| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
04/04/2007 - 04/05/2007 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | General Information or Other | Event Number: 43270 | Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: PEACHTREE CONSTRUCTION
Region: 4
City: FORT WORTH State: TX
County:
License #: L-05401
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ART TUCKER
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON | Notification Date: 04/02/2007
Notification Time: 12:30 [ET]
Event Date: 03/30/2007
Event Time: [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/02/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
SANDRA WASTLER (FSME)
|
| This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material. | Event Text AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
"On March 30, 2007, in Dallas, TX, during a torrential rainstorm, the driver of a truck carrying radioactive material slammed into the guardrail of a bridge. The driver, who is the Radiation Safety Office for the company, was thrown from the truck and hospitalized. The moisture density gauge (Troxler Model 3450, S/N 544) transport case was thrown from the truck and fell [approximately] 40 feet to a service road where the transport case broke apart and the gauge ended up on the side of the road. The next morning the Dallas Fire and Rescue Department (DFD) was alerted that a nuclear gauge had been transported in the truck and was unaccounted for. Once the gauge was sighted and radiation symbols identified, DFD closed the service road and called in an environmental firm for assistance. Four hours later the Agency was notified by DFD via the Agency's answering service. DFD personnel suited up and retrieved the gauge. The gauge was found to be undamaged except for a broken display. The two sources in the gauge (40mCi, AmBe-241, S/N47-28488 and 8mCi, Cs-137, S/N750-7116) were still retracted into the body of the device and appeared undamaged. The instrument was removed to a secure location and the licensee is making arrangements for the manufacturer to retrieve and repair the unit. The investigation is on-going."
TX Incident No.: I-8400
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 43276 | Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: JIM ANDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER | Notification Date: 04/04/2007
Notification Time: 14:01 [ET]
Event Date: 02/25/2007
Event Time: 03:58 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/04/2007 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | | 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling | Event Text INVALID SECONDARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION
"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) [general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system or multiple main steam isolation valves]. NUREG1022 Revision 2 identifies the information that needs to be reported as discussed below.
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.
"This report is being made under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(a). On February 25, 2007 at 3:58 AM EST Units 1 and 2 received an invalid full Secondary Containment Isolation. The following initiations and isolations were observed: All Fission Product Monitor Valves isolated, both Units' SBGT trains initiated and the reactor building ventilation supply and exhaust fans tripped and isolated, and the refueling floor ventilation supply and exhaust fans tripped and isolated. Operations personnel verified that all Secondary Containment isolations and initiations occurred
as expected.
"The isolation was caused by a blown fuse. During investigation into the Secondary Containment isolation, fuse 1D11A-F14A in panel 1H11-P606 was found to be blown. After replacing this fuse, the isolation signal cleared and all related systems were returned to normal operation. Fuse 1D11A-F14A supplies the trip auxiliary units 1C51A-Z2A and 1C51A-Z2C. Loss of power to these units de-energizes several relays which are also deenergized as a result of a Refueling Floor Vent High Radiation signal which would actuate the same isolation logic and cause an SBGT initiation.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
"The four Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) fans auto started and both Unit One and Unit Two reactor building and refueling floor normal ventilation systems automatically shutdown and isolated. The SBGT initiation and the ventilation system shutdown were both complete actuations.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
"The above system functioned successfully."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. | |