| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
05/11/2007 - 05/14/2007 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 43226 | Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: TIMOTHY THOMPSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 03/09/2007
Notification Time: 14:48 [ET]
Event Date: 03/09/2007
Event Time: 14:23 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/12/2007 | Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
| Person (Organization):
GEORGE HOPPER (R2)
MARY JANE ROSS-LEE (NRR)
LOREN PLISCO (R2)
JIM DYER (NRR)
DUNKER (FEMA)
McKENTRY (DHS)
YATES (DOE)
BURGESS (EPA)
DALVIEL (HHS)
JEFFREY CRUZ (IRD)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO RCS LEAKAGE GREATER THAN TECH SPEC LIMIT
"A Notification of Unusual Event has occurred on Unit 2 due to Reactor Coolant System (RCS) unidentified leakage greater than 10 gallons per minute."
The licensee notified NRC Resident Inspector. Notified USDA (Brzostels).
* * * UPDATE AT 1754 ON 3/9/06 FROM T. PETRAK TO P. SNYDER * * *
"No actual RCS leakage occurred and the RCS always remained intact. The additional water injection occurred and the RCS always remained intact. The additional water injection into the Reactor Coolant System was required to makeup for gases that came out of solution and accumulated in the reactor vessel head and were being vented from the RCS during a planned drain down."
The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 1751 on 3/9/07. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector, state, and local government agencies. The licensee will remain in Mode 5 for their planned outage.
Notified R2DO (G. Hopper), NRR EO (M. Case), IRD (T. Blount), NRR (J. Dyer), DHS (McKentry), FEMA (Biscoe), DOE (Wyatt), EPA (Burgess), HHS (Dalviel), USDA (Giles).
* * * UPDATE AT 1531 EDT ON 5/11/07 FROM ROBERT DORMAN TO GERRY WAIG * * *
This report is retracted based on the following:
"On 3/9/07, an NOUE was declared while Unit 2 was in Mode 5, draining the RCS to support Rx Vessel disassembly, due to what was then diagnosed as an RCS Unidentified Leak greater than 10 gpm. Subsequent review of the event revealed that no leak existed and the mismatch between charging and letdown, which was the basis of the leak determination, was caused by a nitrogen bubble being vented from the Rx Vessel Head and the additional charging volume was displacing the nitrogen volume as it was being vented. As a result, Vogtle Unit 2 is retracting the NOUE classification that was made on 3/9/07."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Ernstes). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 43352 | Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: NONDESTRUCTIVE AND VISUAL INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: State: LA
County:
License #: LA-5601-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: RICHARD PENROD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN | Notification Date: 05/08/2007
Notification Time: 15:40 [ET]
Event Date: 05/04/2007
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/08/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
| Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOUISIANA - WORKER OVEREXPOSURE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"[A licensee representative] with Nondestructive and Visual inspection notified the Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality on May 4, 2007 of an overexposure. The indicated exposure from the badge reading is 5123 mrem. Additional information will be forwarded once it is received."
Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA070011 |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43358 | Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: TODD GRANLUND
HQ OPS Officer: GERRY WAIG | Notification Date: 05/11/2007
Notification Time: 18:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/15/2007
Event Time: 01:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/12/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
PATTY PELKE (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | Event Text INVALID ECCS AND SYSTEM ACTUATIONS
"This telephone notification is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), to report an invalid actuation reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A).
"On March 15, 2007, with Unit 2 in a refueling outage, the reactor vessel was filled to a solid condition and being depressurized following the completion of the vessel hydrostatic test. At 0102 CDST, with pressure indicating approximately 43 psig, the 2B Residual Heat Removal (RHR) pump was started in the shutdown cooling mode. With the vessel solid, the resultant pressure transient caused invalid reactor vessel low-level trip signals and Division 2 and 3 ECCS actuations.
"The 2C RHR pump auto-started and injected into the vessel. The 2A Diesel Generator (DG) started, and 2B RHR Injection valve (2E12-F042B) auto-opened. The Division 3 ECCS actuation did not result in any equipment starts because the High Pressure Core Spray pump and the 2B DG were properly removed from service at the time of the event. The operators verified that the reactor vessel low-level trips and ECCS actuations were invalid, and shut down the 2C RHR pump and the 2A DG. The 2B RHR Injection Valve was also closed.
"The cause was determined to be a knowledge deficiency compounded by less than adequate procedural guidance regarding starting shutdown cooling while the reactor vessel is in a solid condition. Corrective actions included reviewing the event with licensed operators, revising the appropriate operating procedures, and developing just-in-time training for future use.
"The event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as an invalid ECCS actuation and invalid system actuation."
