Event Notification Report for March 14, 2007
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/13/2007 - 03/14/2007
EVENT NUMBERS
43238432394324043241
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43238
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: SARA ANDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: SARA ANDERSON
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 03/14/2007
Notification Time: 20:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2007
Event Time: 14:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2007
Notification Time: 20:36 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2007
Event Time: 14:55 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 04/13/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHRIS HOTT (R1)
CHRIS HOTT (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE
"During performance of a Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) Pump, Valve, Flow and Unit Cooler Functional and In-service Test, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable. The inoperability is due to failure of AO-2-23-042 "HPCI Steam Line Drain Inboard Isolation to Main Condenser" to open. The AO-2-23-042 is normally open and its passive safety function is to remove any steam condensation from the HPCI pump turbine steam supply line. HPCI is a single train safety system rendered inoperable by this condition."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION RECEIVED FROM DAVID FOSS TO JOE O'HARA AT 1431 ON 4/13/07 * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 3/14/07 at 2036 hours (EN# 43238). Notification of this issue to the NRC on 3/14/07 was initially made as a result of the discovery of a failure of AO-2-23-042 'HPCI Steam Line Drain Inboard Isolation to Main Condenser' to open. This condition was discovered during performance of a routine Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) Pump, Valve, Flow and Unit Cooler Functional and In-Service Test. Failure of this valve to open results in water condensing in the HPCI steam supply line. HPCI had already been considered inoperable since approximately 0934 hours on 3/14/07 as a result of the performance of the test. Repairs were made to the AO-2-23-042 valve and HPCI was returned to an operable status by 2205 hours (IR 603918).
"Since the initial report, it has been determined that this condition is not reportable. HPCI was declared inoperable as a result of the performance of the surveillance test and therefore, the HPCI system inoperability was considered a planned evolution. In accordance with NUREG-1022, reporting of planned inoperabilities are not required to be reported unless a condition is discovered that could have prevented the system from performing its function. Water entering the HPCI steam supply piping only occurred as a result of the performance of the surveillance test and could not have caused HPCI to be inoperable during non-test conditions. The AO-2-23-042 is normally open when HPCI is required to be operable and its passive open safety function is to remove any steam condensation from the HPCI pump turbine steam supply line. The active safety function of the valve is to close on design basis events involving the initiation of HPCI. The passive open safety function is not required when the HPCI system is inoperable for testing. The active safety function was unaffected by this condition.
"The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction."
Notified the R1DO(Krohn).
"During performance of a Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) Pump, Valve, Flow and Unit Cooler Functional and In-service Test, the High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) was declared inoperable. The inoperability is due to failure of AO-2-23-042 "HPCI Steam Line Drain Inboard Isolation to Main Condenser" to open. The AO-2-23-042 is normally open and its passive safety function is to remove any steam condensation from the HPCI pump turbine steam supply line. HPCI is a single train safety system rendered inoperable by this condition."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION RECEIVED FROM DAVID FOSS TO JOE O'HARA AT 1431 ON 4/13/07 * * *
"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 3/14/07 at 2036 hours (EN# 43238). Notification of this issue to the NRC on 3/14/07 was initially made as a result of the discovery of a failure of AO-2-23-042 'HPCI Steam Line Drain Inboard Isolation to Main Condenser' to open. This condition was discovered during performance of a routine Unit 2 High Pressure Coolant Injection System (HPCI) Pump, Valve, Flow and Unit Cooler Functional and In-Service Test. Failure of this valve to open results in water condensing in the HPCI steam supply line. HPCI had already been considered inoperable since approximately 0934 hours on 3/14/07 as a result of the performance of the test. Repairs were made to the AO-2-23-042 valve and HPCI was returned to an operable status by 2205 hours (IR 603918).
"Since the initial report, it has been determined that this condition is not reportable. HPCI was declared inoperable as a result of the performance of the surveillance test and therefore, the HPCI system inoperability was considered a planned evolution. In accordance with NUREG-1022, reporting of planned inoperabilities are not required to be reported unless a condition is discovered that could have prevented the system from performing its function. Water entering the HPCI steam supply piping only occurred as a result of the performance of the surveillance test and could not have caused HPCI to be inoperable during non-test conditions. The AO-2-23-042 is normally open when HPCI is required to be operable and its passive open safety function is to remove any steam condensation from the HPCI pump turbine steam supply line. The active safety function of the valve is to close on design basis events involving the initiation of HPCI. The passive open safety function is not required when the HPCI system is inoperable for testing. The active safety function was unaffected by this condition.
"The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction."
Notified the R1DO(Krohn).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43239
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICH KLINEFELTER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICH KLINEFELTER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/14/2007
Notification Time: 22:06 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2007
Event Time: 23:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2007
Notification Time: 22:06 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2007
Event Time: 23:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 03/15/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CHRIS HOTT (R1)
CHRIS HOTT (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
OUTAGE OF SPDS AND ERDS
"At 2300 hours, on 03/14/2007, the Unit 2 SPDS and ERDS system will be removed from service to support restoration activities from a planned maintenance outage on the power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 20 hours. (Scheduled for completion at 1900 hours on 03/15/2007). During this time, Control Room indications and alternate methods will be available.
"Since the Unit 2 SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM HUFFORD TO HUFFMAN AT 2336 EDT ON 3/15/07 * * *
The SPDS and ERDS systems were returned to service at approximately 2230 EDT on 3/15/07. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Hott) has been notified.
"At 2300 hours, on 03/14/2007, the Unit 2 SPDS and ERDS system will be removed from service to support restoration activities from a planned maintenance outage on the power supply. The duration of work is expected to be approximately 20 hours. (Scheduled for completion at 1900 hours on 03/15/2007). During this time, Control Room indications and alternate methods will be available.
"Since the Unit 2 SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM HUFFORD TO HUFFMAN AT 2336 EDT ON 3/15/07 * * *
The SPDS and ERDS systems were returned to service at approximately 2230 EDT on 3/15/07. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R1DO (Hott) has been notified.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 43240
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK COVEY
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK COVEY
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 03/14/2007
Notification Time: 22:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2007
Event Time: 14:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2007
Notification Time: 22:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2007
Event Time: 14:35 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/04/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
TWO OUT OF THREE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS OUT OF SERVICE
"A pinhole leak was discovered on B train Essential Service Water (ESW) system piping while preparing the pipe surface for non-destructive examination. Control room personnel were notified of the leak at 1435. B ESW was immediately declared inoperable. At the time of control room notification, surveillance testing on the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFP) was in progress. This surveillance testing made the TDAFP inoperable and non-functional. The surveillance activities were terminated and the TDAFP was returned to operable status at 1438.
"B ESW is the safety related water source for B train of auxiliary feedwater (AFW). For the three minute period between notification of the pinhole leak until the TDAFP was restored to operable status, there were two auxiliary feed pumps inoperable. This met the conditions for entry into T/S LCO Action 3.7.5.D which requires a plant shut down to Hot Standby within 6 hours. This action was exited when the TDAFP surveillance testing was terminated. Additionally, with 2 of 3 auxiliary feedwater pumps non-functional for 3 minutes, there was a condition which could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function for those 3 minutes."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1555 EDT ON 5/4/07 FROM KEITH DUNCAN TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee provided the following information as the basis for retracting this report:
"On March 14, 2007, (Event Number 43240) Callaway Plant reported a condition that, at the time, was believed to be a condition which could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. At that time the 'A' motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump (MDAPP) was operable, the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was not functional because of a surveillance test in progress. The 'B' MDAFP was presumed to be non-functional because of a pinhole leak in the 'B' train essential service water (ESW) system piping. 'B' ESW is the safety related water source for the 'B' MDAFP.
"Subsequent inspection, non-destructive examination, analysis and evaluation of the 'B' train ESW piping determined that the structural integrity of the pipe was retained. 'B' ESW pump was able to provide the required flow to the train. 'B' train ESW was functional with the pinhole leak. With the 'B' ESW train functional, the 'B' train of auxiliary feedwater had its emergency water source. The auxiliary feedwater system would have been able to fulfill its safety function. This event is not reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (O'Keefe).
"A pinhole leak was discovered on B train Essential Service Water (ESW) system piping while preparing the pipe surface for non-destructive examination. Control room personnel were notified of the leak at 1435. B ESW was immediately declared inoperable. At the time of control room notification, surveillance testing on the Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump (TDAFP) was in progress. This surveillance testing made the TDAFP inoperable and non-functional. The surveillance activities were terminated and the TDAFP was returned to operable status at 1438.
"B ESW is the safety related water source for B train of auxiliary feedwater (AFW). For the three minute period between notification of the pinhole leak until the TDAFP was restored to operable status, there were two auxiliary feed pumps inoperable. This met the conditions for entry into T/S LCO Action 3.7.5.D which requires a plant shut down to Hot Standby within 6 hours. This action was exited when the TDAFP surveillance testing was terminated. Additionally, with 2 of 3 auxiliary feedwater pumps non-functional for 3 minutes, there was a condition which could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function for those 3 minutes."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1555 EDT ON 5/4/07 FROM KEITH DUNCAN TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee provided the following information as the basis for retracting this report:
"On March 14, 2007, (Event Number 43240) Callaway Plant reported a condition that, at the time, was believed to be a condition which could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function. At that time the 'A' motor driven auxiliary feedwater pump (MDAPP) was operable, the turbine driven auxiliary feedwater pump was not functional because of a surveillance test in progress. The 'B' MDAFP was presumed to be non-functional because of a pinhole leak in the 'B' train essential service water (ESW) system piping. 'B' ESW is the safety related water source for the 'B' MDAFP.
"Subsequent inspection, non-destructive examination, analysis and evaluation of the 'B' train ESW piping determined that the structural integrity of the pipe was retained. 'B' ESW pump was able to provide the required flow to the train. 'B' train ESW was functional with the pinhole leak. With the 'B' ESW train functional, the 'B' train of auxiliary feedwater had its emergency water source. The auxiliary feedwater system would have been able to fulfill its safety function. This event is not reportable per 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4DO (O'Keefe).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 43241
Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: GEOTECHNICAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS
Region: 4
City: PHOENIX State: AZ
County:
License #: 07-402
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM WRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: GEOTECHNICAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSULTANTS
Region: 4
City: PHOENIX State: AZ
County:
License #: 07-402
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM WRIGHT
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/15/2007
Notification Time: 13:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2007
Event Time: 17:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2007
Notification Time: 13:45 [ET]
Event Date: 03/14/2007
Event Time: 17:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
GREG MORELL (FSME)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT ON DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"At approximately 8:30 AM, March 15, 2007, the Agency was informed that a Density Moisture Gauge had been run over by a large steel compacting roller which crushed the gauge. This had occurred at approximately 5:30 PM on March 14, 2007. It appeared that when it occurred, the operating rod was in the safe position and the source was shielded. During the attempt to retrieve the gauge, the source fell out of the shielded position and the internal sources fell out of the capsule. These were retrieved from the site and placed along with the crushed gauge into the transport container and returned to the office of the licensee. Wipe tests were taken and no spreadable contamination was noted.
"The Agency is currently inspecting the licensee and will continue follow-up evaluations as necessary. "
State Report # 07-05
* * * UPDATE FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA (VIA FAX) TO HUFFMAN AT 14:04 EDT ON 3/16/07 * * *
"The Agency performed an inspection of the broken gauge and source at the licensee's office on the morning of March 15, 2007. The broken gauge and source were removed from the Troxler transport case and the broken Cs-137 source and AmBe/241 source were examined and wipe tested. The sources and broken gauge were returned to the transport case, stored in the gauge storage room with additional shielding material placed around it and locked up awaiting shipping and transport containers from Troxler. A field survey of the site where the gauge was run over was conducted again and no radioactive material was detected. Initial wipe test data from the two sources indicates no spreadable radioactive contamination. Discussion with the licensee indicates that exposure to the gauge technician during source retrieval was minimized."
R4DO (Shannon) and FSME EO (Giitter) notified.
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"At approximately 8:30 AM, March 15, 2007, the Agency was informed that a Density Moisture Gauge had been run over by a large steel compacting roller which crushed the gauge. This had occurred at approximately 5:30 PM on March 14, 2007. It appeared that when it occurred, the operating rod was in the safe position and the source was shielded. During the attempt to retrieve the gauge, the source fell out of the shielded position and the internal sources fell out of the capsule. These were retrieved from the site and placed along with the crushed gauge into the transport container and returned to the office of the licensee. Wipe tests were taken and no spreadable contamination was noted.
"The Agency is currently inspecting the licensee and will continue follow-up evaluations as necessary. "
State Report # 07-05
* * * UPDATE FROM THE STATE OF ARIZONA (VIA FAX) TO HUFFMAN AT 14:04 EDT ON 3/16/07 * * *
"The Agency performed an inspection of the broken gauge and source at the licensee's office on the morning of March 15, 2007. The broken gauge and source were removed from the Troxler transport case and the broken Cs-137 source and AmBe/241 source were examined and wipe tested. The sources and broken gauge were returned to the transport case, stored in the gauge storage room with additional shielding material placed around it and locked up awaiting shipping and transport containers from Troxler. A field survey of the site where the gauge was run over was conducted again and no radioactive material was detected. Initial wipe test data from the two sources indicates no spreadable radioactive contamination. Discussion with the licensee indicates that exposure to the gauge technician during source retrieval was minimized."
R4DO (Shannon) and FSME EO (Giitter) notified.