Event Notification Report for June 26, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/25/2007 - 06/26/2007
EVENT NUMBERS
43446434474344843468
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 43446
Rep Org: WATTS CONSTRUCTORS, LLC
Licensee: WATTS CONSTRUCTORS, LLC
Region: 4
City: HONOLULU State: HI
County: HONOLULU
License #: 53-27792-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RYAN TERAYAMA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: WATTS CONSTRUCTORS, LLC
Region: 4
City: HONOLULU State: HI
County: HONOLULU
License #: 53-27792-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RYAN TERAYAMA
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/26/2007
Notification Time: 20:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/26/2007
Event Time: 13:00 [HST]
Last Update Date: 06/26/2007
Notification Time: 20:45 [ET]
Event Date: 06/26/2007
Event Time: 13:00 [HST]
Last Update Date: 06/26/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
EDWIN HACKETT (FSME)
ILTAB (via email)
GREG PICK (R4)
EDWIN HACKETT (FSME)
ILTAB (via email)
NUCLEAR MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE STOLEN FROM CONSTRUCTION SITE
At approximately 1300 HST on 6/2607, the licensee discovered that their Nuclear Moisture Density Gauge, a CPN Model MC-3 Serial Number M3409007585, had been stolen from a storage shed at the construction site. The outer storage shed lock and the lock on the gauge's storage container were cut. In addition to the gauge some propane equipment was also taken. The Honolulu PD is on-site conducting an investigation.
The construction site is located on Ford Island (federal property portion) in Pearl Harbor near Building 184. The project is for NOAA with contract administration provided by Department of the Navy. The last known use of this particular gauge by the licensee was on 6/8/07. The licensee is evaluating whether to offer a reward for the return of the stolen gauge.
The licensee's RSO was informed of the theft by staff at the construction site. Notified the State of Hawaii Rad Health.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks
At approximately 1300 HST on 6/2607, the licensee discovered that their Nuclear Moisture Density Gauge, a CPN Model MC-3 Serial Number M3409007585, had been stolen from a storage shed at the construction site. The outer storage shed lock and the lock on the gauge's storage container were cut. In addition to the gauge some propane equipment was also taken. The Honolulu PD is on-site conducting an investigation.
The construction site is located on Ford Island (federal property portion) in Pearl Harbor near Building 184. The project is for NOAA with contract administration provided by Department of the Navy. The last known use of this particular gauge by the licensee was on 6/8/07. The licensee is evaluating whether to offer a reward for the return of the stolen gauge.
The licensee's RSO was informed of the theft by staff at the construction site. Notified the State of Hawaii Rad Health.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43447
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: STARMET NMI
Region: 1
City: CONCORD State: MA
County:
License #: SM-0179, SU-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB GALLAGHAR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: STARMET NMI
Region: 1
City: CONCORD State: MA
County:
License #: SM-0179, SU-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BOB GALLAGHAR
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 06/27/2007
Notification Time: 09:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/26/2007
Event Time: 20:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2007
Notification Time: 09:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/26/2007
Event Time: 20:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/12/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1)
CINDY FLANNERY (FSME)
RAY POWELL (R1)
CINDY FLANNERY (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - SMALL FIRE AT LICENSEE'S FACILITY
"On Wednesday, June 26, 2007, at approximately 8:00 PM EST a fire was reported at the Starmet NMI facility in Concord, Massachusetts [2229 Main Street]. Starmet NMI possesses two materials licenses with Massachusetts, License No. SM-0179 and License No. SU-1453. The fire occurred in the foundry area within the facility, formerly used for the manufacture of depleted uranium munitions. The fire appeared to be contained to a small area within the building, in the vicinity of a 55-gal drum, a 5-gal bucket and a small pile of metal shavings.
"Radiological surveys performed once the fire was extinguished resulted in no elevated readings from any of these containers or the material. The investigation is ongoing and more information will be provided as it is obtained."
* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT GALLAGHAR TO SNYDER AT 1416 ON 7/12/07 * * *
"The Concord Fire Department has determined the cause of the fire to have been the auto-ignition of metal filings and therefore non-suspicious in nature. The official fire investigation has been closed. No off-site radiological consequences resulted from this fire.
Notified FSME (Holonich), R1DO (Lorson) via e-mail.
"On Wednesday, June 26, 2007, at approximately 8:00 PM EST a fire was reported at the Starmet NMI facility in Concord, Massachusetts [2229 Main Street]. Starmet NMI possesses two materials licenses with Massachusetts, License No. SM-0179 and License No. SU-1453. The fire occurred in the foundry area within the facility, formerly used for the manufacture of depleted uranium munitions. The fire appeared to be contained to a small area within the building, in the vicinity of a 55-gal drum, a 5-gal bucket and a small pile of metal shavings.
"Radiological surveys performed once the fire was extinguished resulted in no elevated readings from any of these containers or the material. The investigation is ongoing and more information will be provided as it is obtained."