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector. |
| Fuel Cycle Facility | Event Number: 43359 | Facility: GLOBAL NUCLEAR FUEL - AMERICAS
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION (UF6 TO UO2)
LEU FABRICATION
LWR COMMERICAL FUEL
Region: 2
City: WILMINGTON State: NC
County: NEW HANOVER
License #: SNM-1097
Agreement: Y
Docket: 07001113
NRC Notified By: PHILLIP OLLIS
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 05/12/2007
Notification Time: 12:07 [ET]
Event Date: 05/11/2007
Event Time: 16:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/12/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
RESPONSE-BULLETIN
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
SCOTT FLANDERS (FSME)
| Event Text BULLETIN 91-01 LOSS OF DOUBLE CONTINGENCY
"During the quarterly shutdown and clean-out of a rotary press used for pressing UO2-Gd203 powder in FMO, it was observed that approximately half of the schedule 80, one-inch diameter Chlorinated Poly Vinyl Chloride (CPVC) tubes placed in the lower shaft casing of the press did not extend the full length of the cavity as required by the nuclear safety analysis. These tubes are credited as a fixed neutron poison inside the casing and must extend the entire length of the cavity in order for the unit to be demonstrated safe geometry for [LEU] enriched UO2 under optimal moderation conditions. The independent control on mass remained intact, thus no unsafe condition existed. The as-found condition was analyzed and demonstrated to be safe.
"The unit was in a shutdown condition and contained no Uranium at the time of the discovery.
"While this did not result in an unsafe condition, this event is being reported pursuant to NRC Bulletin 91-01 within 24 hours of discovery.
"NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS NECESSARY UNDER NORMAL OPERATING CONDITIONS
The basis of criticality safety relies on geometry and mass as independent criticality safety controls.
"NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS WHICH FUNCTIONED PROPERLY UNDER UPSET CONDITIONS
Mass control remained intact, thus no unsafe condition existed.
"NUMBER AND TYPES OF CONTROLS NECESSARY TO RESTORE A SAFE SITUATION
Control on geometry demonstrated by current analysis. No uranium present at time of discovery.
"SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE OF EVENTS
Low Safety Significance - independent control on mass remained intact - additional failure modes required before a criticality accident could occur. The as-found condition was analyzed and demonstrated to be safe.
"SAFETY EQUIPMENT STATUS
Unit was shutdown for maintenance and will remain Shutdown until CPVC tube error corrected.
"STATUS OF CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Unit will remain shutdown pending final investigation results and implementation of additional preventive actions."
The licensee will be notifying the North Carolina Radiation Protection Agency and the New Hanover County Emergency Management Agency. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43360 | Facility: DIABLO CANYON
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JAN NIMICK
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL | Notification Date: 05/12/2007
Notification Time: 18:09 [ET]
Event Date: 05/12/2007
Event Time: 10:25 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 05/12/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
VINCENT GADDY (R4)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS START DUE TO LOSS OF OFF SITE START UP POWER
"On May 12, 2007, at 10:25 am PST, offsite startup power was lost to Diablo Canyon Units 1 and 2. This is the 8-hour non-emergency event notification in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for a valid actuation of five emergency diesel generators (EDGs) due to the loss of startup power.
"Unit 1 is in a refueling outage in No Mode, with all fuel offloaded to the spent fuel pool (SFP). Auxiliary power is cleared for maintenance and offsite power was being provided by startup power. EDG 1-3 was also cleared for maintenance. On the loss of startup power, EDGs 1-1 and 1-2 auto-started and powered their loads. Since SFP cooling is not automatically loaded on the EDGs, Operators re-started a SFP Cooling pump. This re-established decay heat removal via component cooling water (CCW) (two of three pumps remained operable) and auxiliary saltwater pump 1-2. SFP temperature remained at approximately 105 degrees F.
"Unit 2 remained in Mode 1 at 100 percent power with auxiliary power supplying Unit 2 equipment. The loss of startup power caused all three EDGs to auto-start but they did not load.
"At approximately 11:30am PDT, startup power was restored to the site via the Mesa substation. Operators completed restoration of startup power to plant equipment by approximately 14:30 PDT.
"The cause of the loss of startup power was reported as a failed Morro Bay - Diablo transmission line."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43361 | Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL HILL
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 05/13/2007
Notification Time: 18:26 [ET]
Event Date: 05/13/2007
Event Time: 15:20 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/13/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xii) - OFFSITE MEDICAL
| Person (Organization):
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text TRANSPORT OF POTENTIALLY CONTAMINATED PERSON TO OFFSITE MEDICAL FACILITY
At 1451 EDT, a contractor employee working in the turbine building in a potentially contaminated area, reported having chest pains and difficulty breathing. At 1520 EDT, the individual was transported to Oconee Memorial Hospital, Seneca, SC. Radiation Protection had not yet determined if individual was contaminated. Enroute to the hospital, Radiation Protection determined individual was not contaminated. This determination was made prior to arrival to the hospital.
After treatment at the hospital, the individual was released.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |