| U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center Event Reports For
12/21/2005 - 12/22/2005 ** EVENT NUMBERS ** |
 | !!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED. THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!! | | Power Reactor | Event Number: 42109 | Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [1] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES STALZER
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 11/02/2005
Notification Time: 01:13 [ET]
Event Date: 11/01/2005
Event Time: 23:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
| Person (Organization):
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation | Event Text TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO DEGRADATION OF CONTAINMENT COATINGS
"On November 2, 2005 at approximately 00:00 Central Standard Time (CST), Point Beach Nuclear Plant (PBNP) Unit 2 commenced a reactor shutdown required by Technical Specification 3.0.3.
"During a review of the containment coatings in both Unit 1 & 2 containments, it was discovered that the containments have not been maintained with the analysis of record performed by Sergeant and Lundy (S&L). The S&L analysis performed for Unit 2 was based on the known condition of coatings when the analysis was performed. There was no explicit margin for further degradation. Subsequent discoveries of degraded or unqualified coatings cannot be accommodated by the existing analysis as written.
"An Operability Recommendation (OPR) was performed for Unit 2 and approved on 10/30/05 at 2000. Following this OPR, a further review of containment coatings in the Unit 2 containment was performed and showed a potential for approximately 11 square feet of unqualified coatings [in] the Zone of Influence (ZOI) for the containment sump. The OPR allowed for a maximum of 5.68 square feet of loose material in the ZOI.
A Unit 2 containment walk-down was performed on the evening of November 1, 2005. This revealed that the unqualified coatings in the ZOI were approximately 11 square feet. This information placed Unit 2 in an unanalyzed condition, which lead the operators to enter Technical Specification 3.0.3 at 2300 on November 1 due to both trains of Emergency Core Cooling System (ECCS) being declared inoperable for sump recirculation capability.
"Actions are currently underway to remove enough unqualified coatings to be within the assumptions made in the OPR and restore Containment Sump recirculation capability. When this is completed, the technical specification shutdown will be terminated, and Unit 2 will make preparations to return to full power.
"Unit 1 is currently in Mode 5 and ECCS is not required. However, the condition is also applicable to Unit 1 containment. Actions have been underway since the identification of the original issue to remove unqualified containment coatings. The Plant Manager has placed a hold on entering Mode 4 on Unit 1 pending completion of corrective actions."
Presently there are 2 workers and a Radiation Protection technician inside containment. The licensee said that workers will go inside containment and remove the degraded coating. This will take approximately 45 minutes and have a total exposure to personnel of 85 millirem.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
*** UPDATE FROM C. STALZER TO J. KNOKE AT 03:15 ON 11/02/05 ***
At 01:06 CST the licensee exited from Technical Specification 3.0.3. requirements and plans to hold power on Unit 2 at 97% power pending further assessment and evaluation.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified the R3DO (Kozak).
* * * RETRACTION FROM E. SCHULTZ TO W. GOTT AT 1712 ON 12/21/05 * * *
"On November 2, 2005, at 01:13 [ET] PBNP submitted Emergency Notification #42109, to report a TS required shutdown due to potential of an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety and an event or condition that potentially could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function. The condition related to the discovery of degraded containment coatings in the zone of influence (ZOI) for the containment sump.
"A subsequent evaluation concluded that the degraded coatings would not have significantly affected sump recirculation flow capability. Additionally, the zone of influence was identified to be approximately one-third that assumed for the design-basis calculation. Based on the conservatism in the sump blockage analysis, the degraded coatings in the Unit 2 containment within the original ZOI did not affect the conclusion that equipment needed for accident mitigation would have operated as designed.
"Therefore, the Emergency Notification made on November 2, 2005, documenting that this condition created the potential of an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, and potentially could have prevented the fulfillment of a safety function, is retracted. The Technical Specification required shutdown is also retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (H. Peterson). |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42209 | Rep Org: OHIO BUREAU OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF DAYTON
Region: 3
City: DAYTON State: OH
County:
License #: 03620580000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: STEPHEN JAMES
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 12/16/2005
Notification Time: 14:16 [ET]
Event Date: 05/18/2004
Event Time: [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/16/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
BECK KARAS (NMSS)
E-MAIL (TAS)
| Event Text OHIO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF TRITIUM FOIL SOURCE
The State provided the following information via email:
"Licensee had submitted license renewal application. RFI from ODH requested info on disposition of sources to be removed from the license. One H-3 foil source from a Varian Aerograph ECD was reported as having been disposed of on May 18, 2004. When asked to produce documentation, the licensee went back to their copy of the waste shipping manifest to find reference to the H-3 source. However, this source was not referenced on the manifest as being included in the shipment on the licensee's copy. The licensee has contacted the waste broker to investigate whether this source had been included in the waste shipment. Source was purchased in the late 1970's and was removed from service and placed in storage in the late 1990's. The source is now calculated to have an activity of 232 millicuries. The licensee will file a written report to ODH as required by Ohio regulations."
This source was part of an electron capture detector, Varian model 02-1681-01.
