Event Notification Report for May 24, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/23/2007 - 05/24/2007
EVENT NUMBERS
433894339043384433854338143382
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 43389
Facility: BWX TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: STEVE SCHILTHELM
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: STEVE SCHILTHELM
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/25/2007
Notification Time: 09:41 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2007
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2008
Notification Time: 09:41 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2007
Event Time: 16:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
SANDRA WASTLER (FSME)
FUELS FOUO (email)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
SANDRA WASTLER (FSME)
FUELS FOUO (email)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
24-HOUR REPORT INVOLVING AN ITEM RELIED ON FOR SAFETY (IROFS)
"BWXT operates a multiple-component acid cleaning operation for SNM [DELETED] components. One of the potential accident scenarios specifically evaluated in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) is for the multiple components to be dislodged from the fixture and fall into the acid solution. If the components were to remain in the acid for a sufficient time, the acid could dissolve the [DELETED] releasing the SNM into unfavorable geometry acid tank. Dissolving through the [DELETED] and dissolving sufficient quantities of SNM to result in a potential safety issue would take about an hour.
"To protect against this accident scenario, the fixture is designed to handle the components while maintaining the required spacing (IROFS). In addition, there is an engineered feature consisting of a timer and automatic acid dump valve (IROFS). This system will dump the entire acid bath from the tank well before the [DELETED] material is breached.
"On May 24 2007, at approximately 4:30 p.m., an operator was placing a fixture holding 9 components on a 10 position fixture into the acid solution tank. The fixture hung up on the tank. The resulting impact caused 7 of the components dislodge from the fixture and fall into the tank. The fixture maintaining the spacing between components is an IROFS. The operator immediately initiated a manual dump of the acid solution and opened the water valve to rinse any residual acid off the components in the tank. The second IROFS, automated timer that activates the dump valve, was not challenged since the operator manually dumped the tank.
"BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10CFR70.61, Appendix A, (b)(2).
"The component acid bath operation has been suspended and the failed fixture was tagged and taken out of service. The components which fell into the tank were inspected and found to have no loss of [DELETED] integrity.
"The operator involved in the incident was FFD tested.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and an investigation team has been established to perform a thorough review of the incident."
* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY H. Crouch * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
24-HOUR REPORT INVOLVING AN ITEM RELIED ON FOR SAFETY (IROFS)
"BWXT operates a multiple-component acid cleaning operation for SNM [DELETED] components. One of the potential accident scenarios specifically evaluated in the Integrated Safety Analysis (ISA) is for the multiple components to be dislodged from the fixture and fall into the acid solution. If the components were to remain in the acid for a sufficient time, the acid could dissolve the [DELETED] releasing the SNM into unfavorable geometry acid tank. Dissolving through the [DELETED] and dissolving sufficient quantities of SNM to result in a potential safety issue would take about an hour.
"To protect against this accident scenario, the fixture is designed to handle the components while maintaining the required spacing (IROFS). In addition, there is an engineered feature consisting of a timer and automatic acid dump valve (IROFS). This system will dump the entire acid bath from the tank well before the [DELETED] material is breached.
"On May 24 2007, at approximately 4:30 p.m., an operator was placing a fixture holding 9 components on a 10 position fixture into the acid solution tank. The fixture hung up on the tank. The resulting impact caused 7 of the components dislodge from the fixture and fall into the tank. The fixture maintaining the spacing between components is an IROFS. The operator immediately initiated a manual dump of the acid solution and opened the water valve to rinse any residual acid off the components in the tank. The second IROFS, automated timer that activates the dump valve, was not challenged since the operator manually dumped the tank.
"BWXT is making this 24 hour report in accordance with 10CFR70.61, Appendix A, (b)(2).
"The component acid bath operation has been suspended and the failed fixture was tagged and taken out of service. The components which fell into the tank were inspected and found to have no loss of [DELETED] integrity.
"The operator involved in the incident was FFD tested.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified and an investigation team has been established to perform a thorough review of the incident."
* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY H. Crouch * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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General Information or Other
Event Number: 43390
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: SILVER SPRINGS State: MD
County:
License #: MD-31-001-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: HOLY CROSS HOSPITAL
Region: 1
City: SILVER SPRINGS State: MD
County:
License #: MD-31-001-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RAY MANLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/25/2007
Notification Time: 13:01 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2007
Event Time: 15:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2007
Notification Time: 13:01 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2007
Event Time: 15:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
SANDRA WASTLER (FSME)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
SANDRA WASTLER (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - Pd-103 SOURCE BROKEN OPEN
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"Called to report an incident at Holy Cross Hospital. At 1540 hours, on 5/24/07, in room 11 of the operating room of the hospital, the Licensee ruptured a 3.2 mCi Palladium-103 seed while conducting a patient implant therapy. Preliminary licensee evaluation indicates that the Mick Applicator jammed and failed to advance. Efforts to free the device may have led to the seed fracture. The patient therapy was halted after 60 of the 83 seeds (given in the written directive) were successfully implanted. The Oncologist has indicated that the 60 seeds implanted were adequate for successful therapy and no additional seeds would be administered. Licensee followed radiation spill procedures and radiation surveys conducted by licensee RSO showed radioactive material contamination on the Mick Applicator and surrounding absorbent chucks. Contaminated materials have been controlled and stored in nuclear the medicine department. Smears of adjacent OR surfaces and floor were negative for contamination. The OR was released at about 1900 hours that day. The licensee has notified the manufacturer of the incident. Licensee will send initial written report by CBD 5/29/07 with follow-up detailed report within 30 days."
