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Event Notification Report for January 23, 2007

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

Event Reports For
01/22/2007 - 01/23/2007

** EVENT NUMBERS **


43105 43106 43111 43113

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General Information or Other Event Number: 43105
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: BRISTOL MEYERS SQUIBB MEDICAL IMAGING
Region: 1
City: NORTH BILLERICA State: MA
County:
License #: 60-0088
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOHN SUMARES
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 01/16/2007
Notification Time: 11:15 [ET]
Event Date: 01/14/2007
Event Time: 10:46 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/18/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
JANET SCHLUETER (NMSS)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
ILTAB (DANIS) E-MAIL ()

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MASSACHUSETTS - STOLEN Mo-99 GENERATOR

The National Response Center notified the NRC Operations Center that a 6 curie Molybdenum-99 generator was reported stolen in the State of Wisconsin. A representative of the shipment carrier along with the State of Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section provided additional details. The generator had originated at Bristol Myers Squibb in Massachusetts and was stolen from a pickup truck at the Milwaukee, WI Airport en route to Froedtert Hospital in Wisconsin. The theft was reported to the Milwaukee Sheriff's Department.

Massachusetts has assigned docket number 01-6787 to track this incident.

* * * UPDATE FROM SCHMIDT (WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION) TO KNOKE AT 1330 ON 1/18/07 * * *

A representative of the State of Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section called reporting that the material package was not stolen from the truck, but had fallen off the truck while enroute Froedtert Hospital. On 1/14/07 a private citizen had observed this event and took the material package home with him and contacted the carrier company identified on the shipping label. Because this was over the weekend no one was at the company to take the call. On 1/17/07 the citizen turned in the missing package to local police. The police subsequently brought the package to Froedtert Hospital in Wisconsin. On 1/18 the hospital evaluated the container and determined there was no damage and no contamination.

The NRC Operations Center conveyed this information to the State of Massachusetts Radiation Control Program (Sumares). Contacted R1DO (Cobey), R3DO (Peterson), NMSS (Wastler), ILTAB (email).

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

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!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor Event Number: 43106
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES BAREFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 01/18/2007
Notification Time: 21:08 [ET]
Event Date: 01/18/2007
Event Time: 16:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

BATTERY CHARGER ROOM COOLER INOPERABLE

"Entered a condition which required TS 3.0.3 entry and an 8 hour report. While the 2B RHR equipment outage was in progress, it was discovered that the 2A Battery Charger room cooler was not operating. The condition was investigated and it was found that the thermal overloads were tripped on the supply breaker. They were reset and the fan was restarted. The shift observed the fan operation for 10 minutes and then decided to check the breaker every 30 minutes until a plan could be implemented to swap trains of battery chargers. During the first 30 minute check, the breaker overloads were found tripped again. See time line below.

"This put us in a condition where an LOSF existed on both trains of RHR due to the requirement to evaluate supported systems when opposite train LCO's are entered.
02:00 2B RHR tagged out for equipment outage, entered LCO for RHR.
16:00 2A Battery Charger room cooler found not running. Entered LCO for DC sources.
16:35 Overloads reset on 2A Battery Charger room cooler supply breaker and fan restarted. LCO initially cleared, but now will conservatively be reinstated since the overloads tripped again later.
17:02 2A Battery Charger room cooler breaker thermal overloads found tripped again.
17:26 2B RHR tagged in and made available, but not yet operable (still need to perform surveillance),
17:37 Swing Battery Charger (2C) placed in service for 2A. Exited LCO for DC sources.

"LCO 3.0.3 was applicable from 16:00 until 17:37. Condition is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) 'Event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to remove residual heat.'"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION PROVIDED BY HUNTER TO KOZAL ON 1/22/07 AT 1457 EST * * *

"The eight hour report (EN #43106) per 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(b) was conservatively reported based on inconsistent operation of non-TS [Technical Specification] attendant equipment (the room cooler supplying cooling to the A-Train Battery charger) leading to the declaration of the battery charger as inoperable. However, no actual loss of safety function existed for the Unit 2 RHR Subsystem. Therefore, the eight hour report is retracted for the following reasons:

"The A-train DC battery was operable, and the A-train DC Battery Charger and DC bus were available. Procedures and training are in place for the door between the battery charger rooms to be opened to ensure sufficient cooling to the A train DC switchgear room. The time for room temperature heat-up allows for operator actions and the rooms and entry/exit pathways are accessible for operators to perform these actions during normal operations and design basis events. The battery charger room temperature was 86F upon discovery which is well within the equipment capability. Therefore, the battery charger room cooler system was available to provide cooling for the long term design basis accident.

"Technical specification 3.5.2, Condition A was entered due to the Unit 2 B-Train RHR pump scheduled equipment outage. During the entire time that the Unit 2 B-Train RHR pump was inoperable and out of service, the Unit 2 A-Train RHR pump would have performed its required function to supply sufficient flow during an accident (it was declared inoperable due to an inoperable DC support system, but remained available). Condition A allows one or more ECCS trains to be inoperable provided that 'at least 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train' is available. Even with the battery charger room cooler non-functional, the A-Train RHR pump would have performed its safety function and combined with the A-Train charging pump, would have delivered 100% of the ECCS flow equivalent to a single OPERABLE ECCS train.

"In summary, a loss of safety function on both trains of RHR did not exist and the 50.72(b)(3)(v)(b) report (EN # 43106) is retracted."

Notified R2DO (HAAG).

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Other Nuclear Material Event Number: 43111
Rep Org: CAMDEN IRON AND METAL
Licensee: CAMDEN IRON AND METAL
Region: 1
City: CAMDEN State: NJ
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MIKE BUTTIL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 01/22/2007
Notification Time: 09:38 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/2007
Event Time: 07:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
BENJAMIN SANDLER (TAS)

This material event contains a "Less than Cat 3" level of radioactive material.

Event Text

STOLEN ALLOY ANALYZER

A Niton Alloy Analyzer was stolen probably after midnight on 1/22/2007 (it snowed late last night and there were tracks in the snow). The hand-held gun type analyzer was locked in a case similar to a suitcase. To prevent unauthorized use, a code number is also required to use the analyzer. No other material was stolen. The Camden police were notified.

Model: XLP818Q
Serial number: 6406
Source: 30 milliCurie Cd/Am-241

Camden Police Report Case: 070122-044

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source.

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Power Reactor Event Number: 43113
Facility: VERMONT YANKEE
Region: 1 State: VT
Unit: [1] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: MIKE RAMSEY
HQ OPS Officer: JASON KOZAL
Notification Date: 01/22/2007
Notification Time: 22:42 [ET]
Event Date: 01/22/2007
Event Time: 19:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/22/2007
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
MARIE MILLER (R1)

Unit SCRAM Code RX CRIT Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation

Event Text

HPCI DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO FAULTY FLOW INDICATOR

The licensee discovered that the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system flow control loop was degraded in such a manner that HPCI would not perform its safety function. The HPCI loop flow indicator indicated 200 GPM with no flow in the loop. The specification for that parameter is <100GPM. With the flow indicator in this condition the HPCI flow controller would perform non-conservatively (less flow into the system than was demanded), and would not perform its intended safety function therefore rendering HPCI inoperable.

The licensee declared HPCI inoperable and in accordance with Technical Specification 3.5.E.2 entered a 14 day LCO. The licensee has commenced troubleshooting and will initiate repairs as necessary to return the system to operation.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

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Thursday, March 29, 2012