Event Notification Report for August 31, 2005

POTENTIAL RELEASE OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL AT SCENE OF VEHICLE ACCIDENT

The U.S. Coast Guard National Response Center (NRC) was informed by a representative of Cardinal Health Nuclear Pharmacy Services located in Dublin, OH, that one of their commercial trucks operating in Kansas City, MO, was involved in a fatality (driver) accident. The reporting party (representative) noted that there was a potential release of approximately 200 millicuries Technetium-99m due to the accident, however, this could not be confirmed since the police are treating the location as a crime scene. The U.S.C.G. NRC notified NRC Region III Office and various federal agencies including DOT, EPA and HHS.

UNIT 3 EXPERIENCED AN AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DURING ROUTINE TESTING

"Event: At 1428 hours on 8/31/2005, Oconee Unit 3 tripped. A routine test of the alternate power source for the Control Rod Drive System was in progress when power to the Control Rod Drive system was interrupted, which resulted in a reactor trip. AC power transferred to the Start-up source (switchyard). Normally the Main Steam Header pressure control setpoint is automatically increased for post-trip RCS temperature control. This did not occur. As a result the RCS cooled down to approximately 536F (versus a normal post-trip temperature of approximately 555F), reducing RCS pressure to the actuation setpoint for Engineered Safeguards Channels 1 and 2. This started the High Pressure Injection pumps in ECCS mode, caused partial containment isolation and initiated start-up of both Keowee Hydro Units (emergency power). Because Start-up power was available, Keowee did not supply power but remained in stand-by. At 1433 hours Operators terminated ECCS injection.

"Initial Safety Significance: Because RCS pressure decreased below normal post-trip levels which resulted in an ECCS actuation, this is considered an abnormal transient. Unit 3 has been stabilized and at this time the actual event is considered to have low safety significance. The exact cause of the loss of power to the Control Rod Drive system is unknown, but is under investigation. It is suspected that that loss also resulted in the failure of the Main Steam Header Pressure to shift to the post-trip Main Steam pressure control setpoint.

"Corrective Action(s): Operations stabilized Unit 3. A post-trip investigation is in progress, per site procedures and directives."

All control rods fully inserted as a result of the reactor trip. No primary or secondary reliefs or PORVs lifted. Pressurizer level decreased off-scale low and was recovered prior to securing the High Pressure Injection pumps (the licensee estimates approximately 3000 gallons was injected). Current RCS temp is 542F (Tave) with RCS pressure in the normal post-trip band. Decay heat is being removed by the Steam Generators to Condenser through the Turbine Bypass Valves. Main Feedwater remained in service during the transient.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and does not plan a press release at this time.

* * *UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (NIX) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) @ 2156 EDT ON 8/31/05 * * *

"During this event, the Engineering Safeguards (ES) System was manually bypassed at 14:33 on 8-31-05 to restore both High Pressure Injection (HPI) System trains to a normal lineup following an ES-initiated safety injection. Manually bypassing ES for both trains of HPI required entry into Tech Spec 3.0.3 at 15:33 on 8-31-05. Tech Spec 3.0.3 requires shutdown of Unit 3 to Mode 3 by 03:33 on 9-1-05 and to Mode 4 by 09:33 on 9-1-05. This condition was discovered to apply at 21:15 on 8-31-05.

"Initial Safety Significance: Units 1 and 2 remain at 100% power with no issues following the Unit 3 ES Actuation and Keowee Hydro Unit emergency start. Unit 3 remains in Mode 3. No other safety systems have actuated or exhibited abnormal behavior. Therefore, the safety significance of this condition is LOW.

"Corrective Action(s): Restore ES System to Automatic for the HPI System."

The licensee reported this under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2) (i), Technical Specification Shutdown.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Lesser) notified.

