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NUREG 0933
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The objective of this task was to provide instrumentation to monitor plant variables and systems during and following an accident. Indications of plant variables and status of systems important to safety are required by the plant operator (licensee) …
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TASK III.A.1: IMPROVE LICENSEE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS - SHORT-TERM The objectives of this task were to improve and upgrade licensee emergency preparedness by requiring improvements in facilities, plans, procedures, offsite support, technical assistance, …
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The objective of this task was to upgrade the emergency preparedness of nuclear power plants. Specific criteria to meet this objective were delineated in NUREG-0654. [1] ITEM III.A.2.1: AMEND 10 CFR 50 AND 10 CFR 50, APPENDIX E The four parts of this item …
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The objective of this task is to enable NRC, in the event of a nuclear accident at a licensed reactor facility, to: (1) monitor and evaluate the situation and potential hazards, (2) advise the licensee's operating staff as needed, and (3) in an extreme …
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The objective of this task is to upgrade the state of emergency preparedness of State and local governments affected by nuclear facilities. The Federal Emergency Management Agency was given the lead on this effort by the President on December 7, 1979. …
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The objectives of this task are: (1) to have information available for the news media and the public describing how nuclear plants operate, radiation and its health effects, and protective actions against radiation; and (2) to provide training for members …
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TASK III.D.1: RADIATION SOURCE CONTROL The objective of this task is to perform evaluations to establish additional design features that should be included in the rulemaking proceeding of Item II.B.8. The purpose of these evaluations is to identify design …
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The objective of this task was to improve public radiation protection in the event of a nuclear power plant accident by improving (1) radioactive effluent monitoring, (2) the dose analysis for accidental releases of radioiodine, tritium, and carbon-14, …
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DESCRIPTION The issue was raised after the occurrence of various incidents of water hammer that involved steam generator feedrings and piping, emergency core cooling systems, RHR systems, containment spray, service water, feedwater, and steam lines. The …
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DESCRIPTION This NUREG-0471 [1] task involves the maintenance and improvement of calculational capabilities for assessing doses to individuals from radiation and radioactive effluents from normal operation and from radioactive releases from postulated …
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DESCRIPTION Compilation of occupational radiation exposure reports from operating reactors has shown that exposures to station and contractor personnel have generally been increasing over the past 7 years for both PWRs and BWRs. The overriding problem at …
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DESCRIPTION This NUREG-0471 [1] task involves evaluating information from semiannual operating reports, inplant measurements program and topical reports, and revisions to models for calculating releases of radioactive materials in effluents from PWRs and …
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DESCRIPTION Present NRC actions taken in response to a serious incident are directed from an Incident Response Center (IRC). To implement an adequate response, it is necessary that the IRC be equipped with appropriate communications services, information …
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DESCRIPTION Practice in health impact assessments at the time of identification of this issue was to convert radiation exposure estimates into estimates of health effects, such as cancer deaths, illness, and life shortening. However, the models that were …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue is identified in Appendix D of NUREG-0572 [1] and is one of the key observations made after the ACRS requested its members and consultants to make comprehensive reviews of all Licensee Event Reports (LERs) …
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DESCRIPTION This issue was raised in an AEOD memorandum [1] to NRR and OIE in October 1980 and addressed the problem of flow blockage by Asiatic clams (Corbicula) in redundant safety-related cooling water systems at Arkansas Nuclear One. CONCLUSION This …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background On June 19, 1981, AEOD issued a preliminary report [1] on the incident at Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 in which the plant lost both redundant trains of service water when the service water system became air-bound as a result of …
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DESCRIPTION While operating at 100% power on March 10, 1980, San Onofre Unit 1 experienced a complete loss of the salt water cooling system. The event involved an unlikely triple failure and desiccant contamination of the instrument air system was found …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background On April 7, 1980, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Units 1 and 2 experienced a significant event resulting from a loss of offsite power. Although both units were safely shut down, the analysis and evaluation of the event …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was raised in a DL memorandum [1] to DST in March 1982 and addressed the subject of service water system (SWS) fouling at operating plants primarily by aquatic bivalves. Prior to and following this memorandum, …
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DESCRIPTION This issue was raised in an AEOD memorandum [1] to NRR in May 1982 and addressed the problem of flow blockage by blue mussels (Mytilus Edilus) in the reactor building closed cooling water system at Pilgrim. CONCLUSION This issue has been …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background On November 11, 1981, the DAILY REPORT-REGION I carried a "prompt report" from Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 indicating the licensee had been notified that the water tight integrity of the service water pump rooms in both …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was initiated to address concerns raised by the Union of Concerned Scientists. (References [1] , [2] , and [3] .) The purposes for including this issue as a generic issue are to: (1) provide brief background …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified [1] when the staff found the Byron Unit 1 vulnerable to core-melt sequences in the absence of the availability of Byron Unit 2 which was not yet operational. Because of the licensing status of …
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DESCRIPTION The issue, as originally proposed, [1] addressed the concern for fission product removal by the containment sprays and suppression pools in PWRs and BWRs, respectively; however, it was expanded to include PWR plants that use ice condenser …
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated 3/1/2026
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