Maryland Radioactive Material License: MD-31-001-03
A "Medical Event" may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"Called to report an incident at Holy Cross Hospital. At 1540 hours, on 5/24/07, in room 11 of the operating room of the hospital, the Licensee ruptured a 3.2 mCi Palladium-103 seed while conducting a patient implant therapy. Preliminary licensee evaluation indicates that the Mick Applicator jammed and failed to advance. Efforts to free the device may have led to the seed fracture. The patient therapy was halted after 60 of the 83 seeds (given in the written directive) were successfully implanted. The Oncologist has indicated that the 60 seeds implanted were adequate for successful therapy and no additional seeds would be administered. Licensee followed radiation spill procedures and radiation surveys conducted by licensee RSO showed radioactive material contamination on the Mick Applicator and surrounding absorbent chucks. Contaminated materials have been controlled and stored in nuclear the medicine department. Smears of adjacent OR surfaces and floor were negative for contamination. The OR was released at about 1900 hours that day. The licensee has notified the manufacturer of the incident. Licensee will send initial written report by CBD 5/29/07 with follow-up detailed report within 30 days."
Maryland Radioactive Material License: MD-31-001-03
A "Medical Event" may indicate potential problems in a medical facility's use of radioactive materials. It does not necessarily result in harm to the patient.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43384
Facility: CALVERT CLIFFS
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRUCE SHICK
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 1 State: MD
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BRUCE SHICK
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/24/2007
Notification Time: 12:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2007
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2007
Notification Time: 12:23 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2007
Event Time: 11:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY OPERATIONS FACILITY OUT OF SERVICE FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"EOF resources OOS due to planned maintenance of electrical supply transfer switch. No power available to EOF."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 13:39 ON 5/24/07 FROM BRUCE SHICK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
Power was restored to the EOF at 13:30 on 5/24/07.
"EOF resources OOS due to planned maintenance of electrical supply transfer switch. No power available to EOF."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 13:39 ON 5/24/07 FROM BRUCE SHICK TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
Power was restored to the EOF at 13:30 on 5/24/07.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 43385
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TONY HUDSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TONY HUDSON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 05/24/2007
Notification Time: 12:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2007
Event Time: 08:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2007
Notification Time: 12:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2007
Event Time: 08:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION MADE TO ANOTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCY
"A required 24-hour notification was made by Paducah Regulatory Affairs to EPA Region IV in Atlanta, GA at 0815, 5-24-2007. The notification was made concerning a PCB spill of greater than the agreed upon action level of 10 pounds of PCBs confined within a building.
"The approximate 3 gallon PCB oil spill was from an electrical capacitor located inside the C-333 Process Building. The oil spilled onto a concrete floor and was contained to the immediate area. The area was flagged and posted as a PCB spill area and clean up is in progress.
"This event is reportable as a 4 hour event as required by the NRC NUREG 1022, a specific report made to a government agency. PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-07-1362; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2007-06; Worksheet No. 43385."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
"A required 24-hour notification was made by Paducah Regulatory Affairs to EPA Region IV in Atlanta, GA at 0815, 5-24-2007. The notification was made concerning a PCB spill of greater than the agreed upon action level of 10 pounds of PCBs confined within a building.
"The approximate 3 gallon PCB oil spill was from an electrical capacitor located inside the C-333 Process Building. The oil spilled onto a concrete floor and was contained to the immediate area. The area was flagged and posted as a PCB spill area and clean up is in progress.
"This event is reportable as a 4 hour event as required by the NRC NUREG 1022, a specific report made to a government agency. PGDP Assessment and Tracking Report No. ATR-07-1362; PGDP Event Report No. PAD-2007-06; Worksheet No. 43385."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43381
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TIM BOLAND
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: TIM BOLAND
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 05/24/2007
Notification Time: 04:42 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2007
Event Time: 02:11 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2007
Notification Time: 04:42 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2007
Event Time: 02:11 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/24/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 3 | Startup | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO ELECTRO-HYDRAULIC CONTROL (EHC) SYSTEM LEAK
"On 05/24/2007 at 0211 CDT Browns Ferry Unit 1 initiated a Manual reactor SCRAM due to an Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) System pressure lowering and reservoir level lowering due to an EHC system leak. The leak was from #6 Main Turbine Combined Intermediate Valve (CIV). All Systems responded as required to the manual SCRAM signal. No Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiations occurred as a result of the manual SCRAM signal. Reactor water level was maintained in the normal band during the SCRAM. There were no Primary Containment Isolation signals received during the SCRAM. The EHC leak was stopped due to reservoir level depletion and EHC pumps being secured. There were no indications of main steam relief valves (MSRVs) opening. Reactor pressure is being controlled using Main Steam Line Drains. Reactor Level is being maintained in band using Control Rod Drive pumps. Repair of the EHC leak is in progress."
