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NUREG 0933
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Displaying 26 - 50 of 81
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This NUREG-0471 [1] item was developed because of concerns regarding the long-term capability of hermetically- sealed instruments and equipment which must function in postaccident environments. Certain classes of …
1
DESCRIPTION This NUREG-0471 [1] item was an ACRS generic concern that initially addressed the common mode failure of identical components exposed to identical or nearly-identical conditions or environments. This concern was later expanded to include other …
1
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This concern was identified by the ACRS as a result of their review [1] of LERs covering a period from 1976 through 1978 and, subsequently, a comprehensive review of the problem was completed which covered the LERs and …
1
DESCRIPTION Historical Background In the event of a LOCA in which offsite power remains available, the reactor operator may choose to shut down the emergency diesel generators shortly after the LOCA. If, after the diesels are shut down, offsite power is …
1
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue effects all PWR-type reactors (Westinghouse, CE, B&W). The issue as described, [1] , [2] , [3] concerns postulated accidents resulting from a steam line break which consequentially results in a steam generator …
1
DESCRIPTION On November 10, 1979, an event occurred at the Oconee Power Station, Unit 3, that resulted in loss of power to a non-Class 1E 120-volt AC single-phase power panel that supplied power to the integrated control system (ICS) and the nonnuclear …
1
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This concern was raised [1] because of the potential for a high-altitude nuclear weapon detonation causing a large electromagnetic pulse (EMP) which subsequently could induce large currents and voltages in electrical …
1
DESCRIPTION In a San Onofre Unit 1 Preliminary Notification issued in September 1980, it was reported that, during testing, the licensee had identified a problem with the design of the diesel generator sequencing circuitry. This problem occurred when a …
1
DESCRIPTION This issue was identified during plant design and emergency procedure reviews which raised questions as to whether certain safety actions have to be accomplished automatically or whether manual operator action is acceptable. CONCLUSION This …
1
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue corresponds to AEOD recommendation 4 highlighted in an AEOD memorandum [1] to NRR in December 1980. The AEOD recommendation resulted from a natural circulation cooldown event from full power at St. Lucie Unit …
1
DESCRIPTION In AEOD/CO05, [1] AEOD identified potential safety problems concerning steam generator overfill due to control system failures and combined primary and secondary blowdown. As a result of discussions with the Commissioners and the EDO, NRR …
1
DESCRIPTION AEOD issued a memorandum [1] in which a potential safety issue involving combined primary and secondary system LOCAs was raised. The issue was discussed at Commission meetings on October 16, 1980 and on November 10, 1980. NRR informed AEOD of …
1
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was initiated in response to an immediate action memorandum [1] issued by AEOD in September 1981 regarding desiccant contamination of instrument air lines. NRR responded to the AEOD memorandum by establishing a …
1
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This proposed generic issue has its origin in a January 1981 event at Millstone Unit 2. [1] An operator inadvertently opened a 125V DC main feeder breaker, causing the loss of one of the two redundant emergency systems …
1
DESCRIPTION Historical Background On April 7, 1980, Arkansas Nuclear One (ANO) Units 1 and 2 experienced a significant event resulting from a loss of offsite power. Although both units were safely shut down, the analysis and evaluation of the event …
1
DESCRIPTION An AEOD memorandum [1] to NRR on July 15, 1980, identified the concern that some operating nuclear power plants do not have technical specifications or Administrative controls governing operational restrictions for Class 1E 120 VAC vital …
1
DESCRIPTION Historical Background In an AEOD memorandum [1] to NRR, it was concluded that the design of the Point Beach Nuclear Plant, Units 1 and 2, under certain conditions, allowed manual interconnection of redundant electrical load groups, thereby …
1
DESCRIPTION Historical Background In January 1982, AEOD published a report (AEOD/C201 [1] ) on safety concerns associated with reactor vessel level instrumentation in BWRs. The report was forwared to NRR for further action. Safety Significance BWRs use …
1
DESCRIPTION Historical Background In August 1982, AEOD reviewed a number of LERs related to Class 1E safety related switchgear circuit breakers and found a high incidence of their failure to close on demand. A preliminary report was written and …
1
DESCRIPTION On April 8, 1981, while operating at 100% power, the Arkansas Nuclear One, Unit 1 experienced a moderate feedwater-overfill transient in one of its once-through steam generators. AEOD performed a case study of this event, concluded that the …
1
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified at an NRC Operating Reactor Events meeting on January 7, 1982, [1] and addressed fire protection system (FPS) actuations that resulted in adverse interactions with safety-related equipment at …
1
DESCRIPTION Historical Background On two occasions (February 22 and 25, 1983), Salem Unit 1 failed to scram automatically due to failure of both reactor trip breakers to open on receipt of an actuation signal. In both cases, the unit was successfully …
1
DESCRIPTION Historical Background This issue was identified [1] when a number of concerns regarding DC power systems were raised during the review of the proposed resolution of Issue A-30, "Adequacy of Safety-Related DC Power Supplies." The main concerns …
1
DESCRIPTION Historical Background In October 1982, the Executive Director for Operations appointed the Committee to Review Safety Requirements at Power Reactors (CRSRPR) to review U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) security requirements at nuclear …
1
DESCRIPTION Historical Background In BWRs, SRVs are mounted on the main steam line inside the drywell. Each SRV discharge is piped through its own discharge line (tailpipe) to a point below the minimum water level in the primary containment suppression …
1
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