* * * UPDATE FROM ROBERT GALLAGHAR TO SNYDER AT 1416 ON 7/12/07 * * *
"The Concord Fire Department has determined the cause of the fire to have been the auto-ignition of metal filings and therefore non-suspicious in nature. The official fire investigation has been closed. No off-site radiological consequences resulted from this fire.
Notified FSME (Holonich), R1DO (Lorson) via e-mail.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43448
Rep Org: SC DIV OF HEALTH & ENV CONTROL
Licensee: ECS - CAROLINAS, LLP
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County:
License #: 584
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK WINDHAM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: ECS - CAROLINAS, LLP
Region: 1
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County:
License #: 584
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MARK WINDHAM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 06/27/2007
Notification Time: 09:29 [ET]
Event Date: 06/26/2007
Event Time: 13:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2007
Notification Time: 09:29 [ET]
Event Date: 06/26/2007
Event Time: 13:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/27/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RAY POWELL (R1)
CINDY FLANNERY (FSME)
RAY POWELL (R1)
CINDY FLANNERY (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) was notified on Tuesday, June 26, 2007, at 1315 hrs, that a Humboldt Model EZ 5001, s/n 4965, containing 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241:Be, had been damaged at 1305 hrs on June 26 2007. The RSO stated that the gauge had been damaged by a bulldozer. [The SC DEHC] Duty Officer responded to the scene and arrived at 1510 hrs. The area around the gauge had been properly roped off and the source rod was locked in its shielded position. The gauge handle and rod had been snapped off at the top of the gauge and the top of the gauge was cracked open at the rod end. The gauge was secured in the transport container and the inspector advised the RSO to return the gauge to the permanent storage location, secure it from further use, and to contact the gauge manufacturer for further instruction regarding disposal.
"The RSO was advised by [the SC DEHC] to submit a written report detailing this event to the Department within 30 days. The event is open and pending the licensee's investigation and report to the Department, updates will be made through the national NMED system.
"Location: Calvary Baptist Church, 3810 Grandview Drive, Spartanburg, SC"
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control (DHEC) was notified on Tuesday, June 26, 2007, at 1315 hrs, that a Humboldt Model EZ 5001, s/n 4965, containing 10 mCi of Cs-137 and 40 mCi of Am-241:Be, had been damaged at 1305 hrs on June 26 2007. The RSO stated that the gauge had been damaged by a bulldozer. [The SC DEHC] Duty Officer responded to the scene and arrived at 1510 hrs. The area around the gauge had been properly roped off and the source rod was locked in its shielded position. The gauge handle and rod had been snapped off at the top of the gauge and the top of the gauge was cracked open at the rod end. The gauge was secured in the transport container and the inspector advised the RSO to return the gauge to the permanent storage location, secure it from further use, and to contact the gauge manufacturer for further instruction regarding disposal.
"The RSO was advised by [the SC DEHC] to submit a written report detailing this event to the Department within 30 days. The event is open and pending the licensee's investigation and report to the Department, updates will be made through the national NMED system.
"Location: Calvary Baptist Church, 3810 Grandview Drive, Spartanburg, SC"
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 43468
Rep Org: US ARMY
Licensee: US ARMY
Region: 3
City: WARREN State: MI
County:
License #: 21-01222-05
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN MCGUIRE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: US ARMY
Region: 3
City: WARREN State: MI
County:
License #: 21-01222-05
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KAREN MCGUIRE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 07/02/2007
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 06/26/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/2007
Notification Time: 17:03 [ET]
Event Date: 06/26/2007
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/03/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
MICHELE BURGESS (FSME)
DAMAGED CAMPBELL PACIFIC MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
On June 26, 2007, the 62nd Engineering Unit, located in Ft. Hood, Texas and recently returned from deployment, sent an email to the US Army TACOM LCMC, located in Warren , MI regarding a damaged Campbell Pacific (CPN) MC-1 moisture density gauge, serial number: M7112095. The device contains a 10 millicurie Cs-137 source and a 50 millicurie Am-241:Be source (1977 activity strength). The email requested guidance on the failure of the device handled assembly to lock in 'safe' or any other position. The lead trap door is disconnected from pushrod and fails to allow source rod to extend. The unit is on recuperative leave and the US Army will follow up with the unit personnel later this week. The US Army will continue to investigate to determine the status of the device, where and when it was damaged, and the status of the sources and the device's storage location.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY KAREN MCGUIRE TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1329 ON 07/03/07 * * *
"The tester was used in Iraq and was shipped back to the unit in Texas in Dec 06. In Iraq, the tester had some difficulty with the lead trap door not easily sliding out of the way, when the rod was pushed down, but it did function. The rod locking mechanism worked in Iraq.
"On 18 Jun, the Local Radiation Safety Officer (LRSO) with the 62nd Engr Bn was notified verbally of a display problem involving the tester. A trained operator made the notification. On 26 June, the LRSO and Alternate LRSO both trained operators then decided to check out the tester. They cranked down on the display screw and the tester display functioned. They then decided to check the tester out further and discovered that the handle wouldn't lock in the safe and other positions. They compared this to another tester and then determined that the tester had a problem needing maintenance. The LRSO then sent an e-mail on 26 June asking for maintenance or turn-in instructions.
