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NUREG 0933

Displaying 26 - 44 of 44

DESCRIPTION Historical Background Protection systems in nuclear power plants are required to meet the design criteria of IEEE-279, "Criteria for Protection Systems for Nuclear Power Generating Stations." [1] One of the criteria of IEEE-279 requires that …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background On two occasions (February 22 and 25, 1983), Salem Unit 1 failed to scram automatically due to failure of both reactor trip breakers to open on receipt of an actuation signal. In both cases, the unit was successfully …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified [1] when a number of concerns regarding DC power systems were raised during the review of the proposed resolution of Issue A-30, "Adequacy of Safety-Related DC Power Supplies." The main concerns …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background Reactor protection systems (RPS) or "scram" systems are tripped by many diverse signals. The purposes of these various signals can be broadly divided into three classes: protection of the reactor core (e.g., overpower …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background Issue 50 addressed several areas of concern with BWR water level instrumentation and its resolution involved voluntary implementation of water level measurement improvements for all of the staff concerns, except the one …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified in a DST/NRR memorandum [1] which addressed a condition in which some protective devices intended to trip active engineered safety features (ESF) components, under indication of equipment …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background In February 1983, the Westinghouse Owners Group submitted WCAP-10271, "Evaluation of Surveillance Frequencies and Out of Service Times for the Reactor Protection Instrumentation System," to the NRC for review and …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background The ATWS rule [1] , [2] for W plants requires the implementation of a diverse ATWS mitigation system, Auxiliary [or ATWS] Mitigating Systems Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC). The functions prescribed for AMSAC are turbine trip …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) incident investigation team (IIT) report on the loss of integrated control system (ICS) power event at Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified in a May 1986 DSI memorandum [1] in which 21 instances of BWR vessel draining through various paths in the RHR system piping were described. Later, in August 1986, AEOD/E609 [2] was issued …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background Potential seismic interaction involving the movable in-core flux mapping systems was identified as a generic issue in August 1985. [1] This potential interaction exists because portions of the in-core flux mapping system, …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was raised in SECY-89-170 [1] and addressed the potential for control system vulnerabilities as a result of fire-induced alternate shutdown/control room panel interactions. Concern for these interactions arose …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was raised [1] by NRR following a review of events at 3 operating BWR plants that involved inadvertent ESF actuations upon loss and subsequent restoration of power to Rosemount analog transmitter trip units …
DESCRIPTION This issue was identified [1] by NRR to address the concerns raised during the licensing of Nine Mile Point Unit 2. On February 7, 1985, Niagara Mohawk submitted to the NRC a report on "Non-Class 1E Devices Connected to Class 1E Power …
DESCRIPTION As discussed in SECY-93-049, [1] the staff reviewed significant license renewal issues and found that several related to environmental qualification (EQ). A key aspect of these issues was whether the licensing bases, particularly for older …
In resolving GSIs over the years, the staff generally found it necessary to make assumptions and establish limitations on the scope of the issues. As a result of its review of the resolution of some GSIs, the ACRS expressed concerns that the assumptions …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background The Rosemount Transmitter Review Group (RTRG) was established [1] to perform an assessment of the actions taken to address Rosemount transmitter oil-loss concerns. This assessment included an evaluation of the adequacy of …
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified by RES after concern was raised for the number of component failures in the solid state protection systems of nuclear power plants that were caused by the growth of tin whiskers. [1] In 1987, …
The objective of this task was to ensure that the man-machine interface (MMI) is adequate for the safe operation and maintenance of nuclear power plants. This objective was to be attained by developing: (1) human factors engineering guidelines for …

Page Last Reviewed/Updated 3/1/2026

Disclaimer: Some of the formatting in NUREG-0933 may not be correct. We are currently working on fixing the formatting.