NUREG 0933
Displaying 1 - 25 of 27
The objective of this task was to improve the quality assurance program (QA) for design, construction, and operations to provide greater assurance that plant design, construction, and operational activities were conducted in a manner commensurate with …
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The objective of this task was to provide instrumentation to monitor plant variables and systems during and following an accident. Indications of plant variables and status of systems important to safety are required by the plant operator (licensee) …
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TASK II.J.1: VENDOR INSPECTION PROGRAM The objective of this task was to improve vendor-supplied components and services through a modified and more effective vendor inspection program. ITEM II.J.1.1: ESTABLISH A PRIORITY SYSTEM FOR CONDUCTING VENDOR …
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The objective of this task was to improve the qualification of licensees for operating nuclear power plants by requiring greater oversight of design, construction, and modification activities. ITEM II.J.3.1: ORGANIZATION AND STAFFING TO OVERSEE DESIGN AND …
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The objective of this task was to clarify deficiency report requirements to obtain uniform reporting and earlier identification and correction of problems. ITEM II.J.4.1: REVISE DEFICIENCY REPORTING REQUIREMENTS DESCRIPTION This TMI Action Plan [1] item …
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TASK III.A.1: IMPROVE LICENSEE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS - SHORT-TERM The objectives of this task were to improve and upgrade licensee emergency preparedness by requiring improvements in facilities, plans, procedures, offsite support, technical assistance, …
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The objective of this task was to upgrade the emergency preparedness of nuclear power plants. Specific criteria to meet this objective were delineated in NUREG-0654. [1] ITEM III.A.2.1: AMEND 10 CFR 50 AND 10 CFR 50, APPENDIX E The four parts of this item …
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The objective of this task is to enable NRC, in the event of a nuclear accident at a licensed reactor facility, to: (1) monitor and evaluate the situation and potential hazards, (2) advise the licensee's operating staff as needed, and (3) in an extreme …
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The objective of this task is to upgrade the state of emergency preparedness of State and local governments affected by nuclear facilities. The Federal Emergency Management Agency was given the lead on this effort by the President on December 7, 1979. …
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The objectives of this task are: (1) to have information available for the news media and the public describing how nuclear plants operate, radiation and its health effects, and protective actions against radiation; and (2) to provide training for members …
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DESCRIPTION Present NRC actions taken in response to a serious incident are directed from an Incident Response Center (IRC). To implement an adequate response, it is necessary that the IRC be equipped with appropriate communications services, information …
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DESCRIPTION The concern of this issue involves the requirement for verification that the balance-of-plant equipment satisfies the design intent. This issue was identified in NUREG-0705. [1] CONCLUSION Task I.F in NUREG-0660, [2] the TMI Action Plan, is a …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background Cracking has occurred in PWR piping systems as a result of stress corrosion, vibratory and thermal fatigue, and dynamic loading. However, as of February 1981, no cracking had been experienced in the primary system piping …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background Prior to 1981, the number of bolting-related incidents reported by licensees was on the increase. A large number of these were related to primary pressure boundary applications and major component support structures. As a …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background On April 7, 1980, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Units 1 and 2 experienced a significant event resulting from a loss of offsite power. Although both units were safely shut down, the analysis and evaluation of the event …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background Cracks were found in the normal make-up high pressure injection (MU/HPI) nozzles of several B&W plants following an inspection of the 8 B&W plants licensed to operate. These cracks appeared to be directly related to loose …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background PORVs and block valves were originally designed as non-safety components in the reactor pressure control system for use only when plants are in operation. The block valves were installed because of expected leakage from …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background On two occasions (February 22 and 25, 1983), Salem Unit 1 failed to scram automatically due to failure of both reactor trip breakers to open on receipt of an actuation signal. In both cases, the unit was successfully …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was initiated to address concerns raised by the Union of Concerned Scientists. (References [1] , [2] , and [3] .) The purposes for including this issue as a generic issue are to: (1) provide brief background …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was raised [1] in March 1985 to address the staff's concern that there were no requirements for dynamic qualification testing or dynamic surveillance testing of large bore hydraulic snubbers (> 50 kips load …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified in the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) incident investigation team (IIT) report on the loss of integrated control system (ICS) power event at Rancho Seco Nuclear Generating Station …
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DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified [1] by NRR after reactor operating experience and research results on MOVs, SOVs, AOVs, and HOVs indicated that testing under static conditions did not always reveal how these valves would …
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This issue has two parts that were evaluated separately. ISSUE 174.A: SONGS EMPLOYEES' CONCERN DESCRIPTION Historical Background A San Onofre Nuclear Generating Station (SONGS) employee filed a concern with the SONGS Employee Program concerning the …
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DESCRIPTION On August 24, 1992, Hurricane Andrew hit south Florida and caused extensive onsite and offsite damage at Turkey Point. Following this hurricane which was classified Category 4, an NRC/industry team was organized to: (1) review the damage …
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DESCRIPTION Core design is a fundamental component of plant safety because maintaining fuel integrity is the first principal safety barrier (i.e., fuel cladding, reactor coolant system boundary, or the containment) against serious radioactive releases. …
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Page Last Reviewed/Updated 3/1/2026
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