Event Notification Report for May 09, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
05/08/2005 - 05/09/2005
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41680
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BARRY COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BARRY COLEMAN
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 05/09/2005
Notification Time: 18:35 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2005
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2005
Notification Time: 18:35 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2005
Event Time: 18:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
MARK LESSER (R2)
MARK LESSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
FAILURE OF THE SAFETY PARAMETERS DISPLAY SYSTEM (SPDS)
"The Unit 1 and Unit 2 SPDS systems are out of service and have been out of service since 05-07-2005 at 22:00 for Unit 1 and 1800 for Unit 2.
"The SPDS is a part of the Hatch Emergency Plan as described in Section H of the plan.
"Alternate sources for many of the points in SPDS are available in the main control room. Consequently, with much of this information available in the control room, and communications between the emergency facilities also available, emergency assessment capabilities are maintained. However, since the SPDS units have been out of service for approximately 44 hours, this is being reported under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) and under the guidance of NUREG-1022, section 3.2.13, 'Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities.'
"Until today the systems could be rebooted to obtain data when needed."
The systems were intermittently available throughout the weekend and completely failed on 5/9/2005. Plant maintenance is working "around the clock" to restore SPDS capabilities.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (COLEMAN) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) AT 1113 EDT ON 5/10/05 * * *
The licensee reports that both Unit 1 and Unit 2 SPDS systems were returned to service at 2200 EDT on 5/9/05. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Lesser) notified.
"The Unit 1 and Unit 2 SPDS systems are out of service and have been out of service since 05-07-2005 at 22:00 for Unit 1 and 1800 for Unit 2.
"The SPDS is a part of the Hatch Emergency Plan as described in Section H of the plan.
"Alternate sources for many of the points in SPDS are available in the main control room. Consequently, with much of this information available in the control room, and communications between the emergency facilities also available, emergency assessment capabilities are maintained. However, since the SPDS units have been out of service for approximately 44 hours, this is being reported under the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) and under the guidance of NUREG-1022, section 3.2.13, 'Loss of Emergency Preparedness Capabilities.'
"Until today the systems could be rebooted to obtain data when needed."
The systems were intermittently available throughout the weekend and completely failed on 5/9/2005. Plant maintenance is working "around the clock" to restore SPDS capabilities.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (COLEMAN) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) AT 1113 EDT ON 5/10/05 * * *
The licensee reports that both Unit 1 and Unit 2 SPDS systems were returned to service at 2200 EDT on 5/9/05. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R2DO (Lesser) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41681
Facility: PALISADES
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: FLOYD LAWRENCE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: FLOYD LAWRENCE
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 05/09/2005
Notification Time: 20:03 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2005
Event Time: 19:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2005
Notification Time: 20:03 [ET]
Event Date: 05/09/2005
Event Time: 19:46 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/10/2005
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
FRANK GILLESPIE (NRR)
TIM MCGINTY (IRD)
MARK SATORIUS (R3)
ROBERT LERCH (R3)
KENNETH RIEMER (R3)
FRANK GILLESPIE (NRR)
TIM MCGINTY (IRD)
MARK SATORIUS (R3)
ROBERT LERCH (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED
"Emergency Category: Primary Coolant System Integrity
"Appears leak has been isolated."
The plant was performing a SI (Safety Injection) accumulator bottle sampling test. At the conclusion of the test, a valve failed to close which caused excessive pressure in a line. When the pressure source was isolated, thermal expansion occurred which pushed some fluid through the Primary Coolant System check valves into the primary coolant system. When the system was depressurized to relieve the pressure, the primary coolant check valve failed to reseat. As a result, approximately 90 gals of primary coolant back flowed through the primary check valve over a two minute period. The leakage was stopped when the line was isolated remotely from the control room.
The plant is still in the unusual event. The exit criteria is a tech spec leak rate calculation to verify that primary coolant leakage is less than the tech spec allowed value which will take approximately three hours to complete.
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE P. RHODES TO J. KNOKE ON 05/10/05 AT 00:15 EDT * * *
At 00:11 EDT on 05/10/05 the licensee terminated their Unusual Event for Primary Coolant System integrity. The present leak rate is 0.018 gal/min, which is within the allowable Technical Specification limit of <1 gal/min for unidentified primary coolant leakage. There is an LCO (72 hrs) for the primary coolant system check valve that improperly reseated (CK-ES-3131).
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Riemer), NRR EO (Gillespie), IRD Manager (McGinty), DHS (A. Akers) and FEMA (K. Biscoe).
"Emergency Category: Primary Coolant System Integrity
"Appears leak has been isolated."
The plant was performing a SI (Safety Injection) accumulator bottle sampling test. At the conclusion of the test, a valve failed to close which caused excessive pressure in a line. When the pressure source was isolated, thermal expansion occurred which pushed some fluid through the Primary Coolant System check valves into the primary coolant system. When the system was depressurized to relieve the pressure, the primary coolant check valve failed to reseat. As a result, approximately 90 gals of primary coolant back flowed through the primary check valve over a two minute period. The leakage was stopped when the line was isolated remotely from the control room.
The plant is still in the unusual event. The exit criteria is a tech spec leak rate calculation to verify that primary coolant leakage is less than the tech spec allowed value which will take approximately three hours to complete.
The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE P. RHODES TO J. KNOKE ON 05/10/05 AT 00:15 EDT * * *
At 00:11 EDT on 05/10/05 the licensee terminated their Unusual Event for Primary Coolant System integrity. The present leak rate is 0.018 gal/min, which is within the allowable Technical Specification limit of <1 gal/min for unidentified primary coolant leakage. There is an LCO (72 hrs) for the primary coolant system check valve that improperly reseated (CK-ES-3131).
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Riemer), NRR EO (Gillespie), IRD Manager (McGinty), DHS (A. Akers) and FEMA (K. Biscoe).