Event Notification Report for June 21, 2007

HPCI INOPERABLE DUE TO QUARTERLY VALVE STROKE TEST FAILURE

"During performance of the quarterly HPCI valve stroke test the HV-55-2F006, HPCI pump discharge isolation valve to Core Spray failed to open within the maximum allowed time. The HV-55-2F006 valve is a motor operated valve and the maximum allowed opening time is 17.25 seconds. The valve was given an open signal via the hand switch as required by the test but did not initially respond. Several minutes later the valve went full open. HPCI was declared inoperable at 0315 on 6/21/2007. Cause for valve stroke time failure is not known at this time."

As a result, the licensee is in a 14 day shutdown LCO.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM ARNOSKY TO HUFFMAN AT 0807 EDT ON 8/01/07 * * *

This is a retraction of the event notification made on 6/21/07 at 04:05 hours EDT. This event (#43436) was initially reported as a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system safety function under the requirement of 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). The Unit 2 HPCI system was declared inoperable due to failure of the HPCI pump discharge isolation valve to Core Spray to open within the maximum allowed time during surveillance testing. The valve was required to open within 17.25 seconds but opened several minutes after the open signal was initiated.

The open contactor was replaced and the valve was successfully tested. The affected valve was declared operable on 6/22/07 at 04:07 hours. The HPCI system was restored to operable on 6/23/07 at 04:07 hours following completion of maintenance and testing activities.

An evaluation determined that HPCI was capable of injecting sufficient flow to complete its safety function through the unaffected operable injection flow path to the feedwater header. The achievable flow rate would have exceeded the leakage from a one-inch liquid line break. Also, HPCI operation remained capable of being terminated by operator action during an ATWS event. Therefore, HPCI remained capable of fulfilling its safety function while the injection flow path to Core Spray was unavailable.

A condition did not exist at the time of discovery that could have prevented the fulfillment of the HPCI safety function.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (White) notified.

FIRE DUE TO SEQUENCING PROBLEM

"At approximately 0142 hours on 6/21/2007, during Solid Waste Uranium Recovery (SWUR) operations, a sequencing problem caused a cardboard box containing combustible waste with about [Deleted] U-235 to be fed on top of a closed feed hopper door. As the equipment cycled the incinerator fire door, the box, which was on top of the feed hopper door ignited. The box was inside the feed hopper containment shroud when it ignited. The integrity of the containment shroud remained intact during the fire. However, some smoke did escape into the room.

"Operational personnel put out the fire (a single box of 3.5 cubic feet) using a hand held fire extinguisher.

"The plant emergency response team (PERT) was activated via plant paging system at 0145 and the Richland Fire Department was called. The Richland Fire Department arrived at 0155. With appropriate PPE (SCBA), two PERT and two Richland Fire Fighters entered the facility and confirmed that the fire had been previously extinguished.

"The SWUR process is currently shut down and will remain down pending investigation and completion of appropriate corrective actions.

"The fire was limited to a single 3.5 cubic foot box containing [Deleted] U-235. All facility HEPA filters remained undamaged during the event."

There was no release of radioactive materials. All areas surveyed after the fire was extinguished were free of radioactive contamination. The individuals that put out the fire and the individuals that subsequently entered the area to confirm that the fire had been extinguished were evaluated for internal contamination with negative results.

ITEM RELIED ON FOR SAFETY NOT RELIABLE UNDER ALL SCENARIOS.

"During a review of the Integrated Safety Analysis for an additive addition step, it was determined that one of the Items Relied on for Safety (IROFS), as documented in the ISA Summary was not reliable. This report is submitted for administrative reporting pursuant to 10CFR70.50 Appendix A (a)(5). At no time did an unsafe condition exist. The existing criticality safety analysis of the operation bounded the situation, was effective and was not challenged.

"The IROFS described for the additive sequence did not prevent incorrect type of additive from being added under all scenarios.

"All affected equipment is in the process of being shut down pending revision of the ISA IROFS for this additive addition process. Units will remain shutdown pending final investigation and implementation of additional preventive actions.

"Independent controls on moderation remained intact. The as found condition was previously analyzed and demonstrated to be safe. At no time did an unsafe condition exist."

Licensee will notify NRC Region 2, North Carolina Radiation Protection Agency, and the New Hanover County Emergency Management Agency.

"SPDS (SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM) INOPERABLE DUE TO PLANT COMPUTER INOPERABILITY

"The Wolf Creek Nuclear Plant Information System (NPIS; Plant Computer) was conservatively declared inoperable at 2000 (CDT) on 06/21/2007 due to questions concerning accuracy of some of the computer point outputs. Initial troubleshooting and investigation identified that some computer points may be reading 0.1% to 0.2% lower than actual process parameter. Investigation is ongoing to determine the scope and cause for this condition and to correct the problem. Compensatory measures for loss of NPIS are being implemented in accordance with procedure OFN RJ-023, NPIS Malfunctions. The plant is stable with power being maintained at or below 100% based on Nuclear Instruments."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.