 Type A transport containers onto the highway and over an embankment. A brook tributary to a lake is at the bottom of the embankment where the accident occurred. Six of the containers had dropped into brook. The rest were strewn about the highway and the embankment.

"The containers were carrying radiopharmaceuticals in the form of Tc-99m bulk and patient doses, F-18 in the form of FDG for PET imaging, and I-131 for patient therapy. The Tc-99m was transported in an internally shielded Type A nylon covered container and the I-131 and F-18 were transported in Type A shielded ammo boxes.

"In all, 17 of the 18 containers were recovered. None of the containers recovered had any external contamination. One ammo box had a torn off lid, but the tungsten syringe shield containing a dose of F-18 was not breached. The 18th ammo box container with 2 F-18 doses totaling 271.21 mCi was not recovered. However, the F-18 had decayed approximately 7 half-lives by 4:00 pm, so there was no radiological consequence. Since this box had fallen onto the bottom of the brook and, due to the fact that no other container was breached, it was concluded that the two tungsten syringe shields would not have been breached.

"There was no release of radioactive material in this event. There was not breach of any internal container housing the radioactive material.

"This event is considered closed. There were no radiological consequences to members of the public and emergency workers."

Attempts to recover the last container included using divers and metal detectors.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43495
Facility: OYSTER CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-2
NRC Notified By: STEVE FULLER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 07/17/2007
Notification Time: 06:30 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2007
Event Time: 05:22 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/17/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
JIM KRAFTY (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Shutdown

Event Text

AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON LOW REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL (RVWL)

"An automatic reactor scram occurred at 0522 on 07/17/07 due to a low reactor water level, following a trip of the 'C' Reactor Feed Pump. Reactor water level lowered to the low-low level setpoint and a reactor isolation occurred. Reactor level has been returned to the normal band and a reactor cooldown has been initiated using isolation condensers."

The cause of the "C" RFP trip is attributed to an electrical fault as sensed on ground sensing and differential sensing instrumentation. No flames or smoke was observed, however, operators reported an acrid smell of insulation. Following the automatic scram on low reactor water level [138" above top of active fuel (TAF)], level continued to decrease to the low-low setpoint of 86" TAF resulting in a reactor isolation signal. The reactor isolation signal initiates closure of the Main Steam Isolation Valves (MSIVs), trip of the Recirc Pumps and actuation of the Isolation Condensers. Current reactor pressure is 520 psig with a cooldown rate of 82F/hr. The licensee plans to issue a press release and will take the Unit to cold shutdown for repairs.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 1000 EDT ON 07/17/07 FROM STEVE FULLER TO S. SANDIN * * *

The following information reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) was provided as an update:

"The following systems actuated upon receipt of a lo-lo reactor water level signal, subsequent to the reactor scram, reported under EN #43495, which occurred at 0522 on 07/17/07:

MSIVs - Isolation
Isolation Condensers - Initiation
Standby Gas Treatment - Initiation
Recirc Pumps - Trip
Containment Valves - Isolation
Core Spray - Start, but no injection
Containment Spray - Manual initiation only, following use of EMRVs to control Rx pressure, causing elevated Torus water temperature."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Krafty).

* * * UPDATE AT 1122 EDT ON 7/17/07 FROM STEVE FULLER TO S. SANDIN * * *

The following information reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi) was provided as an update:

"Notified the New Jersey D.E.P. of an unplanned plant shutdown which occurred at 0522 07/17/07. There was no environmental impact from the plant shutdown.

"This notification is required to be made within 12 hours of an unplanned plant shutdown."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Krafty).

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43498
Facility: THREE MILE ISLAND
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: ADAM MILLER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 07/17/2007
Notification Time: 15:17 [ET]
Event Date: 06/27/2007
Event Time: 08:28 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/17/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JIM KRAFTY (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FAILED RELAY STARTS ONE TRAIN OF THE DECAY HEAT RIVER WATER SYSTEM

"This event is being reported via a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER. In this case, the telephone report is not considered an LER. This report is being made under 10CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A).

