Event Notification Report for October 07, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/06/2005 - 10/07/2005
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 42045
Rep Org: BRAUN INTERTEC
Licensee: BRAUN INTERTEC
Region: 3
City: BLOOMINGTON State: MN
County:
License #: 22-16537-02
Agreement: N
Docket: 03021059
NRC Notified By: GREG EBELING
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: BRAUN INTERTEC
Region: 3
City: BLOOMINGTON State: MN
County:
License #: 22-16537-02
Agreement: N
Docket: 03021059
NRC Notified By: GREG EBELING
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/07/2005
Notification Time: 18:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2005
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2005
Notification Time: 18:05 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2005
Event Time: 10:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
E. WILLIAM BRACH (NMSS)
RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA SOURCE TEMPORARILY UNABLE TO RETRACT
When performing radiography at Marathon Petroleum located in St. Paul Park, MN, a radiography source was unable to be fully retracted due to a dent in the guide tube tip caused by a collimator set screw. The camera is an AEA Model 660B Serial # B1839 which contains a 22 curie Iridium-192 source. The licensee personnel called their radiation safety officer (RSO) who assessed the situation. The RSO using shielding and other equipment was able to unscrew the guide tube tip with the collimator attached to allow the source to retract. There were no personnel overexposures. The licensee checked their remaining guide tube tips to ensure that the same problem did not exist on the other tips.
The Licensee notified Region 3.
When performing radiography at Marathon Petroleum located in St. Paul Park, MN, a radiography source was unable to be fully retracted due to a dent in the guide tube tip caused by a collimator set screw. The camera is an AEA Model 660B Serial # B1839 which contains a 22 curie Iridium-192 source. The licensee personnel called their radiation safety officer (RSO) who assessed the situation. The RSO using shielding and other equipment was able to unscrew the guide tube tip with the collimator attached to allow the source to retract. There were no personnel overexposures. The licensee checked their remaining guide tube tips to ensure that the same problem did not exist on the other tips.
The Licensee notified Region 3.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42110
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: RONALD HARRINGTON
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PAUL UNDERWOOD
HQ OPS Officer: RONALD HARRINGTON
Notification Date: 11/02/2005
Notification Time: 12:46 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2005
Event Time: 10:37 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/02/2005
Notification Time: 12:46 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2005
Event Time: 10:37 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/02/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
DAVID AYRES (R2)
DAVID AYRES (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION
"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) system checked above. NUREG1022 Revision 2 identifies the Information that needs to be reported as discussed below.
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.
"On October 7, 2005, at 10:01 EDT, a procedure was started to calibrate the Unit 2 Refueling Floor Vent Exhaust radiation monitors 2D11K611C and K611D. Monitor K611C was tested and restored, and K611D was being tested in the tripped condition. At 10:37, the K611C monitor received a momentary, spurious high radiation signal, or spike. As per design, the high radiation signal resulted in the following automatic actions: Group 2 primary containment isolation valves closed, secondary containment isolated, and both Unit 1 and 2 A and B trains of Standby Gas Treatment initiated. The initiation signal was invalid because it did not result in response to an actual high radiation condition, nor did it trip as a result of any other requirement for initiation of the safety function, such as a downscale or inoperable trip, for example.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
"The four Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) trains auto started and both Unit 1 and 2 secondary containment fully isolated. This is a complete actuation. The primary containment isolation valve Group 2 isolation was outboard valves only. This is a partial actuation.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
"The above systems functioned successfully."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The following information is provided as a 60 day telephone notification to NRC under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) in lieu of submitting a written LER to report a condition that resulted in an invalid actuation of the 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B) system checked above. NUREG1022 Revision 2 identifies the Information that needs to be reported as discussed below.
"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.
"On October 7, 2005, at 10:01 EDT, a procedure was started to calibrate the Unit 2 Refueling Floor Vent Exhaust radiation monitors 2D11K611C and K611D. Monitor K611C was tested and restored, and K611D was being tested in the tripped condition. At 10:37, the K611C monitor received a momentary, spurious high radiation signal, or spike. As per design, the high radiation signal resulted in the following automatic actions: Group 2 primary containment isolation valves closed, secondary containment isolated, and both Unit 1 and 2 A and B trains of Standby Gas Treatment initiated. The initiation signal was invalid because it did not result in response to an actual high radiation condition, nor did it trip as a result of any other requirement for initiation of the safety function, such as a downscale or inoperable trip, for example.
"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.
"The four Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) trains auto started and both Unit 1 and 2 secondary containment fully isolated. This is a complete actuation. The primary containment isolation valve Group 2 isolation was outboard valves only. This is a partial actuation.
"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.
"The above systems functioned successfully."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.