The Scram was characterized as uncomplicated. All rods fully inserted. The only significant equipment out of service at the time was RCIC. When the leak was initially discovered, it was about 60 drops per minute. When repairs were attempted, the piping separated and approximately 600 gallons of EHC fluid was discharged out the break onto the turbine building floor. Cleanup of the EHC fluid is in progress and environmental monitoring is in place to assure no offsite release of the spill.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 05/24/2007 at 0211 CDT Browns Ferry Unit 1 initiated a Manual reactor SCRAM due to an Electro-Hydraulic Control (EHC) System pressure lowering and reservoir level lowering due to an EHC system leak. The leak was from #6 Main Turbine Combined Intermediate Valve (CIV). All Systems responded as required to the manual SCRAM signal. No Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) initiations occurred as a result of the manual SCRAM signal. Reactor water level was maintained in the normal band during the SCRAM. There were no Primary Containment Isolation signals received during the SCRAM. The EHC leak was stopped due to reservoir level depletion and EHC pumps being secured. There were no indications of main steam relief valves (MSRVs) opening. Reactor pressure is being controlled using Main Steam Line Drains. Reactor Level is being maintained in band using Control Rod Drive pumps. Repair of the EHC leak is in progress."
The Scram was characterized as uncomplicated. All rods fully inserted. The only significant equipment out of service at the time was RCIC. When the leak was initially discovered, it was about 60 drops per minute. When repairs were attempted, the piping separated and approximately 600 gallons of EHC fluid was discharged out the break onto the turbine building floor. Cleanup of the EHC fluid is in progress and environmental monitoring is in place to assure no offsite release of the spill.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43382
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEN McKUNE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: KEN McKUNE
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 05/24/2007
Notification Time: 05:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2007
Event Time: 02:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2007
Notification Time: 05:11 [ET]
Event Date: 05/24/2007
Event Time: 02:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/25/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP ON LOW STEAM GENERATOR WATER LEVEL
"This 4-hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 automatically tripped on low steam generator water level. The automatic trip was preceded by lowering steam generator feed pump suction pressure, followed by the trip of both steam generator feed pumps on low suction pressure. The cause of the low suction pressure was due to a condensate system breach that occurred in the Condensate Polisher building. The condensate polishing system has been isolated and condensate pressure has stabilized.
"Salem Unit 2 is currently in mode 3 with reactor coolant system temperature at 547 degrees with pressure at 2235 psig. Auxiliary feedwater pumps 21, 22, and 23 started automatically, as expected, due to the low steam generator level. Decay heat removal is via the steam dumps to the main condenser. All equipment functioned as designed. There were no personnel injuries.
"A 15 minute notification was made to the State of New Jersey due to hydrazine laden water exiting the Condensate Polisher building and entering the storm drainage system."
All control rods fully inserted following the reactor trip. Emergency Diesel Generator are available, if needed. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 17:18 ON 5/25/2007 FROM ERIC POWELL TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"In addition to hydrazine that was contained in the condenser water that exited the Condensate Polisher Building, supplemental samples determined that the water also contained tritium at approximately 50,000 picoCuries per liter. The state of New Jersey was updated with this information."
Notified the R1DO (Trapp).
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This 4-hour notification is being made to report that Salem Unit 2 automatically tripped on low steam generator water level. The automatic trip was preceded by lowering steam generator feed pump suction pressure, followed by the trip of both steam generator feed pumps on low suction pressure. The cause of the low suction pressure was due to a condensate system breach that occurred in the Condensate Polisher building. The condensate polishing system has been isolated and condensate pressure has stabilized.
"Salem Unit 2 is currently in mode 3 with reactor coolant system temperature at 547 degrees with pressure at 2235 psig. Auxiliary feedwater pumps 21, 22, and 23 started automatically, as expected, due to the low steam generator level. Decay heat removal is via the steam dumps to the main condenser. All equipment functioned as designed. There were no personnel injuries.
"A 15 minute notification was made to the State of New Jersey due to hydrazine laden water exiting the Condensate Polisher building and entering the storm drainage system."
All control rods fully inserted following the reactor trip. Emergency Diesel Generator are available, if needed. The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 17:18 ON 5/25/2007 FROM ERIC POWELL TO MARK ABRAMOVITZ * * *
"In addition to hydrazine that was contained in the condenser water that exited the Condensate Polisher Building, supplemental samples determined that the water also contained tritium at approximately 50,000 picoCuries per liter. The state of New Jersey was updated with this information."
Notified the R1DO (Trapp).
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.