NUREG 0933
Displaying 1 - 25 of 32
TASK II.E.1: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM The objective of this task was to improve the reliability of the auxiliary feedwater (AFW) system. ITEM II.E.1.1: AUXILIARY FEEDWATER SYSTEM EVALUATION This item was clarified in NUREG-0737, [1] requirements were …
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The objectives of this task were to perform systems reliability analyses and to effect changes in emergency operating procedures and operator training to improve the capability of plants to mitigate the consequences of the small-break LOCAs and …
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DESCRIPTION The issue was raised after the occurrence of various incidents of water hammer that involved steam generator feedrings and piping, emergency core cooling systems, RHR systems, containment spray, service water, feedwater, and steam lines. The …
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DESCRIPTION Prior to 1978, operating experience with PWR steam generators was characterized by extensive corrosion and mechanically-induced degradation of the steam generator tubes, frequent plant shutdowns to repair primary-to- secondary leaks, and two …
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DESCRIPTION This item was originally identified in NUREG-0371 [1] and was later declared a USI in NUREG-0510. [2] (See Item A-3 for further details.) CONCLUSION This item was RESOLVED and requirements were established. (See Item A-3 for further details.) …
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DESCRIPTION During the course of the licensing action for North Anna Units 1 and 2, a number of questions were raised as to the potential for lamellar tearing and low fracture toughness of the steam generator and RCP support materials for these …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue effects all PWR-type reactors (Westinghouse, CE, B&W). The issue as described, [1] , [2] , [3] concerns postulated accidents resulting from a steam line break which consequentially results in a steam generator …
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DESCRIPTION This issue was raised in an AEOD memorandum [1] to NRR and OIE in October 1980 and addressed the problem of flow blockage by Asiatic clams (Corbicula) in redundant safety-related cooling water systems at Arkansas Nuclear One. CONCLUSION This …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified [1] after AEOD completed a study on internal appurtenances in LWRs. This study, AEOD/E101, [2] was initiated because of the relatively high number of LERs that described events in which internal …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background On June 19, 1981, AEOD issued a preliminary report [1] on the incident at Calvert Cliffs Unit 1 in which the plant lost both redundant trains of service water when the service water system became air-bound as a result of …
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DESCRIPTION In AEOD/CO05, [1] AEOD identified potential safety problems concerning steam generator overfill due to control system failures and combined primary and secondary blowdown. As a result of discussions with the Commissioners and the EDO, NRR …
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DESCRIPTION AEOD issued a memorandum [1] in which a potential safety issue involving combined primary and secondary system LOCAs was raised. The issue was discussed at Commission meetings on October 16, 1980 and on November 10, 1980. NRR informed AEOD of …
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DESCRIPTION While operating at 100% power on March 10, 1980, San Onofre Unit 1 experienced a complete loss of the salt water cooling system. The event involved an unlikely triple failure and desiccant contamination of the instrument air system was found …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background On April 7, 1980, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Units 1 and 2 experienced a significant event resulting from a loss of offsite power. Although both units were safely shut down, the analysis and evaluation of the event …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was raised in a DL memorandum [1] to DST in March 1982 and addressed the subject of service water system (SWS) fouling at operating plants primarily by aquatic bivalves. Prior to and following this memorandum, …
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DESCRIPTION This issue was raised in an AEOD memorandum [1] to NRR in May 1982 and addressed the problem of flow blockage by blue mussels (Mytilus Edilus) in the reactor building closed cooling water system at Pilgrim. CONCLUSION This issue has been …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background Following the steam generator tube rupture (SGTR) event at Ginna in January 1982, [1] the staff proceeded to develop generic steam generator requirements which would help mitigate or reduce steam generator tube …
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DESCRIPTION Following the SGTR event at Ginna on January 25, 1982, increased staff effort was placed on developing means to mitigate and reduce steam generator tube degradations and ruptures. To meet these objectives, two steps were taken. The first step …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background In an evaluation of INPO/NSAC Significant Operating Experience Report 81-17, [1] the operators at Fort Calhoun determined that the configuration of their plant made it susceptible to the possibility that all AFW supply …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background PORVs and block valves were originally designed as non-safety components in the reactor pressure control system for use only when plants are in operation. The block valves were installed because of expected leakage from …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background On November 11, 1981, the DAILY REPORT-REGION I carried a "prompt report" from Calvert Cliffs Units 1 and 2 indicating the licensee had been notified that the water tight integrity of the service water pump rooms in both …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was recommended [1] for prioritization by DSI after a review of the AEOD engineering evaluation report (AEOD/E325) [2] on vapor binding of the AFW pumps at H.B.Robinson Unit 2. Further AEOD study of the event …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background Once-through steam generators (OTSGs) are a feature unique to B&W reactor designs. Main feedwater is injected from a header, located at approximately mid-elevation of the OTSG, into an annular downcomer region. As the …
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DESCRIPTION The loss of all feedwater event at Davis-Besse on June 9, 1985, resulted in the formation of an NRC project team to investigate the event. The team's findings were published in NUREG-1154 [1] and were subsequently reviewed by DL/NRR. As a …
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DESCRIPTION In 1985, operating experience as well as staff and industry studies indicated that AFW systems continued to fail at a high rate. These studies also indicated that plants with similar AFW system reliabilities (as calculated in accordance with …
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated 3/1/2026
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