NUREG 0933
Displaying 1 - 25 of 33
DESCRIPTION Prior to 1978, operating experience with PWR steam generators was characterized by extensive corrosion and mechanically-induced degradation of the steam generator tubes, frequent plant shutdowns to repair primary-to- secondary leaks, and two …
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DESCRIPTION This item was originally identified in NUREG-0371 [1] and was later declared a USI in NUREG-0510. [2] (See Item A-3 for further details.) CONCLUSION This item was RESOLVED and requirements were established. (See Item A-3 for further details.) …
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DESCRIPTION During the course of the licensing action for North Anna Units 1 and 2, a number of questions were raised as to the potential for lamellar tearing and low fracture toughness of the steam generator and RCP support materials for these …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background Operation of a LWR results in slow corrosion of the interior metal surfaces of the primary coolant system. The resulting corrosion products circulate through the reactor core and are activated by neutron flux from the …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This NUREG-0371 [1] item involves the development of consistent and formalized acceptance criteria regarding the conversion to higher density storage racks (increased storage capacity) in existing spent fuel storage …
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DESCRIPTION At all nuclear plants, overhead cranes are used to lift heavy objects in the vicinity of spent fuel. If a heavy object such as a spent fuel shipping cask or shielding block were to fall onto spent fuel in the storage pool or reactor core …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue effects all PWR-type reactors (Westinghouse, CE, B&W). The issue as described, [1] , [2] , [3] concerns postulated accidents resulting from a steam line break which consequentially results in a steam generator …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified [1] after AEOD completed a study on internal appurtenances in LWRs. This study, AEOD/E101, [2] was initiated because of the relatively high number of LERs that described events in which internal …
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DESCRIPTION In AEOD/CO05, [1] AEOD identified potential safety problems concerning steam generator overfill due to control system failures and combined primary and secondary blowdown. As a result of discussions with the Commissioners and the EDO, NRR …
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DESCRIPTION AEOD issued a memorandum [1] in which a potential safety issue involving combined primary and secondary system LOCAs was raised. The issue was discussed at Commission meetings on October 16, 1980 and on November 10, 1980. NRR informed AEOD of …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background Following the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event at Ginna in January 1982, [1] the staff proceeded to develop generic steam generator requirements which would help mitigate or reduce steam generator tube …
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DESCRIPTION Following the SGTR event at Ginna on January 25, 1982, increased staff effort was placed on developing means to mitigate and reduce steam generator tube degradations and ruptures. To meet these objectives, two steps were taken. The first step …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background PORVs and block valves were originally designed as non-safety components in the reactor pressure control system for use only when plants are in operation. The block valves were installed because of expected leakage from …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was raised [1] by DSI/NRR in August 1982 [2] following a search of LERs which suggested that additional licensing attention was needed for certain ancillary power plant equipment. The available information …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background The risks of beyond design basis accidents in the spent fuel storage pool were examined in WASH-1400 [1] (App. I, pp. I-96ff). It was concluded that these risks were orders of magnitude below those involving the reactor …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background Once-through steam generators (OTSGs) are a feature unique to B&W reactor designs. Main feedwater is injected from a header, located at approximately mid-elevation of the OTSG, into an annular downcomer region. As the …
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DESCRIPTION In the prioritization of Issue 22, "Inadvertent Boron Dilution," it was found that inadvertent boron dilution events during cold shutdown operation do not constitute a significant risk to the public. Further work by DSI confirmed this …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background Combustible gases such as H 2 , propane, and acetylene are used during normal operations of nuclear power plants in limited quantities and for relatively short periods of time. H 2 , the most prevalent of these gases in …
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DESCRIPTION In December 1984, the staff recommended in SECY-83-357B [1] that rulemaking with regard to H 2 control for LWRs with large, dry containments could be safely deferred due to the greater inherent capability of these containments to accommodate …
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DESCRIPTION Steam generator overfill and its consequences have received staff and industry attention because of the frequency and severity of overfill events. Over the years, a number of issues have been raised concerning steam generator overfill …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified by NRR/EIB in February 1986 when it was suggested that Issue 106, "Piping and the Use of Highly Combustible Gases in Vital Areas," be expanded to include new safety concerns associated with the …
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Issue Identification The NRC identified [1] this issue in June 1992 to address an NRC staff members concern, given in a DPO dated December 3, 1991, [2] and modified March 27, 1992, [3] about the potential for a main steamline break (MSLB) accident to …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background Issue 106 was resolved with the issuance of Generic Letter 93-06, "Research Results on Generic Safety Issue 106, Piping and the Use of Highly Combustible Gases in Vital Areas," dated October 25, 1993, [1] which included …
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In resolving GSIs over the years, the staff generally found it necessary to make assumptions and establish limitations on the scope of the issues. As a result of its review of the resolution of some GSIs, the ACRS expressed concerns that the assumptions …
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In November 1992, two engineers who had previously worked under contract for the Pennsylvania Power and Light Company (PP&L) filed a report contending that the design of the Susquehanna station failed to meet regulatory requirements with respect to …
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated 3/1/2026
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