"The maintenance check (which includes ensuring proper function of the tester, the rod moving freely through the ranges and cleaning the tester of any dust and dirt) at the unit was the first, since its arrival from IRAQ. The unit planned to use the tester, but after discovering the problem with it, they then used another tester. The testers at the unit have maintenance done every six months depending on the use of the equipment.
"The rod with the source is inside of the tester housing. The tester is stored like normal in its transport case. The shutter is in place and closed. The lead trap door is in place. The lead trap door just doesn't slide out of the way when the source rod is lowered, thus it is preventing the source from being exposed or from coming out of the tester. The rod when operated will move through different positions, but will not lock at those positions (i.e. safe, 6 inch, 8 inch and 12 inch). This is due to a pin engaging defect. The rod will fully retract. If the tester probe is locked, then the rod will not move through the positions. There are no known personnel exposures.
"The tester is in a double locked room and the tester is in a locked DOT 7A container inside of a locked greenlee box. The only personnel having access to the keys and the testers are the LRSO and Alternate LRSO. This ensures that the tester is not used."
Licensee is awaiting the results of a radiation survey of the storage area to be performed today (the last one performed was in April) and results from a leak test, which was performed on 27 June 07. The radiation survey was requested as a result of the tester failure and the leak test was performed, because it is the annual leak test period for the testers. The leak test was sent to our Army lab in Redstone, AL. Licensee has placed a call to expedite the analysis of the leak test and to check if they have received it. It is planned to transport the tester back to the manufacturer for disposition.
Notified R3DO ( R. Lanksbury) and FSME EO (M. Burgess)
On June 26, 2007, the 62nd Engineering Unit, located in Ft. Hood, Texas and recently returned from deployment, sent an email to the US Army TACOM LCMC, located in Warren , MI regarding a damaged Campbell Pacific (CPN) MC-1 moisture density gauge, serial number: M7112095. The device contains a 10 millicurie Cs-137 source and a 50 millicurie Am-241:Be source (1977 activity strength). The email requested guidance on the failure of the device handled assembly to lock in 'safe' or any other position. The lead trap door is disconnected from pushrod and fails to allow source rod to extend. The unit is on recuperative leave and the US Army will follow up with the unit personnel later this week. The US Army will continue to investigate to determine the status of the device, where and when it was damaged, and the status of the sources and the device's storage location.
* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY KAREN MCGUIRE TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1329 ON 07/03/07 * * *
"The tester was used in Iraq and was shipped back to the unit in Texas in Dec 06. In Iraq, the tester had some difficulty with the lead trap door not easily sliding out of the way, when the rod was pushed down, but it did function. The rod locking mechanism worked in Iraq.
"On 18 Jun, the Local Radiation Safety Officer (LRSO) with the 62nd Engr Bn was notified verbally of a display problem involving the tester. A trained operator made the notification. On 26 June, the LRSO and Alternate LRSO both trained operators then decided to check out the tester. They cranked down on the display screw and the tester display functioned. They then decided to check the tester out further and discovered that the handle wouldn't lock in the safe and other positions. They compared this to another tester and then determined that the tester had a problem needing maintenance. The LRSO then sent an e-mail on 26 June asking for maintenance or turn-in instructions.
"The maintenance check (which includes ensuring proper function of the tester, the rod moving freely through the ranges and cleaning the tester of any dust and dirt) at the unit was the first, since its arrival from IRAQ. The unit planned to use the tester, but after discovering the problem with it, they then used another tester. The testers at the unit have maintenance done every six months depending on the use of the equipment.
"The rod with the source is inside of the tester housing. The tester is stored like normal in its transport case. The shutter is in place and closed. The lead trap door is in place. The lead trap door just doesn't slide out of the way when the source rod is lowered, thus it is preventing the source from being exposed or from coming out of the tester. The rod when operated will move through different positions, but will not lock at those positions (i.e. safe, 6 inch, 8 inch and 12 inch). This is due to a pin engaging defect. The rod will fully retract. If the tester probe is locked, then the rod will not move through the positions. There are no known personnel exposures.
"The tester is in a double locked room and the tester is in a locked DOT 7A container inside of a locked greenlee box. The only personnel having access to the keys and the testers are the LRSO and Alternate LRSO. This ensures that the tester is not used."
Licensee is awaiting the results of a radiation survey of the storage area to be performed today (the last one performed was in April) and results from a leak test, which was performed on 27 June 07. The radiation survey was requested as a result of the tester failure and the leak test was performed, because it is the annual leak test period for the testers. The leak test was sent to our Army lab in Redstone, AL. Licensee has placed a call to expedite the analysis of the leak test and to check if they have received it. It is planned to transport the tester back to the manufacturer for disposition.
Notified R3DO ( R. Lanksbury) and FSME EO (M. Burgess)