Ohio Item Number: OH050008
Notified the R3DO (Burgess), NMSS (Karas) and TAS (via E-mail).
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| General Information or Other | Event Number: 42210 | Rep Org: ARIZONA RADIATION REGULATORY AGENCY
Licensee: QUALITY TESTING, LLC
Region: 4
City: TEMPE State: AZ
County:
License #: AZ 7-491
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: AUBREY GODWIN
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY | Notification Date: 12/16/2005
Notification Time: 16:20 [ET]
Event Date: 12/16/2005
Event Time: 09:30 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/16/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
AGREEMENT STATE
| Person (Organization):
CLAUDE JOHNSON (R4)
BECK KARAS (NMSS)
E-MAIL (TAS)
MEXICO (E-MAIL) ()
| Event Text ARIZONA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
"At approximately 9:30 AM December 16, 2005, the Agency was informed by the Licensee that a Troxler Model 3411B Portable Gauge, SN 17964 had been stolen from the back of an employee's pick up truck. The theft occurred between 2:00 - 4:30 AM December 16, 2005. The gauge contains 8 mCi (millicuries) of Cesium-137 and 40 mCi (millicuries) AM:Be-241.
"Phoenix PD is investigating and has issued report number 2005-52380969
"The Licensee is offering a $500.00 reward for the recovery of the truck and sources. A press release is to be made.
"The Agency continues to investigate.
"The states of CA, NV, CO, UT, and NM and Mexico and U.S. NRC and FBI are being notified of this event."
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42215 | Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE | Notification Date: 12/21/2005
Notification Time: 14:01 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2005
Event Time: 08:05 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID PRIMARY CONTAINMENT ISOLATION SYSTEM (PCIS) ACTUATION
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting more than one system.
"On November 15, 2005, while operating at 100% thermal power, at 08:05 hours CST, Browns Ferry Unit 2 incurred an inadvertent, invalid actuation of the PCIS Group 6 logic. One reactor zone ventilation exhaust radiation monitor (the B channel) was indicating downscale due to a pre-existing maintenance issue, and, during activities to formally place the channel in a tripped status in accordance with the applicable Technical Specifications, the PCIS logic fuse for the opposite (A channel) radiation monitor was inadvertently removed rather than the fuse for the B channel. The PCIS logic responded as designed to the condition of both radiation monitors being downscale, and a Group 6 logic actuation resulted. The actuation was invalid because it resulted from an error related to an equipment tagging activity; there were no actual plant conditions which required the associated equipment actuations/isolations to occur.
"The following equipment actuations/isolations occurred: Unit 2 Group 6
* Initiation of the Standby Gas Treatment System
* Initiation of Control Room Emergency Ventilation
* Isolation of the following equipment:
* reactor zone and refuel zone normal ventilation systems
* drywell-torus differential pressure compressor
* drywell-torus Hydrogen/Oxygen analyzers
* drywell radiation continuous air particulate monitor
"All equipment responded in accordance with the plant design. There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for resolution."
The NRC senior resident inspector has been notified. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42216 | Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [ ] [2] [ ]
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: RICHARD WELLS
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT | Notification Date: 12/21/2005
Notification Time: 16:27 [ET]
Event Date: 12/06/2005
Event Time: 23:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/21/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
PAUL FREDRICKSON (R2)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 86 | Power Operation | 86 | Power Operation | Event Text INVALID SPECIFIED SYSTEM ACTUATION - "A" AUXILIARY FEEDWATER
"This report is being made in lieu of an LER per the guidance of 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). The `A' train Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater pump received an invalid auto-start signal due to a failed safeguards driver board in the A train Solid State Protection System (SSPS). This was a complete actuation of the 'A' train of auxiliary feedwater, and all components functioned as designed. The pump was manually secured and no other systems were affected. The plant entered an 8 hour LCO for an inoperable train of SSPS. The safeguards driver board was replaced and the plant exited the LCO. Investigation of the cause of the card failure is in progress."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. |
| Power Reactor | Event Number: 42217 | Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [2] [ ] [ ]
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN RYAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ | Notification Date: 12/22/2005
Notification Time: 03:20 [ET]
Event Date: 12/22/2005
Event Time: 02:08 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/22/2005 | Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
| Person (Organization):
BRIAN MCDERMOTT (R1)
|
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX CRIT | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode | | 2 | N | Y | 67 | Power Operation | 58 | Power Operation | Event Text AFW START DURING MAIN FEEDWATER PUMP TRIP
"While performing a plant shutdown due to a packing leak on #24 Feedwater Regulating Valve on 12/22/05 at 0208 at about 67% power, #22 MBFP tripped while swapping lube oil coolers. #21 and #23 motor driven auxiliary feedwater pumps auto started. All systems responded properly. Entered appropriate abnormal operating procedure (2-AOP-FW-1, Loss of Main Feedwater). Reduced power to within the capacity of one MBFP and established conditions to shutdown and realign #21 and #23 ABFPs to Auto. On 12/22/05 at 0218, #21 and #23 ABFPs were shutdown and aligned for automatic operation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. | |