INVALID ACTUATION OF AN EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR

"This telephone notification to report an invalid actuation is provided in accordance with 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1), which states, 'In the case of an invalid actuation reported under Sec. 50.73(a)(2)(iv), other than actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical, the licensee may, at its option, provide a telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center within 60 days after discovery of the event instead of submitting a written LER.' The specific reporting requirement in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A), states, 'Any event or condition that resulted in manual or automatic actuation of any of the systems listed in paragraph (a)(2)(iv)(B).' For this report, the affected system was the emergency AC electrical power systems as listed in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B)(8). Specifically, the Train A emergency diesel generator (EDG) automatically started due to an invalid system actuation.

"On August 31, 2005, at approximately 1805 hours (EDT), with H. B. Robinson Steam Electric Plant (HBRSEP), Unit No. 2, operating in MODE 1 at approximately 100% power, the Train A EDG automatically started from the standby condition. The EDG did not automatically connect to the associated emergency bus (E-1), because no E-1 bus undervoltage (UV) signal was present. The automatic start was caused by a failed solenoid-operated valve (SOV) in the air start system for the EDG (valve number DA-23A). The SOV failed-open, which is the designed failure-mode condition for this valve. This admitted air to the EDG air-start distributor, which started the Train A EDG. No additional failures or abnormalities were noted. The Train A EDG successfully started and achieved the required speed and voltage, but as stated previously, the EDG did not load because no UV signal was present on the associated bus.

"The Train B EDG remained operable during this event. Also, the EDGs each have two starting SOVs that are in parallel in the starting air system. A start signal or a loss of power to either valve is sufficient to start the associated EDG.

"The failed SOV was replaced. The Train A EDG was tested after replacement of the SOV and returned to service at 1016 hours on September 1, 2005.

"The invalid EDG start was entered into the corrective action program for HBRSEP, Unit No. 2. The investigation of this event has been completed. The results of the investigation determined that the EDG start was caused by a short-circuit failure of the coil for the SOV. Additional corrective actions for this condition, beyond replacement of the failed SOV, are in progress and are being tracked via the corrective action program."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST NUCLEAR GAUGES

"Agency received notification of two found devices. The devices were found to belong to Alcoa Alumina Atlantic in Point Comfort. An on-site investigation at the licensee's facility was performed on 09/06-09/07/05, by two TX Radiation Control (RC) inspectors, who subsequently found that there was actually an inventory total of six devices that were missing from the Alcoa facility (all Texas Nuclear, Model 5192 gauges, with 20 milliCuries of Cs-137). The licensee stated that the six device/gauges were removed from the plant equipment [area] over the period of October 2003-October 2004, and placed into storage. They maintain that they do not know how or when two of the devices/gauges were taken from the facility as scrap metal for recycling, and do not know the location of the other four devices/gauge.

"The devices/gauges that have been found are: one (Serial Number B1683) at Nucor Steel Texas Division, Highway 79, Jewett, Texas 75846 (TX RAM L02504), and two (Serial NumberB1686) at GSD Trading USA, Inc. scrap yard, Houston, Texas. Nucor Steel has bee directed by TX Radiation Control to hold on to all scrap metal received from Alcoa. GSD has been surveying all scrap metal received from Alcoa for radiation detection. Impoundment orders were issued from TX Radiation Control on 09/09/05, for TX Radiation Control's RSO, to take possession of all radioactive devices containing Cs-137 at Nucor Steel and all radioactive material, excluding RAM exempt under 25 TAC §289 and naturally occurring material (NORM) possessed under a general license that is found at the GSD facility. All materials taken in possession by RC's RSO will be temporarily stored at RC headquarters in Austin, Texas.

"The four devices/gauges that were determined to be missing are: Manufacturer: Texas Nuclear, Model 5192 with the respective Serial Numbers: B1682, B1684 B1685, & B1687. Efforts are still being made to recover the remaining missing four gauges.

"Texas Incident No. I-8258"

Less than the quantity of an IAEA Category 3 source.

Sources that are 'Less than IAEA Category 3 sources,' are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.

For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.