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NUREG 0933
Displaying 1 - 21 of 21
TASK II.E.1: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM The objective of this task was to improve the reliability of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. ITEM II.E.1.1: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM EVALUATION This item was clarified in NUREG-0737, [1] requirements were …
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The objectives of this task were to perform systems reliability analyses and to effect changes in emergency operating procedures and operator training to improve the capability of plants to mitigate the consequences of the small-break LOCAs and …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This NUREG-0371 [1] item involves the development of consistent and formalized acceptance criteria regarding the conversion to higher density storage racks (increased storage capacity) in existing spent fuel storage …
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DESCRIPTION At all nuclear plants, overhead cranes are used to lift heavy objects in the vicinity of spent fuel. If a heavy object such as a spent fuel shipping cask or shielding block were to fall onto spent fuel in the storage pool or reactor core …
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DESCRIPTION This NUREG-0471 [1] task involved the preparation of a paper detailing the bases for design basis flood events utilized by the staff in case reviews, including probable maximum floods, hurricanes, tsunamis, seiches, seismically-induced dam …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue, as originally stated in 1978, [1] addressed the unavailability (at that time) of a suitable model to predict the erosion rates and, therefore, the flood hydrographs at nuclear power plant sites resulting from …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background On April 7, 1980, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Units 1 and 2 experienced a significant event resulting from a loss of offsite power. Although both units were safely shut down, the analysis and evaluation of the event …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background The containment flooding issue stems from a flooding event that occurred at the Indian Point 2 reactor in October 1980. [1] A large quantity of water leaked from fan coolers onto the containment building floor and …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background In an evaluation of INPO/NSAC Significant Operating Experience Report 81-17, [1] the operators at Fort Calhoun determined that the configuration of their plant made it susceptible to the possibility that all AFW supply …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background On November 11, 1981, the DAILY REPORT-REGION I carried a "prompt report" from Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 indicating the licensee had been notified that the water tight integrity of the service water pump rooms in both …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background The risks of beyond design basis accidents in the spent fuel storage pool were examined in WASH-1400 [1] (App. I, pp. I-96ff). It was concluded that these risks were orders of magnitude below those involving the reactor …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was recommended [1] for prioritization by DSI after a review of the AEOD engineering evaluation report (AEOD/E325) [2] on vapor binding of the AFW pumps at H.B.Robinson Unit 2. Further AEOD study of the event …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background The issue of using the most recent NOAA procedures for determining probable maximum precipitation (PMP) was raised [1] after an OL applicant disputed the NRC use of NOAA Hydrometeorological Report (HMR) Nos. 51 [2] and …
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DESCRIPTION The loss of all feedwater event at Davis-Besse on June 9, 1985, resulted in the formation of an NRC project team to investigate the event. The team's findings were published in NUREG-1154 [1] and were subsequently reviewed by DL/NRR. As a …
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DESCRIPTION In 1985, operating experience as well as staff and industry studies indicated that AFW systems continued to fail at a high rate. These studies also indicated that plants with similar AFW system reliabilities (as calculated in accordance with …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified as an alternative approach to the Finding 15 recommendation [1] discussed in Issue 125.I.5, "Safety Systems Tested in All Conditions Required by DBA," which states that "[t]horough integrated …
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In November 1992, two engineers who had previously worked under contract for the Pennsylvania Power and Light Company (PP&L) filed a report contending that the design of the Susquehanna station failed to meet regulatory requirements with respect to …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background The Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation (NRR) identified this issue in April 1999, [1] when the concern was raised that licensees operating within the regulatory guidelines of Generic Letter (GL) 85-11, Completion of …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was raised [1] , [2] by an NMSS staff member whose concern arose from the observation that spent fuel pool racks using Boral for neutron absorption had experienced some problems with swelling and degradation of …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background Spent fuel pools (SFPs) at PWRs are Seismic Category I structures that contain borated water, maintain spent fuel temperatures, and provide radiation shielding. The SFPs are typically lined with stainless steel plates, …
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DESCRIPTION This issue was identified by an NMSS engineer in December 2006 and addressed concerns about potential safety issues with cranes that are used to lift spent fuel casks at nuclear power plants. The areas of concern involved questions about the …
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated 3/1/2026
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