"During Engineered Safeguards Actuation System (ESAS) logic testing on June 27, 2007, an invalid actuation of the 'A' train of the Decay Heat River Water System (DR) occurred. The DR is comprised of the 'A' and 'B' trains, and serves as the reactor's ultimate heat sink. The ESAS has three independent input channels, which cause actuation in a two out of three logic. During ESAS logic testing, the channel under test is placed in the tripped state. Actuation relays in the other two channels should remain energized by the outputs from the other two channels not under test. The invalid actuation of the 'A' DR train during testing on June 27, 2007, was due to a failed ESAS relay in one of the other two channels not being tested. During this invalid actuation, the 'A' DR train was fully actuated. The operation of this normally standby system did not have any adverse impact on plant operation, nor any negative impact on the DR.

"The failed relay that caused the invalid actuation during ESAS logic testing did not impact the OPERABILITY of the ESAS, since the relay was failed in the actuated state. The failed relay was replaced on June 29, 2007."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43499
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: STEVE BRUNSON
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 07/17/2007
Notification Time: 15:21 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2007
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/17/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

UNANALYZED CONDITION - VENT SPACE LESS THAN DESIGN BASIS

"During a review of the temporary repair of the steam line drain bypass line in the Unit 1 Reactor Building Steam Chase, two storage gangboxes were noted to be on the grated opening in the floor of the Steam Chase (elevation 129 ft). These grated openings are designed to be open to provide pressure and temperature relief between the steam chase and the torus room for high energy steam line breaks.

"Appendix N to the Unit 1 FSAR credits the openings for venting the steam chase to the torus room through the openings for a main steam line break, and for venting the torus room to the steam chase for a HPCI steam line break in the torus room. The most limiting event is the HPCI steam line break in the torus room and the vent path associated with that event. Original assumptions used in the calculation for the vent opening did not adequately account for the grating itself and for louvers installed in a previous plant modification. As a result the vent area was further reduced.

"Upon further review of the above condition, it has been determined that a non-conforming and unanalyzed condition exists In that the vent area between the torus room and main steam chase in the reactor building is less than the area assumed in the analysis, even without gangboxes covering a portion of the grating.

"As such, for a HPCI steam line break in the torus room, the short term pressure between the torus room and the corner rooms (diagonals) is greater than 2 psid, which is the stated limit in Appendix N of the Unit 1 FSAR. The corner rooms contain ECCS components in the RHR and core spray systems. Based on engineering judgment there is reasonable assurance that the present nonconforming condition does not prevent safety systems and structures from fulfilling their safety function. This is based on the following information:

"Structural Steel floor elevation platforms do not appear to have been credited in the structural design capability of the walls. These platforms should act to help maintain the wall intact with increased pressure. The increased pressure transient is a very short term transient, approximately 2-3 seconds in duration, after which the pressure will return to within 2 psid. It is expected that the wall would withstand this transient without degrading the performance of the low pressure ECCS systems or other structures and components. Lastly, the probability of occurrence of a steam leak leading to an instantaneous line break is very small. There is currently no report of steam leaks from the HPCI line, and although a probability evaluation has not been performed, it is likely that the probability of occurrence of such a break is very small. Thus, there is no known immediate threat that would prevent safety systems from performing their safety function. More detailed review is continuing at this point.

"Short term corrective action will be required to increase the open 'vent' area between the torus room and the reactor building 130 ft elevation and restore at least the assumed vent path from the torus room. This can be accomplished by removing the gangboxes over the vent area in the steam chase and/or completing a floor plug evaluation of vent area needed between the torus room and the reactor building 130 ft elevation which will restore compliance with the 2 psid criteria. Analysis is currently underway to assess the pressure and temperature effects on the safety related structures and equipment by these short term actions.

"Regarding reportability, based on engineering judgment as previously discussed, the unanalyzed condition does not represent a condition that significantly degraded plant safety; however, additional information is needed in order to more conclusively determine this. For this reason this condition is being conservatively reported under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) until such time as more conclusive information is provided to make the final determination."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43500
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: BRIAN JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 07/17/2007
Notification Time: 19:10 [ET]
Event Date: 07/17/2007
Event Time: 15:59 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 07/17/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ERIC DUNCAN (R3)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

FIRE INSIDE OF OWNER CONTROL AREA

"A small fire was discovered in an office building outside the protected area. The fire was extinguished using a hand held water fire extinguisher. The office building was evacuated as a precaution. One individual received a minor burn and was tended to by an onsite EMT. Local fire department responded to assist in smoke removal. EAL classification did not apply since the fire was outside the protected area. Fire was reported to be a trash can fire with fire damage being limited to the trash can, adjacent wall, and ceiling tile. Courtesy notifications to state and local government agencies have been made."


The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Thursday, March 29, 2012